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ABSTRACT 
Foreign Policy Analysis and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy – Understanding the 
Formal and Informal Decision-Making Processes 
 
Claire Piana, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2004 
 
 
The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has witnessed important institutional 
developments since its creation in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty.  These developments have led to 
increased coherence and visibility of the CFSP in certain regions of the world.  Contrary to the 
belief that the CFSP is essentially conducted according to an intergovernmental decision-making 
process, the thesis shows how the creation of the post of the High Representative has led to a 
new system of governance in the field, with the Secretariat General of the Council of the EU at 
its core and the European Commission in a secondary but nevertheless crucial role.  This second 
pillar system of governance is crucial in encouraging member-states to formulate and implement 
common positions.  However, the dissertation also emphasizes the crucial role played by EU 
member-states in CFSP, as they are still the actors who need to initiate the process of 
“devolution” to the High Representative.  In addition, the dissertation singles out the crucial role 
played by the United States in the second pillar, especially important when military issues are 
part of the process.  The empirical analysis shows that when the issue is not of contention for the 
transatlantic relation, then the EU seems to act in a more unified way.  To explain this new 
system of governance, the thesis uses foreign policy analysis (FPA) as the theoretical framework.  
It shows how this approach can be adapted from its state-centric focus to the study of the EU, by 
incorporating elements of the EU institutionalism literature in order to better grasp the specifics 
of the EU institutions.   
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 vii
 CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
1/ Relevance of the Study 
The European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is now in its 
eleventh year of existence.  Elaborated during the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1991, it was at the same time du déjà vu, as well as a new endeavor.  Déjà vu because CFSP 
was clearly the heir of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) established in the early 1970s.  
New because for the first time in the history of European integration, the then twelve EEC 
member-states decided to create –at least by name -  a fully-fledge policy in those areas residing 
at the core of national sovereignty and dealing with the use of force. 
Compared to the evolution of the EC (or first pillar or the EU), CFSP has witnessed, over 
a very short period of time, a number of important institutional transformations stemming 
primarily from the member-states policy successes and failures in their attempt to coordinate 
their foreign policies and increase the clout of the EU internationally.  CFSP instruments have 
also been extended and today it can fairly be said that the EU is, with the addition of the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), on its way to acquire the entire panoply of 
foreign policy instruments available to the state1. 
Despite this tremendous evolution and the unique experiment CFSP represents in 
international relations, scholars have not extensively studied the phenomenon.  When they have, 
they have usually focused on its shortcomings attributed to its intergovernmental framework – 
i.e. CFSP is a treachery, because it requires the agreement of all the EU member-states, a 
situation which rarely exists.  The classical example in the CFSP literature is the Balkan wars of 
1991-1995.  In addition, because the institutional changes to CFSP that have occurred since the 
                                                 
1 These are traditionally the economic, social, political, and military instruments of foreign policy. 
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 Treaty of Amsterdam have left the second pillar in an intergovernmental framework, scholars 
have rarely analyzed the implementation of those changes in particular situations to see how they 
were used in practice.  Finally, because the second pillar deals with foreign policy, it has usually 
been approached from an international relations (IR) perspective, explaining why member-states 
created it or analyzing the outcomes of it from an inter-states relations perspective, rather than 
from a comparative politics perspective, as has extensively been done in the first pillar. 
One major attempt in the literature to study how CFSP has taken a different path than the 
one traditionally predicted by those analysis focusing on the intergovernmental aspects of the 
CFSP has been the work of Michael E. Smith2 on the institutionalization of the CFSP.  Smith 
shows how through the years of EPC, what started essentially as an intergovernmental process, 
gained a life on its own through socialization and institutionalization.  Smith also shows how the 
institutional developments of the second pillar influence outcomes in foreign policy.  Smith’s 
approach however presents four sets of shortcomings.  First, while thorough and necessary as a 
counter-argument to realist and intergovernmental analysis of the EU foreign policy, Smith 
primarily focuses on the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the early days of the creation 
of the CFSP.  Since then however new and crucial changes have been adopted in the way CFSP 
is working.  Second, while acknowledging the importance of member-states in “history-making” 
decisions, Smith does not give enough consideration to the still important role of member-states 
in the implementation of specific policies in the second pillar.  However, member-states do shape 
the behavior of EU institutions as much as they try to influence policy outcomes from outside as 
individual actors.  Third, Smith does not propose an analysis of CFSP’s implementation on the 
                                                 
2 See for instance, Smith, M., Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy – The Institutionalization of Cooperation, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004 
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 ground (except for some references here and there).  Fourth, the US, a crucial variable in 
understanding the CFSP, is rarely given the importance it should.     
This dissertation attempts to thus fill in an important gap in the literature, while building 
on the approach proposed by Smith from the four shortcomings identified above.  It proposes to 
tackle the study of CFSP through the lenses of “institutionalism” and its emphasis on processes.  
Its aim is to analyze how CFSP works on the ground since the changes brought by the 
Amsterdam Treaty.  It is less interested in outcomes of policy decisions than in decision-making 
processes and institutions. Adopting an institutionalist approach of the CFSP decision-making 
process, it shows how the creation of the post of High Representative for the CFSP has led to a 
reinforcement of the Secretariat general of the Council of the EU in the second pillar.  It will 
however also show that member-states are still important in the process, since they are the 
ultimate actors deciding whether or not to delegate power to the High Representative.  The extent 
to which they are involved in the CFSP process depends on the area of CFSP involvement.  
Member-states will be given the importance they still deserve, in so far as they intersect with the 
EU institutions.  Thus, only cases of collective action will be analyzed.  Its basic exploratory 
question is: how does the CFSP work?  Is the EU CFSP process intergovernmental or 
supranational?  And if it can be both, why, and how? 
In addition, the dissertation has an important theoretical component in that it is trying to 
revive the area of IR scholarship called Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).  Foreign policy has 
traditionally been studied from the state perspective.  Accordingly, scholars have adopted two 
different assumptions: either emphasizing the structure of the international system and its role in 
shaping the state’s foreign policy, or emphasizing the internal characteristics of the state to 
explain its foreign policy.  However, the creation of the EU and the establishment of the CFSP 
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 challenge the idea that foreign policy is only the product of states.  The dissertation aims to show 
that FPA is still relevant to understand foreign policy but that it needs adaptation from its state-
centric perspective in order to explain the emergence of a new type of foreign policy, one, in 
some cases, produced by the EU. 
The significance of this research is both empirical and theoretical.  Empirically, as was 
said before, it fills an important gap in the literature on the EU.  It explores an area that has been 
left in a grey zone, while changes have occurred at an unprecedented pace.  It will thus add to the 
body of knowledge on the EU policy-making processes.  Theoretically, it will show the 
relevance of FPA, while attempting to bridge the gap between public policy literature and “high 
politics.”  Finally from a policy perspective, it occurs at an important moment.  On the one hand, 
analyzing the decision-making processes of the CFSP is crucial at a time when the EU is in the 
process of reforming itself.  As Gordon writes, “progress toward CFSP” could conceivably be 
defined according to how integrated it is (as opposed to intergovernmental), how global it is (as 
opposed to regional), how military it is (as opposed to civilian), how well articulated it is (as 
opposed to poorly explained), or how well it can deal with immediate crises (as opposed to 
pursuing long-term goals).  […]  Along any of these axes, I believe the notion of “making 
progress” toward CFSP must involve the creation of institutional, legal, or political mechanisms 
to promote and implement common perspectives or actions.  For the word “cooperation” to 
have meaning, it must to some degree entail getting states to do what they otherwise would not 
have done, either through mechanisms to promote convergence of views (through common 
analysis and consultation), through deals in the expectation of mutual gain, or, most 
significantly, through biding decision-making institutions.  Simply happening to agree on the 
same policy – say, to support democracy in South Africa – is very important, but it does not 
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 require a common foreign and security policy to bring it about3.  In the first EU pillar, the 
European Commission, together with the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, 
and the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of the EU, provide the 
institutional backbone of the decision-making process allowing for policies to be taken and 
implemented by and at EU-level.  Except for the European Commission (but with a lesser role), 
those institutions and institutional mechanisms have no role in the second pillar.  As Gordon 
reminds us however, agreements among member-states could still occur, even in the absence of 
the specific and sui generis mechanisms found in pillar one.  To that extent, agreements occur all 
the time between states, bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally within international fora such 
as the United Nations, or outside.  In foreign policy, these agreements are more difficult to reach, 
especially if they involve the use of force.  Again as Gordon writes, it is easier to agree that 
democracy should be promoted in South Africa, than to agree on the way and means to 
implement that broad policy.  Even declaratory policies are not easily agreed upon however.  To 
take a more recent example, it was very difficult for the member-states to agree on a statement 
about Iraq during the Greek Presidency of the first semester of 2003, when the EU was almost 
divided right in half between the supporters of tougher action and the supporters of the 
continuation of inspections through the UN.  It is in cases such as the latter one, that the 
institutional mechanisms of the second pillar come into play to facilitate agreements among 
member-states.  At times these agreements are far-fledge and include the delegation of the 
common positions’ implementation to the High Representative, as the Macedonian case will 
show.  At other times, the agreements are more of a declaratory nature, such as the case of Iraq 
and thus resemble more what existed within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
framework.  Even in the latter case, these agreements are proof of the existence of a mode of 
                                                 
3 Gordon, Philip, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy”, International Security, vol. 22, n. 3, Winter 1997, pg. 82 
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 CFSP governance; without this institutionalized governance - materialized in the form of the EU 
Presidency, the High Representative alone or with the Commission, or the Secretariat General of 
the Council-, they would simply not exist.  The slow but steady institutionalization of the CFSP 
over the years has today led to an identifiable corpus of decision-making mechanisms that 
steadily lead to integration (although of a different form than the processes found in pillar one) in 
the realm of foreign policy.  These mechanisms help, although still not in a homogeneous 
manner in all foreign policy areas, to forge common positions among the EU member-states.  As 
the next chapter will show in some details, the institutionalization of governance in the second 
pillar has witnessed a qualitative leap since the appointment of the High Representative for CFSP 
in 1999.  The High Representative rather than being based in the traditional institution of 
integration (i.e. the Commission), was established within the structure of the Secretariat General 
of the Council, an institutional framework that seems to progressively replace the Commission as 
the motor of integration in the second pillar.   
The following chapters of the thesis will all support from one angle or the other (from a 
historical perspective in chapter two; a theoretical perspective in chapter three; and an empirical 
perspective in chapter four, five, and six), the main argument exposed in this section: that there is 
an institutionalized system of governance in the second pillar of the EU that is increasingly 
influencing the ability and disposition of the member-states to find a consensus on foreign policy 
issues and in some case, on their implementation.  This argument will nevertheless not lose sight 
of the crucial role still played by member-states in the process, as they still have – through the 
Presidency or on their own – the ultimate power to decide at which level and/or which institution 
will be responsible for the decision-making.      
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 Understanding this process, will allow showing the important connection between CFSP 
and the United States.  It is thus equally relevant for the future of the transatlantic relationship.  
The US is important in tow ways for my research.  First when the question of the development of 
an ESDP/military capabilities for the EU is raised or when the possibility of a European 
intervention is on the floor (through the WEU or more recently through the EU), the US is an 
actor in the decision-making process through NATO - primarily to ensure coherence between the 
different organizations.  Second, it appears, as chapter two will show, that the EU’s affirmation 
of a role in foreign and security policy, has often been achieved by positioning itself vis-à-vis the 
US (wanting to present an alternative view such as in the Middle-East, or wanted to fill in for the 
unwillingness of the US to be involved or to take some of the burden away from the US, such as 
in the Balkans). 
2/ Theoretical Framework 
FPA as a body of literature in IR was created in reaction to “structural approaches” that 
emphasized the external elements or the role of the international system in the foreign policies of 
the state.  Instead FPA looked at internal variables, i.e. inside the state to see how the different 
actors in the decision-making process of national foreign and security policy influenced foreign 
policy decisions.  In the tradition of FPA, the emphasis in the dissertation is thus on foreign 
policy decision-making processes from “initiation” to “implementation” (to refer to Charles 
Lindblom’s terms).  The dissertation thus aims to analyze patters of CFSP development, what 
determine their shape, and how they function.  Structural explanations are certainly useful to 
understand “big” decisions and important “innovations” in the EU, such as why a CFSP was 
created to begin with in 1991 and why it was improved in the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice 
Treaty in 1997 and 1999.  Such questions could not be fully answered without taking into 
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 account environmental variables: German reunification, end of the Cold War, ex-Yugoslav wars 
and Europe inability to stop them, as well as the Kosovo syndrome.  However, to understand the 
inner working of the CFSP, to make sense of “less dramatic” decisions, and to analyze why actor 
X or actor Y intervene in the decision-making process at a certain time and under certain 
conditions, it is important to open up the EU box and see what is inside.  The dissertation thus 
shows how national, international, and supranational actors (understood in a FPA sense, i.e. 
including leaders, civil servants, and institutions) combine in the making of decisions within the 
EU second pillar.   
In addition, I will show that FPA provides the locus for a dialogue between the IR 
literature and institutionalist approaches.  FPA encompasses actors, processes, instruments, 
contexts, and outputs.4  I argue that looking at internal processes is especially important in the 
case of the EU, an entity still in formation, and whose distinctive institutions and evolving 
institutional set-up play an extremely important role in defining the policy-outputs of the 
organization.  CFSP has indeed often been characterized as a process rather than a policy.  It is 
this necessary and useful dialogue between FPA and the institutionalist literature that I will 
illuminate in the thesis.   
3/ Methodology 
The Balkans and the Middle East have been chosen as case-studies for several reasons.  First, 
they both are regions geographically located in the EU neighborhood.  Second, they both are 
regions in which the EU and its member-states have interests, both material and intangible.  
Political stability is important in both regions, to avoid for instance important flux of 
immigration to the EU and to reduce the threat of terrorism fuelled by Islamic fundamentalism. 
                                                 
4 White, B., Understanding European Foreign Policy, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pg. 40 
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 Stability is also important for economic reasons, especially in the Middle East.  Most European 
countries are dependent on the Middle East for oil.  Intangible interests relate to the historical 
attachment of some EU countries to these two regions.  Germany is for geographical and 
historical reasons very interested in stability in the Balkans.  France, former colonial power in 
the Middle East also wants to keep close links with the Arab world.  Spain because of 
geographical closeness is always placing the greater Middle East as a primary foreign policy 
issue to be dealt with. 
Finally, the Balkans and the Middle East (more particularly the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict) have consistently been designed as priority areas by the EU for the implementation of 
its CFSP and this, since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force5.  If one looks at legal 
documents and policy instruments, besides mere declarations, the two regions are the ones where 
the EU is most active.  
The case-studies in the dissertation are based on important empirical research.  FPA 
indeed requires rich empirical analysis as decision-making processes tend to differ according to 
the policy area.  This is especially true of the EU and its complex institutional design.  It is also 
necessary in our case, because the actors involved in the process still experiment with the new 
institutions and because of the different levels of analysis involved in the study 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 The Lisbon European Council of June 1992 identified areas in which joint actions regarding selected individual 
countries or groups of countries would appear to be particularly beneficial, in a first phase, for the attainment of the 
objectives of the CFSP.  They were: 
- Central and Eastern Europe, especially the ex-USSR and former Yugoslavia.  The action proposed involved inter 
alia, promotion of political stability, regional integration, implementation of CSCE commitments relating to the 
respect of human rights, democracy and the prevention and settlements of conflicts; 
- Maghreb and the Middle East.  Reinforced cooperation in all fields was proposed including, the Middle East Peace 
Process, the fight against terrorism and the illicit traffic in drugs, promotion of security and social stability. 
The Extraordinary European Council of October 1993 in Brussels requested the Council to engage in preparatory 
work for the implementation of joint action on the promotion of stability and peace in Europe, on the Middle East, 
on South Africa, on former Yugoslavia and on Russia.  At the same Summit, the general objectives of European 
security were defined as the territorial integrity and political independence of the EU, its democratic character, and 
the stability of neighboring regions.   
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 (national/intergovernmental/supranational).  In addition, taking empirically-rich case studies as 
point of departure avoids what Winn and Lord define as follow: a condition in which theoretical 
advance in the understanding of the EU’s foreign policy outstrips empirical testing.6  Empirical 
information regarding the procedural rules of decision regimes can be traced by various 
observational methods. 
Between October 2001 and March 2002, I spent five months in the Group of Policy Advisers 
of the European Commission as a stagiaire.  Being an insider during this time has allowed me to 
gain access to key decision-makers, as well as to documents, such as minutes from meetings, 
internal documents, policy memos, and in some case, e-mail exchanges that I would not have 
been allowed to see if I were an outsider. 
The bulk of this study is based on elite interviews from the European Council Secretariat, 
from the European Commission, and from the Permanent Representations of the member-states 
to the EU.  Most of the interviews were conducted during the stage, but also in the period from 
September 2002 to December 2002 and another few in January 2004 to update the research.  The 
total amount of people interviewed is 72.  In the Commission, people interviewed worked in the 
Group of Policy Advisors, in the DG Relex (External Relations), and in the Secretariat.  In the 
Council, people worked for the Policy Unit, the CFSP and ESDP Unit, and Solana’s cabinet.  In 
the Permanent Representations, people interviewed were dealing with CFSP and ESDP issues.   
Most of the interviews were open-ended interviews usually based on some standardized 
questions, but adapted then to the evolution of the interviews and to the individuals in question.  
Interviews – except for five - were not tape-recorded as the interviewees usually refused to be 
recorded.  And when they agreed to, I quickly realized that the information that was given was 
                                                 
6 Winn, N. and Lord, C., EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State: Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pg. 17 
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 less “interesting” for the research.  The interviews lasted from 20 minutes to 2 hours.  The 
number of interviews allowed me to find patterns in the answers provided by the interviewees.  
The interviews were necessary to understand the formal aspects of the decision-making 
process, but to also isolate the informal aspects of the process.  They have allowed establishing 
some closeness between the interviewee and myself and when possible I have interviewed the 
same person twice to seek corroboration in their answers.  The ideal situation for an exploratory 
topic such as the one presented in this thesis would have been to be a participant observer in the 
DG Relex unit dealing with CFSP or in the Council Secretariat General.  However, with the 
addition of a military component, the EU has become much more secretive in the area of external 
relations and access to documents is more difficult.  Stagiaires are for instance not accepted in 
the CFSP units anymore, either in the Commission, or in the Council.     
Triangulation in the dissertation is brought by analysis of the secondary literature, monitoring 
of daily information on the EU through Agence-Europe, EU Observer, EU Politix, Financial 
Times, and Le Monde, and analysis of speeches of officials and official documents.  The 
secondary literature has helped frame the dissertation.  The monitoring of daily news was 
necessary because of the ongoing developments in the field.  Official documents were a good 
starting point for interviews.  They are however only the end product of a negotiation, and thus 
do not show what has been going on before.    
4/ Chapter Outline 
The dissertation is divided in seven chapters.  The second chapter is an explanation of the 
dependent variable, the CFSP.  It traces the origins of the CFSP since the outset of the European 
Economic Community (EEC).  It also presents a legal-institutional analysis of how the CFSP 
decision-making process is organized in the EU Treaty and other relevant documents such as 
11 
 European Councils Conclusions.  It also analyzes the more recent developments of the EU in 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).   
The third chapter begins with an overview of the literature on CFSP, to then turn to FPA as 
the core theoretical approach of the thesis.  It shows how FPA, although useful, needs to be 
adapted to understand the foreign policy of a non-state actor such as the EU.  Finally, the chapter 
proposes a theoretical framework with whom to grasp the changes brought since 1999 in the 
CFSP.  
Chapter fourth is an analysis of the first major attempt at implementing CFSP on the ground 
through the case of the 1991-1995 Balkan Wars.  This chapter exposes the context of the crisis, 
analyzes the EU actions during the crisis, and ends with preliminary conclusions as to what 
shortcomings the Balkans Wars emphasized in the CFSP decision-making process. 
The fifth chapter is the first case study of the dissertation and focuses on the EU action in 
Macedonia when the country was faced with the prospect of a civil war in the spring of 2001.  
After some preliminary remarks about the context of the crisis, the chapter goes on to analyze the 
various EU and non-EU actors involved in finding a solution to the crisis.  The chapter concludes 
with some theoretical implications of the empirical findings.  
The sixth chapter is the second case study of the dissertation.  It focuses on the Middle East 
Peace Process and more particularly on the crisis in the region since the second intifada started in 
2000.  The chapter starts with an historical overview of the EU involvement in the Israeli-Arab 
and Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  It then turns to more recent events and, such as in the case of 
FYROM, take each EU and non-EU actor involved in the crisis separately.  The chapter closes 
with some policy and theoretical implications. 
12 
 Finally the last chapter offers general conclusions to the dissertation.  It is divided in three 
sections.  The first is a generalization of the place of the different EU actors in the decision-
making process of the CFSP.  The second section restates the theoretical argument, now 
reinforced by the empirical analysis.  Finally, the chapter briefly concludes with some final 
remarks on the consequence of the 2004 enlargement on the CFSP decision-making. 
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 CHAPTER TWO - Defining the Dependent Variable 
 
 It is important to underline what CFSP is before going into the analysis.  The EU is such 
a novel political organization, that its CFSP is not always well understood.  The dissertation will 
only deal with CFSP and not with the EU as an international actor in more general terms.  The 
latter object of study would encompass studying how the EC behaves externally, which would 
include studying areas that fall under the competences of the first pillar.  Studies have for 
instance been conducted analyzing the EU behavior in the WTO negotiations, vis-à-vis the 
Kyoto protocol, and towards other regional organizations.  All these issues are not CFSP issues 
or second pillar issue per se, although they relate to the EU as an international actor.  Issues dealt 
with as CFSP are still not very numerous, if one puts aside the declarations that the EU has 
issued about international political affairs.  Although such distinction between first and second 
pillar, between external economic affairs and foreign affairs, or between “low politics” and “high 
politics” might appear superficial in today’s world, it reflects the pillar structure of the EU and 
thus the higher sensitivity member-states have to relinquish sovereignty in foreign/security 
matters than in economic matters.  The Convention on the Future of the EU has attempted to 
improve the coordination/coherence among the resources of the first and second pillars to find a 
solution to the consistency problems that have arisen, particularly in the case of economic 
sanctions against foreign governments (the decision to impose sanctions is a pillar II issue, while 
its implementation is a pillar I issue).  As Professor Hill puts it, a conscious aspiration to achieve 
a common European foreign policy exists, on the basis of a huge range of bilateral and 
multilateral relations with third party states and international organizations.  It is not 
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 unreasonable, therefore, to talk of the European Union’s foreign policy, at least alongside those 
of the member-states7. 
 
1/ Key Legal and Institutional Developments of the CFSP8 
A. The EEC and Early Attempts at Coordinating Foreign Policies 
a) Before the EEC 
Although CFSP was established in the nineties, it was not set up on empty ground.  As 
early as the end of WWII, attempts were made to coordinate the security policies of the states of 
Europe.  The first post-WWII West European security organization to emerge was the Brussels 
Treaty Organization (BTO) created in 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. This was a military alliance against a potential new threat from 
Germany.  Soon however, the “enemy” was to be become the USSR.  In 1949, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) was created by joining the American, British, and French 
occupation zones in West Germany and that same year the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) was established9.  With the creation of NATO, the institutionalization of the US 
presence in European security was sealed.  The consensus seemed that any purely Western 
European integration (i.e. without the United States) was set to focus on economic issues.  Thus, 
in 1951, Robert Schuman, then French Foreign Affairs Minister endorsed the idea of a French 
civil servant, Jean Monnet to create an organization with Germany that would put in common the 
production of coal and steel: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was born, the first 
                                                 
7 Hill, Christopher, “EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001: Renationalizing or Regrouping?”, First Annual 
EWX Guest Lecture, Europe in the World Center, University of Liverpool, October 24, 2002 
8 This section up until the Maastricht Treaty largely borrows from Smith, Hazel, European Union Foreign Policy – 
What it is and What it Does, London: Pluto Press, 2002 
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 international organization with supranational features10.  The member-states of the ECSC were 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.   
However, the question of an independent European security organization remained, 
especially in France post-WWII foreign policy elaboration with the central French concern being 
how to control German rearmament, finally authorized in 1950 to fulfill NATO’s mission.  It is 
from that reflection that the idea of a European Defense Community (EDC) was going to 
emerge, particularly following American pressures to allow Germany to rearm.  In 1950 French 
Prime Minister René Pléven proposed the integration of national armies into a European army, 
which would be democratically controlled by a European Political Community (EPC).  The 
Treaty creating the EDC was signed in May 1952 by the same states that signed the ECSC 
Treaty.  The establishment of an EPC entailed the creation of a common foreign policy as a 
mechanism set up to coordinate the foreign policies of member states.  The central supranational 
authority would be able to carry out foreign policy activities but only with the agreement of the 
EPC member states.   
In 1954 however, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty, thus signing 
the death certificate of the organization.  The reasons invoked for the rejection were: a reluctance 
to delegate to a supranational institution control over the French army; the absence of the UK in 
the enterprise, thus leaving France face-to-face with the German army; the overseas 
commitments of the French army, while Germany could concentrate its rearmament in Europe.  
With the failure of the EDC, European leaders realized that if integration had to occur on 
the European continent, the road of the ECSC, i.e. economic integration was more secure, before 
embarking on political integration.  In addition, based on a British idea, the Western European 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The founding NATO members were the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
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 Union (WEU) was established in 1955 as a traditional military alliance, without any 
supranational feature and whose founding member-states where Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  The FRG also became member of 
NATO in 1955. 
 In 1957, the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community was signed. 
Although the original treaty does not mention foreign or security policy, some competences were 
related to “external affairs”, such as the role of the EEC in trade and development.  Step by step 
however, the role and visibility of the EEC in world affairs was to increase.  This is one of the 
reasons why, once Western Europe was embarked on the road to integration, various attempts at 
creating a more political Europe with competencies in foreign and security policy were launched 
by the member-states in order to prevent the Commission from gaining too much power in the 
area11.  These attempts were mostly based on an intergovernmental foundation. 
 
b) After the EEC 
 
A/ DE GAULLE 
  
Nothing in the area of a Community foreign and security was going to evolve with 
General Charles De Gaulle as President of France.  De Gaulle indeed was only thinking of a 
European defense as a way to balance the American security presence in Europe.  In addition, 
such an endeavor had to remain intergovernmental and separate from the Brussels-based process 
of European integration, towards which De Gaulle was extremely distrustful.   
                                                                                                                                                             
10 The High Authority (la Haute Autorité) was the precursor of the European Commission. 
11 See Smith, H., European Union Foreign Policy – What it Is and What it Does, London: Pluto Press, 2002 
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 In 1959, De Gaulle proposed that the foreign ministers of the six EEC member-states 
meet regularly to discuss foreign policy issues and that a secretariat for such political cooperation 
be established in Paris.  De Gaulle EEC partners rejected the idea of the Paris-based secretariat 
but agreed to the meetings that began in Rome in 1960 but were suspended in 1963, after De 
Gaulle vetoed the British application to the EEC.  During that period ministers simply discussed 
issues ranging from relations with the USSR, to the Congo crisis as well as the Cuban missile 
crisis.  There were solely focused on an exchange of views among the participants.  
 However, De Gaulle did not give up on his idea to develop a secretariat and Christian 
Fouchet, a French diplomat, produced in 1961 a report whose objective was the creation of a 
common foreign and defense policy for Europe.  The report was received with mixed feelings, 
especially from the small EEC member-states.  The Dutch government was extremely keen that 
the new policy be firmly attached to NATO in order to retain the US commitment to defend 
Europe in case of war.  It was also concerned that France and Germany might establish a 
directoire that would dominate the new institution12.  In reality, the directoire would amount to 
the institutionalization of French leadership in Western Europe, since the FRG would not have 
been permitted to attempt to exercise leadership in the new organization.  What the Dutch and 
the Belgian governments proposed was to accept the UK in the new organization as a 
counterweight to both France and Germany.  The other option was the consolidation of the 
institutions of the EEC.  Of course neither of these options was agreeable by De Gaulle. 
                                                 
12 The fear of the directoire has been a constant in small member-states approach to the EU decision-making 
process.  More recently, the issue came at the forefront with the collapse of the constitutional talks in December 
2003 and the idea that the three big member-states, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom might push the EU 
integration agenda forward.  
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  However, through the drawing of the Fouchet Plan France and Germany, and more 
particularly De Gaulle and Adenauer, the German Chancellor work closely.  This led to the 
signature of the Treaty of Franco-German Cooperation in 1963, known as the Elysée Treaty13. 
 
B/ AFTER DE GAULLE 
  
The next steps in the institutionalization of foreign policy cooperation among EEC 
member-states had to wait for a change in the leadership of France.  However, until the Single 
European Act (SEA), this institutionalization would be made informally, mostly through 
European Summit declarations entailing a voluntary and non-binding commitment. 
The Single European Act 
 After a little bit more than a decade of practical working, the EPC would find 
formalization in the Single European Act (SEA) which can be regarded as a codification of the 
practices established over the years.  The SEA was signed in 1986 and came into force on July 1, 
1987 and thus provided for the first time a legal framework for European foreign policy 
cooperation.  The SEA brought together the Community policies and the EPC, but the EPC 
provisions were placed under Title III of the Treaty, separate from the provision related to the 
Rome Treaty competencies14.  The main commitment from the member-states in the Treaty was 
that they would consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest.  The SEA 
stated that consultations shall take place before the member-states reach final positions and 
                                                 
13 With the Elysée Treaty, France and Germany agreed to meet at least twice/year at the level of Heads of States, 
three times/year at the level of Foreign Affairs Ministers and every month at the level of civil servants.  France and 
Germany also agreed to work together in areas of common interests in foreign policy.  The Treaty also called for the 
harmonization of both countries defense concept and the exchange of army personnel. 
14 It is interesting to note that under Title III, the member-states are referred to as “High Contracting Parties”, 
pointed to the unchallenged sovereignty of the member-states in foreign affairs.  However, the fact that EC and EPC 
issues were dealt with in a single legal instrument was considered to be an important step towards bringing the two 
together.  Some have even argued that this structure inaugurated the pillar structures of the Maastricht Treaty (see 
Nuttall, Simon, European Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000  
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 member-states abjured unilateral actions before taking full account of the positions of their 
partners and before having considered the possibility of adopting a European position.  The SEA 
also committed the member-states to seeking common principles and objectives and insisted that 
member-states should endeavor to avoid adopting national policies that could inhibit the 
Community’s ability to act cohesively internationally.  The SEA also saw the formalization of 
the provision agreed to at Stuttgart according to which the political and economic aspects of 
security can be discussed in EPC.  However the SEA also stressed that the SEA provisions would 
in no way impede closer cooperation in the field of security within either the WEU or NATO for 
those member states which were also members of those organizations. 
 As previously stated, the decision-making processes in the SEA were nothing new, as 
they were just the formalization of what had been gradually agreed among the member-states 
through the various reports and European Summit Conclusions in the previous years.  Foreign 
ministers were to meet four times a year to discuss foreign policy and were allowed to discuss 
political cooperation when they met as the Council of the Communities.  The SEA also 
confirmed that an emergency meeting of the PC or the foreign ministers could be convened 
within 48 hours at the request of three member-states.  The Commission was to be fully 
associated with EPC.  The role of the Presidency, the PC, the European Correspondents and the 
working parties was confirmed.  The European Council was also recognized in the SEA.  Two 
innovations were brought in the Treaty.  First, it was both the Presidency and the Commission 
that were given responsibility for ensuring consistency between EPC matters and Community’s 
matters.  Second, a small Brussels-based secretariat for the EPC was agreed upon and would 
provide administrative support to the Presidency.  
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  The SEA was followed by a “reactivation” of the WEU and the Hague Platform of 1987 
which acknowledged that the construction of an integrated Europe will be incomplete as long as 
it does not include security and defense.  It was also agreed that the WEU might play a useful 
role in coordinating “out of area” operations.  However, for the necessary breakthrough in 
European security and defense that needed a common ground between the “Europeanists” and 
the “Atlanticists”, the international system had to change. 
 It is however necessary to underline that EPC did not amount to anything.  Without EPC, 
CFSP would probably not have seen the light.  It laid the ground for the procedures to be used in 
CFSP and it created a sort of “coordination reflex”.  As Simon Nuttall writes, EPC worked 
through an intensive network of meetings, contacts, and relationships.  […]  For the first time, 
foreign ministry officials felt that they were part of the European Community adventure, with 
toys on their own to play with.  There was an EPC culture and sense of solidarity which only 
worked so long as decisions were restricted to the charmed circle. With interference neither from 
the EC Institutions nor from other ministries at home.15  
   
B. From the EEC to the EU: The Maastricht Treaty 
 CFSP as such is a creation of the Maastricht Treaty, signed in December 1991 by the then 
twelve EEC member-states.  It should however not be forgotten that the member-states had been 
used to working together on issues of foreign policy for about twenty years trough the EPC 
process.  The initiative first came in a letter addressed to the Italian Presidency by France and 
Germany and asking for the creation of a “common foreign and security policy”, with the EU 
gaining responsibility in defense through a formal link with the WEU.  However, a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy did not mean that foreign policy was going to be communautarized.  
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 Most member-states were indeed opposed to such a move.  Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty 
created the EU, an encompassing “roof” supported by three pillars: the first pillar, called the 
European Community (EC) and encompassing the policies governed by the Community 
method16, while the second and third pillars were intergovernmental pillars where the member-
states remain the central power of decision.  The second pillar deals with foreign and security 
policy, while the third pillar, deals with justice and home affairs issues.  
 The CFSP was created against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, the first Gulf 
War and the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis.  The fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification 
of Germany in October 1990 left France quite nervous about having to face a stronger neighbor. 
Germany on the other hand was eager to give its partners reassurance that it was not going to use 
the end of the Cold War to change the fundamental way it had conducted foreign policy until 
then, i.e. through multilateralism.  This is why in return for its acceptance of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and thus its renouncement of the DM as the German national currency, 
Germany pushed its partners to deepen the European integration process.  France was quite 
favorable to the creation of a foreign policy of the Union.  Indeed, for France, CFSP was a way 
to ensure its predominance in Europe and to amplify its voice on the international arena, while 
eventually allowing Europe to conduct a more independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the US. 
However, this was without counting on the Atlanticist leaning of countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, and Portugal, who did not want to see the CFSP become a competitor to 
NATO.  The result was, as in classical intergovernmental negotiations, a lowest common 
denominator.  
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Nuttall, Simon, op. cit., pg 2 
16 The Community method is the method where the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court 
of Justice (i.e. the supranational institutions) are the key actors. In addition, qualified majority voting is used in the 
Community method. 
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 The CFSP broad goals were defined as follow: 
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of  
the Union; 
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with  
the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the  
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; 
- to promote international cooperation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for  
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The means to reach these goals where extremely lose but translated the acceptance by the 
member-states of an “upgrading” vis-à-vis what was agreed upon in the SEA:  
- by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct  
of policy, in accordance with Article J.2; 
- by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in  
the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common. 
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy  
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They  
shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union  
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international  
relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. 
This last sentence shows the kind of qualitative improvement brought by the Maastricht 
Treaty in the sense that the Council gains some responsibility in terms of “enforcement” of the 
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 CFSP, even though this responsibility appears quite vague.  
Article J.2 also testifies of this qualitative jump: 
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on  
any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to  
ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by  
means of concerted and convergent action. 
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. 
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform on the common  
positions. 
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations  
and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in  
such fora. 
With regard to a common defense, the wording of the treaty becomes even more 
awkward: The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common  
defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.  Follows then a role for the 
Western European Union (WEU) assigned to become the military arm of the EU, without 
prejudice to NATO’s role in European security.  Again, the compromise between Europeanists 
and Atlanticists is quite obvious. 
No major changes were made with regard to decision-making processes.  The 
Presidency’s central role was confirmed, as well as the support role of the troika.  The European 
Council was given the task to define guidelines for foreign policy and the Council was given the 
responsibility to take initiatives, make decisions and implement them.  The Commission 
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 remained fully associated but for the first time was authorized to initiate foreign policy 
proposals, along with the Council.  The emergency procedure was improved in that the 
Presidency, the Commission or any of the member-states could request a special Council 
meeting to be held either within 48 hours or sooner if necessary.  The superficial and uneasy 
distinction between the Council of Ministers of the Community and the foreign ministers 
meeting in EPC was abolished and replaced with one formation, the Council of the EU.  Coreper 
was given the responsibility to prepare all the meetings of the Council, even those related to 
foreign policy.  However, in foreign policy, the PC was keeping its ascendance, even though 
with reduced tasks.  Indeed until the Maastricht Treaty, the PC had sole responsibility to 
administer foreign policy.  With the Maastricht Treaty, the PC was becoming a monitoring and 
oversight body.  The Secretariat for EPC was incorporated into the Council’s general secretariat. 
In addition, some majority voting was allowed in CFSP.   It was agreed that if the 
Council adopted a common position by unanimity, its implementation could be given the status 
of common action and implemented by qualified majority voting (QMV).  Unanimity however 
remained the rule, even though an annexed declaration to the Treaty stated that the member-
states commit themselves to refrain to the extent possible from preventing a unanimous decision 
where a qualified majority exists in favor. 
The CFSP was immediately put to the test with the developments of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia.  During 4 years, the EU was unable to present a united front and to stop the 
bloodshed.  Ineffectiveness, incoherence, inaction, unwillingness were the characteristics of the 
actions at the EU level.  Only with NATO airpower and with US diplomacy, did the conflict 
come to an end in 1995 with the Dayton Agreement.  Only then was the EU going to become a 
major actor, by participating in the reconstruction of the new Yugoslav Republics. 
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 The major lessons of the Yugoslav debacle were the realization that the EU lacked 
visibility (the six-month rotating presidency), coherence (the six-month rotating presidency, the 
intergovernmental framework, the incoherence between pillar one and pillar two), continuity (the 
six-month rotating presidency), and “hard” instruments to conduct foreign affairs in situation of 
crisis.  I will come back to the Yugoslav debacle in the next section. 
 
C. The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties 
 The Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997 brought some important decision-making innovations 
to the CFSP, although its basic intergovernmental philosophy was unchanged.  The two major 
innovations were the creation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) as well as that 
of the post of High Representative (HR) for the CFSP.  The High Representative for CFSP, also 
Secretary General of the Council and Secretary General of the WEU (thus increasing the links 
between the EU and the WEU) and commonly known as Mr. CFSP, assists the Council by 
contributing to the formulation, drawing up, and implementation of political decisions and, where 
necessary, by acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency and conducting 
political dialogue with third parties.  The first HR was designated in 1999 in the person of Javier 
Solana, former Spanish Foreign Minster and former NATO Secretary General.  The designation of 
Solana, a very high level public figure, was a sign that the member-states were seriously committed 
to the position17.  It was also a sign that a compromise was found between Atlanticists and 
Europeanists.  Indeed, as previously mentioned Solana was Secretary general of NATO when he 
took the position and was well appreciated in Washington for his balanced positions.   
                                                 
17 However, the designation of the HR led to numerous debates, as to which kind of figure needed to be appointed in 
the position.  Some member-states opted for a low-key figure that they would be certain would only conduct an 
administrative role, while others fought for somebody with high visibility, even though they knew he/she might take 
the position to a higher level. 
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 The HR is helped in his tasks by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, now called the 
Policy Unit and set up in a declaration annexed to the Treaty.  The staff of the Policy Unit is drawn 
from the Council Secretariat, the member states, the Commission, and the WEU.  The declaration 
annexed to the Treaty lists the unit's main tasks: 
1/ monitoring and analyzing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; 
2/ providing assessments of the EU's interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in 
the future; 
3/ providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have 
significant repercussions, including potential political crises; 
4/ producing at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued 
policy-options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to 
policy formulation in the Council. 
 Support for the HR takes precedence in the daily work of the Policy Unit.  This includes the 
preparation of bilateral and multilateral meetings in which the HR takes part.  Members of the 
Policy Unit frequently travel with Solana to provide advice.  The PU also assists in carrying out the 
mandates the HR received from the European Council on the Balkans and the Middle East.  For 
instance in 2000-2001, one member of the policy Unit spent almost a year in the Balkans (Pristina, 
Belgrade, Skopje) in order to provide the HR with direct information on developments in the area 
and with direct links to the actors in the region.  Another was sent several times by the HR to 
Southern Serbia to assist NATO in facilitating the negotiations between the Serbian government and 
the representatives of the ethnic Albanian community in the Presevo Valley.  A third has traveled 
extensively to the Middle East, in particular in the context of the drafting of the report by the so-
called “Fact Finding Committee” which was established at the summit of Sharm-el-Sheik and of 
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 which the HR is a member.  The policy papers drafted by the Policy Unit have also contributed to 
the development of a more effective and coherent CFSP.  Based on a common analysis by the Policy 
Unit officials, the papers provide a balanced and advanced point of departure for the formulation of 
a common policy of the EU.  The Treaty of Amsterdam asks member-states and the Commission to 
provide the Policy Unit with information, including confidential information.  The Commission, 
contrary to the member-states has been very generous in this context.    
 Although the Policy Unit was intended to give the Union a capacity for common planning 
and "thinking" about EU interests, its composition shows that the member-states restricted its 
independence: one representative from each member-state, one representative from the Commission, 
three from the Council's Secretariat, and one from the WEU. 
The Treaty also allows the Council to appoint Special Representatives (SR) with a mandate 
in relation to particular policy issues.  The SR are directly responsible to the High Representative for 
CFSP.  The EU currently has a special representative in the Middle East, in the African Great Lakes 
Region, to the Coordinator to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, in Afghanistan, and in 
FYROM.  These SR are appointed by QMV and they followed the instance of Mr. Bildt during the 
wars in Yugoslavia. 
 The Amsterdam Treaty also reconstituted the troika; it was now to be composed of the 
Presidency, the HR, the Commission, and if appropriate the successor Presidency. 
The Amsterdam Treaty also attempted to rationalize the instruments of the CFSP.  Common 
strategies were introduced and were to be decided by the European Council on a recommendation 
from the Council of the EU in areas where the member states have important interests.  Each 
strategy specifies its objectives, its duration, and the resources that will have to be provided by the 
EU and the member-states.  The Council implements the strategies by adopting joint actions and 
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 common positions by QMV, except for the questions with military and defense implications.  If a 
member of the Council wishes to oppose one of these decisions for important reasons of national 
policy, the Council can appeal to the European Council, which then resolves the issue on the basis of 
unanimity.  So far the Council has adopted three common strategies: for Russia, for Ukraine, and for 
the Mediterranean region.   
Common strategies have been met with mixed feelings.  While initially a good idea to 
encompass all the elements that make up a EU policy towards a particular country or region, the 
major criticisms addressed are that: they are too broad in scope in the sense that they not only cover 
EU policies towards a country/region, but also national policies; and that they usually are aimed to a 
country/region in which EU policies are already well developed, while other regions – with a lower 
profile – do not get as much attention.  Common strategies thus have ended up being mostly a 
duplication exercise, without any real substance attached to it.  It is commonly accepted that when 
the strategies will come up for renewal they will not be renewed and will need to replaced by 
another instrument. 
The Council can also adopt common positions defining the EU's approach to a particular 
geographical or thematic issue, vis-à-vis a third country or at an international conference for 
example.  The member-states then ensure that their national policies are in line with the common 
position. 
Joint actions are adopted by the Council in certain situations requiring operational action 
committing the member-states.  Each action specifies its objectives, scope, the means to be made 
available to the EU, the conditions for its implementation and if necessary, its duration. 
Finally, the Council can adopt decisions that are also binding on the member-states. 
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 Declarations give public expression to a position, request or expectation of the EU vis-à-vis 
a third country or an international issue.  These declarations are entitled "Declaration by the EU" 
where the Council meets and adopts a position on an international issue and "Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the EU" where the Council does not meet. 
Contacts with third countries take place mainly through political dialogue meetings and 
"démarches".  The EU holds a political dialogue with a very large number of countries or groups of 
countries on questions of international policy.   These meetings take place at all levels: heads of 
state, ministers, political directors, senior officials, and experts.  The EU can be represented at them 
by the Presidency (assisted by the High Representative for CFSP), or by the High Representative 
alone at the request of the Presidency or by the Troika (Presidency, High Representative, and 
Commission) or, in a limited number of cases, by member-states delegates and the Commission.  
"Démarches" are confidential and undertaken vis-à-vis third countries by the Presidency or the 
Troika, on behalf of the EU.  Usually their goal is to resolve with the state in question matters 
related to human rights, democracy or humanitarian action. 
 The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced the possibility of “constructive abstention” in CFSP, 
whereby when a decision is adopted a member-state may couple its abstention with a formal 
declaration.  In that case, the member-state is not required to apply the decision but acknowledges 
that the decision is binding on the EU.  Finally some more QMW were allowed: on procedural 
issues and when the Council implements common strategies decided by the European Council and 
when decisions are taken to implement joint actions and common positions.  However - and this 
seems a revival of the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 - when a decision is adopted by QMV, a 
member-state may invoke important reasons of national interest in order to oppose the adoption of 
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 the text.  If this is the case, the Council of the EU, acting by QMV, may refer the matter to the 
European Council for a unanimous decision.  
 
D. The Development of the European Security and Defense Policy 
a) Saint-Malo and its Aftermath 
The Kosovo war of 1999 and the need to rely again on NATO, thus on the US, prompted 
the EU to launch a military headline goal.  The Kosovo war showed the huge discrepancy 
between military capabilities across the Atlantic.  The case had already been made in December 
1998 with the Saint-Malo Declaration signed by Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair and calling for 
the EU to give itself the military means of its ambitions in order to match its economic clout with 
military might.  The Saint-Malo Declaration was an important step in both British and French 
strategic thinking.  Although the Declaration did not mention any new development in the 
institutionalization of the EU’s CFSP, it stated that the EU should develop a capacity for 
autonomous action, backed by credible military forces.  The European Council was envisaged as 
the key decision-maker on defense and military issues.  It can fairly be said that the St-Malo 
declaration really launched the project a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), project 
that can hope for no realization without the dual commitment of France and the United 
Kingdom18.  
However, for the UK to accept that the EU talked about defense, France had to accept 
that the commitment to operating within the context of the Atlantic Alliance was made explicit in 
the Declaration.  Because St-Malo is so important, it is interesting to look to what 
                                                 
18 As Jolyon Howorth puts it, for the UK government to accept that a credible ESDP is conceptually compatible 
with a strengthened Alliance is indeed a “revolution in military affairs”.  See Howorth, Jolyon, “Britain, France and 
the European Defense Initiative”, Survival, vol. 42, n. 2, Summer 2000, pg. 33 
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 strategic/political calculus both Blair and Chirac answered19.  Blair had four points in its 
argumentation to agree to St-Malo.  First, he wanted to replace the UK “at the heart of Europe”, 
since European integration was happening anyway, with or without the UK.  Since he could not 
commit his country to the Euro yet, the easiest policy British citizens would agree to more 
integration was in the realm of security and defense.  Second, if the EU were to become more 
powerful military, it would mean that the US could concentrate on more difficult tasks and more 
prescient ones.  Third, Bosnia and later Kosovo showed that without the US, Europeans were 
unable to deal with a crisis in their own backyard.  Blair also believed that the US would not 
always be available to deal with “European” crisis.  Fourth, Franco-British cooperation on the 
ground during the war in Bosnia had been good.  Finally the development of the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO seemed to stagnate.  If for NATO to 
survive, European integration had to take the road of defense, Tony Blair was ready.  
On the French side, Jacques Chirac also operated a U-turn in French foreign policy.  As 
soon as he came into power, he decided a rapprochement with NATO.  During the war in 
Kosovo, a de facto cooperation was established, France agreeing to put its military under NATO 
command.  In addition, France also wanted to capitalize on the military cooperation with the 
British during the war in Bosnia.  
Together with the institutional changes decided at the European Councils of Helsinki, 
Feira, and Nice establishing the new foreign and military structures, the St-Malo summit 
launched what is now known as the ESDP.  The Cologne European Council of June 1999 put 
crisis management operations at the heart of ESDP.  Crisis management operations are also 
referred to as Petersberg tasks, by the name of a ministerial Council meeting of the WEU held in 
                                                 
19 For a in-depth analysis of the Saint-Malo Declaration, see Howorth, Jolyon, “Britain, France and the European 
Defense Initiative”,  Survival, vol. 42, n. 2, Summer 2000, pg 33 
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 Petersberg, Germany in June 1992 that formulated these tasks.  The Petersberg tasks are 
humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking.  The Cologne European Council stated that the Union 
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means 
to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises 
without prejudice to actions by NATO. 
At the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 the EU leaders committed 
themselves to the Headline Goal of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 men deployable 
within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year by 200320.  The attribution of troops to the 
RRF is on a voluntary basis, each state deciding on the number of troops it is ready to commit to 
the EU.  It was however widely agreed that the RRF was not fully ready in 2003 because of 
important capability shortfalls.  The Nice European Council in December 200021 put in place 
within the Council of the EU the new permanent politico-military institutions such as the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee (MC)22.  There are still 
however no defense ministers meetings that take place within the EU framework; although EU 
defense ministers meet informally, there is no official agenda for the talks.  The EU now also has 
a Situation Center (SitCen).  The center assesses all available information in timely fashion to 
alert the High Representative of looming conflicts.  When necessary, an ad hoc Crisis Cell can be 
                                                 
20 France took the engagement to contribute a fifth of the global objective of military capabilities and if necessary, to 
take responsibility for being the head-nation. 
21 As David Galloway notes, given the reluctance with which some member states viewed the prospect of treaty 
change in this area, this proposal passed remarkably easily.  The proposal he is referring to is the one contained in 
Article 25 of the Treaty of Nice according to which the Council authorizes the PSC for the duration of crisis 
management operations to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the 
operation.  See Galloway, David, The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Realities and Illusions of Power in the EU, 
England: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001, pg. 156 
22 The Chairman of the MC appointed in 2001 is the former Finnish Chief of Defense, four-star general Gustav 
Hägglund.  It is interesting that the first EU Military Chairman came from a “neutral” country, another sign for the 
four neutral that at the time the EU was not going to be dealing with territorial defense.  When the first military staff 
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 formed to coordinate EU crisis management with the EU Commission and the EU Presidency.  
The SitCen simultaneously stays in contact with the situation rooms at NATO, the OSCE, and 
the UN.  It is however not comparable to its NATO or national counterparts in terms of 
personnel, technical support and access to intelligence.   
The ESDP was declared operational at the Laeken Summit of December 200123, as was 
requested by the Conclusions of the Nice Summit – but this was more a political decision to 
show that this time the EU was serious about becoming a credible international actor (especially 
after the 09/11 attacks on the US).  Indeed, at the moment, the EU is only able to perform the 
lower end of the Petersberg tasks and the agreement with NATO24, on the EU use of NATO 
military assets when NATO as a whole is not engaged (mainly NATO’s logistical and planning 
facilities) was only signed a year later at the Copenhagen Summit of December 200225.  It is also 
                                                                                                                                                             
moved in Brussels, there was only about 30 staff with hardly any desks or computers.  Today the military staff 
comprises about 140 persons.   
23 The very outspoken Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Louis Michel also declared at Laeken that the EU was ready 
to send a peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan with about 3,000 to 4,000 troops from the 15 member-states.  He 
was quickly refuted by other member-states. 
24 One of the points of contention to the exchange of information between the EU and NATO was the transparency 
issue.  The EU is step by step developing a security culture into its predominantly civil structures.  NATO and some 
member-states were concerned about the leaks.  The High Representative therefore introduced in 2000 a tough new 
code on the protection of classified information applicable to the Secretariat General of the Council.  Not only did 
the military and security EU personnel moved to a new building responding to higher norms of security, but access 
to documents has also been restricted.  Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands took the Council to the ECJ, on the 
grounds that the new rules were violating article 255 of the Treaty of the EU that guarantees public access to EU 
documents, as well as article 28 that explicitly applied article 255 to the CFSP.  The matter was resolved by 
allowing four selected members of the European Parliament to be debriefed on CFSP/ESDP matters, after they had 
received security clearance from their country.   
25 A final agreement between the EU and NATO was held by continuous Greek and 
Turkish opposition.  Turkey, a non-EU NATO member, wanted a veto-right over any 
ESDP operations, while such a guarantee was unacceptable for Greece.  Turkey feared 
being overridden during the planning phase before actions by the EU force.  Although the 
agreement does not give Turkey a right of veto on ESDP operations, the EU leaders have 
decided to enable non-EU European allies, such as Turkey to raise concerns if an EU 
operation is conducted in its geographic proximity or if it risks affecting its national 
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 in 2001, that the WEU was integrated in the EU, the “new WEU” only keeping its role as a 
traditional military alliance, as defined in its article V26.   
In 2002, the first crisis management exercise was conducted to test if the EU had 
acquired the necessary structures to integrate both military and civil aspects in crisis 
management.  The exercise conducted with the EU member-states and the EU institutions 
evaluated a series of procedures and structures of crisis management in the phase before action.  
The scenario was that of an island in the Atlantic with ethnic problems where the 15 member-
                                                                                                                                                             
security interests.  It also says that “the NATO EU strategy cooperation and the 
implementation of the Berlin Plus will be confined to NATO members and those non-
NATO EU members that have subscribed to the Partnership for Peace framework 
program.”  This means that Cyprus and Malta will have no say in the use of NATO assets, 
although they would still be able to decide on issues related to ESDP.  Malta is a neutral 
country, while Cyprus is in the process of putting into place arrangements that would lead 
to a demilitarization of the island.  The EU leaders thus accepted that Cyprus would not 
take part in any EU military operation that uses NATO assets.  Cyprus and Malta however 
will be able to participate in ESDP decisions and actions, as long as those decisions do not 
concern the implementation of operations conducted using NATO assets.  The Conclusions 
of the Summit stated that “under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used 
against an ally on the understanding, reciprocally, that NATO military crisis management 
will not undertake any action against the EU or its member-states”.  Solana was given 
mandate by the EU member-states to continue negotiations with NATO on the base of the 
text negotiated by the member-states at the Brussels Summit of October 2002.  Solana’s 
role was crucial in pushing Turkey to accept Berlin +.  To that extent, and showing the 
importance Solana took in the EU CFSP is that the Copenhagen Agreement was signed by 
both Solana and Robertson. 
The EU-NATO Security Pact was however only signed in March 2003.  The Pact mainly allows for the exchange of 
classified information.  The sticking point was access by the EU to classified information as four EU states are 
neutral and thus do not belong to NATO.  See footnote 26. 
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 states would be informed about how the EU would like to act.  The second exercise was 
conducted in 2003 jointly with NATO; its objective was to enhance the coordination between all 
EU actors involved in crisis management as well as with NATO.  In both exercises, consultations 
were added with non-EU NATO members and other EU candidate countries.  Representatives 
from the UN and the OSCE were invited as observers.   
Although ESDP is today definitely a reality, it still leads at regular interval to differences 
between France and the UK as to its fundamentals.  As Jolyon Howorth notes, for France, ESDP 
is first and foremost a European project, which nevertheless assumes readiness, when necessary, 
to make use of an Atlanticist instrument, NATO.  For the UK, the starting-point is of the best 
means of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance, and the solution has been identified as the creation 
of a European instrument: ESDP.  […]  The capacity of the British and the French to talk past 
each other has not been entirely transcended, despite textual agreement on specific objectives27.   
b) The EU Military Operations 
The EU launched its first military mission28, taking over from NATO in the FYROM on 
April 1, 200329.  The goal of the mission was to provide security for the monitors overseeing 
implementation of the Ohrid agreement between Macedonians and Albanians30.  Although a low-
risk operation, involving only around 400 men (from 13 EU states and 14 non-EU states), the 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 The WEU also survives through its article 9, which states that a parliamentary assembly controls the ministerial 
Council.  To manage both articles, a small secretariat of 29 people is also being kept.  The Institute for Security 
Studies in France and the Satellite Center in Torejon, Spain fell under the EU’s authority.  
27 Howorth, Jolyon, op. cit., pg 36 
28 The EU was already in FYROM through the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) comprising 24 unarmed observers 
in charge of managing and analyzing the situation on the ground. 
29 The Pentagon was also concerned about the EU taking over this operation and tried to delay it as long as possible, 
fearing a third open-ended military commitment in the Balkans on top of Bosnia and Kosovo.  The EU Special 
Envoy was also pushing for the EU to take over from NATO as soon as September 2001 and continue collecting 
arms from the Albanians.  However, the idea was not met with a lot of enthusiasm.     
30 The first NATO operation was launched in August 2001 as of a 30-day mission with 3,500 troops assigned to 
collect weapons from paramilitary forces of the ethnic Albanian minority and was under British command.  The 
mission was replaced in September 2001 by another NATO operation of 700 troops for 6 months led by a German 
commander and was scaled down to 400 in 2002.  At that time, it was led by The Netherlands.   
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 FYROM mission was largely seen as the key-test of the EU willingness to make its ESDP 
operational.  The operation used NATO assets and a FYROM operation cell was installed at 
NATO military headquarters in Mons, Belgium.  A NATO Admiral was appointed as operation 
commander for EU-led crisis management units31, while French General Pierre Maral was 
appointed as force commander (France had the most troops on the ground). NATO needed to be 
involved because of a need to coordinate the Macedonian operation with the two other NATO-
led operations in the Balkans, in Kosovo and in Bosnia, in case for instance an extraction force 
was necessary if things went badly in FYROM.  As Giovanna Bono underlines, although the 
EU’s Political and Security Committee exercises overall political and strategic direction for the 
operation, under the advice of the European Council, it works closely with NATO.  […] It is 
apparent that NATO is in overall charge of the operation if the situation on the ground 
deteriorates.  This is because the EU has as yet insufficient military capabilities under the direct 
command of its military staff to engage in peace-enforcement type of operations and because 
there is no full consensus within the EU whether such tasks should become integral to the 
ESDP32.  
Some member-states, such as France and Belgium, were ready to launch the operation 
without having a final agreement signed between NATO and the EU arguing that the Europeans 
could easily take over the NATO mission without Berlin Plus since most of the 700 soldiers 
already on the ground were Europeans.  Others countries however such as the United Kingdom 
and Germany, did not want to establish a precedent33.  In addition, some experts argued that the 
                                                 
31 German Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe at NATO. 
32 Bono, Giovanna, “Operation Concordia: the First Step Towards a New Strategic EU-NATO Relationship?”, 
Internationale Politik – Weltpolotok.net 
33 Such a division of opinion had occurred earlier in March 2001.  The object of the disagreement was the formation 
of a standby rescue force in Kosovo whose role was to protect thirty EU unarmed civilians sent to Southern Serbia 
to monitor the most hazardous section of the buffer zone.  The EU’s General Affairs Council agreed to increase the 
number of monitors from nine to 30 deployed in the three-mile ground safety zone where Albanian extremists were 
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 NATO FYROM mission had an agreement with NATO’s 1,200-strong KFOR rear forces in 
Kosovo and Macedonia to provide security, search, and extraction in case NATO or the EU 
monitors in Macedonia came under attack.  The difference between these two groups of 
countries reflected the fundamental ambiguity of Saint-Malo, with the UK wanted to use ESDP 
as an instrument for improving Europe’s military capabilities through a strong institutional link 
with NATO, while France views ESDP as becoming in the long term, more distant from, if not 
independent from NATO.  The operation did not start until April 2003 because of the lack of an 
agreement with NATO.  At the end of 2002, France even blocked plans in NATO for an 
extension of the mission, insisting that the EU should be given every opportunity to take over the 
mission if it is ready.  
Most of the costs for the operation34 were borne by the participating nations because this 
was a military operation that could thus not be financed by the community budget.  Member-
states had to agree on an estimate before hand of the common costs incurred by all the 
participant countries such as barracks for lodging.  However, expenditures related to 
                                                                                                                                                             
carrying out attacks against the Serbian police.  However, the expanded team was not going to cross the Kosovo 
border into the Presevo Valley until a military back-up force was agreed upon to rescue them if they were taken 
hostage or caught in cross-fire.  NATO was ready to provide the military standby force because of the presence of its 
troops in Kosovo.  However, some member-states, led by France suggested that the protection of the monitors 
should be handed to a European-led unit.   
 
34 Another problem slowing the actual launch of ESDP was the lack of agreement among member-states regarding 
the financing of ESDP operations.  The decision only came in July 2002.  The Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed 
that the non-military costs of the EU military operations were to be financed from a common budget, while the 
military costs were to be considered as individual costs and were to be financed on a “costs lie were they fall” basis.  
Only France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Greece were in favor of paying the costs of military operations from 
the EU budget.  All other countries, especially Germany, wanted to split the costs in common and individual costs.  
Neutral EU countries especially did not want to support the burden of military operations but agreed with sharing 
the cost of non-military aspects of military operations.  The decision also entailed that the costs for the headquarters 
for EU-led operations (transport costs, administration, locally hired personnel, communications, transportation/travel 
within the operation area of HQ, barracks, public information, representation and lodging) would be considered 
common costs on a case-by-case basis.  All costs related to the troops were to be supported by the member states 
taking part in the military operation.  Finally it was agreed that the general framework for financing operations 
having military or defense implications will be reviewed after a first operation is concluded or by June 2004, taking 
into account the lessons learnt from the conduct of operations and their administration.      
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 transportation of the forces were not eligible for payment as common costs and were incurred by 
the respective member-states35.   
The military operation was replaced in December 2003 by a 200-strong police mission36, 
the second police operation for the EU.  In January 2003, the EU had indeed taken over the UN 
police mission in Bosnia37.  These three Balkan operations show the continued commitment of 
the EU to the consolidation of stability and the rule of law in the region, within the objectives of 
the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).  The promotion of European standards of 
policing in FYROM is part of the EU’s wider strategy of supporting the process of reform, 
including institution building, administrative and judicial reforms, and fight against crime and 
corruption.  It also shows the symbiotic relationship between the first and second pillar and is 
proof of the EU new-found effectiveness in the Balkans.  
                                                 
35 See previous footnote 
36 The role of the mission is to help the country fight the rise in organized crime trough monitoring, mentoring, and 
advising. 
37 The EU police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) is made up of 512 men, 422 of whom from member-states and 90 from 
third countries, including Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and Canada.  Third countries 
participating in the mission have to pay an entry fee of 25,000Euro a year, which comes on top of a budget of 38 
million euro from 2003 to 2005 (20 million from the CFSP budget and 18 from member-states).  The entry fee is in 
addition to the cost of personnel on the ground that all states pay and that differ according to country.  The head of 
the mission is a Dane, Sven Christian Frederiksen.  Although the EUPM is an independent body, it is directly linked 
to the Commission via a contract between the police officer who heads the mission and the Commission services, 
providing him with the required operational budgetary means.  The EUPM also receives advice and support from the 
Commission regarding legal, administrative, and financial questions.  The financing of the EUPM in Bosnia led to 
difficult negotiations among the member-states and between the member-states and the EU institutions.  Indeed, the 
38 millions Euro needed for the operation could not all come from the CFSP budget because at the time it was 
almost entirely spent.  Only 28 millions were available.  It was not conceivable to ask for more money from the 
European Parliament, because the latter has almost nothing to say about CFSP spending, and thus is very reluctant to 
see the CFSP budget increased.  The best solution would have been to increase the CFSP budget, through article 28 
of the treaty, which says that when an expenditure is not put in the EC budget, it is then the member-states who must 
pay for it based on the GDP of each of them.  Germany was opposed to such a solution for obvious reasons: it would 
have meant that it had to contribute the most.  Germany was particularly reluctant to establish a precedent.  The 
German problem was also a domestic conflict between the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Joschka Fischer and 
the German Finances Minister, Hans Eichel.     
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 On June 12, 2003, the EU launched a second military operation, this time in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo38 at the request of the UN where a civil war was going on.  Kofi 
Annan, the UN Secretary General, asked France to lead an operation in the region in order to 
give time to the UN peacekeepers to get ready for their operation.  Jacques Chirac contacted the 
United Kingdom to see if it would help with the operation.  The question was also raised of 
making this operation a genuine EU operation, without the use of NATO assets.  The response 
was positive.  This operation held more risks than the one in Macedonia, but it was largely 
regarded as a French operation under EU label, as most of the troops (900 out of 1500) and the 
command structure were French39.  The operational headquarters were located in Paris and 
included staff members from the Secretariat of the EU Council and officers from several 
participating member-states, including Belgium and Germany.  Third states were invited to 
participate.  As mentioned in the Nice Treaty, the Political and Security Committee exercised 
under the responsibility of the Council the political control and strategic direction of the 
operation.  For France, the operation was a precedent to show that the EU could act without the 
use of NATO assets.  The EU-led operation in Bunia allowed former colonial powers such as 
France and Belgium to come back to Africa through the back door.40 
What these two first military operations seem to point at is that rather than having the EU 
acting coherently as a whole in ESDP, military operations in ESDP work more as coalitions of 
the willing, with the EU and/or NATO providing the legitimizing umbrella. 
                                                 
38 The aim of the force was to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia; to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps 
in Bunia and to contribute to the safety of the civilian populations, UN personnel, and the humanitarian presence in 
the town. 
39 The operation ended on September 1st,, 2003 when the UN took over. 
40 Rwanda for instance had expressed misgivings about France’s return in the region. 
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 c) Latest Developments 
Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair met in February 2003.  Although no agreement was found 
on the Iraq question, convergence occurred on different issues intended to boost the ESDP power 
projection (particularly for missions in Africa41, in addition to the Balkans) and to increase 
military capabilities in order to undertake several simultaneous peacekeeping operations.  At this 
bilateral meeting, it was agreed to pool British and French aircraft carriers for humanitarian and 
peacekeeping missions and to use national operational headquarters for ESDP missions.  The 
scheme would be to rotate Britain’s carriers with those of France, Spain and Italy, allowing at 
least one to be kept available for such non-NATO missions.  The two countries also announced 
that they intended to work together on the design and construction of new aircraft carriers.  In 
addition France and the UK agreed on a solidarity clause42, as well as on the creation of an 
armament agency (to avoid waste and duplication), both topics discussed at the time in the 
Convention on the future of the EU.  
Despite this agreement and at the height of the Iraq crisis in April 2003, the Belgian 
Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt invited his colleagues, the prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-
Paul Juncker, the President of France Jacques Chirac, and the Chancellor of Germany Gerard 
Schroeder, to meet in Brussels to discuss the creation of an independent European military 
headquarter in Tervuren, in a separate building than the NATO building43.  This initiative was 
                                                 
41 What is of particular interest to both countries, as the Bunia operation shows, is improving their military 
capabilities for intervention in Africa.  The competition over Africa between Great Britain and France has now 
receded, especially since the French operation Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994, which led France to have become 
persona non grata in some African countries.  The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan is reportedly equally warm to 
the idea of the EU providing a Rapid Reaction Capability for the UN that the latter lacks. – See Grant, C., “A 
European View of ESDP”, Presented at the CEPS-IISS meeting in Brussels, 09/10/2001     
 
42 The solidarity clause is included in the text of the Constitution and refers to the idea that in case of a terrorist 
attack or a natural or man-made disaster on the territory of one member state of the EU, the other would help that 
state. 
43 The FT reported that the Belgian plan was even going further than that and was calling for a European army.  This 
was accepted neither by France, or Germany, because the two countries did not want to appear as too anti-American.  
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 not well received in the US and in the Atlanticist countries.  What is more, Javier Solana and the 
Greek Presidency were not invited at the Summit.  In addition it came just after the “Berlin +” 
between the EU and NATO agreements had finally been signed.  The ideas developed by “the 
gang of 4” were referred to by Nicholas Burns, the US Permanent Representative to NATO, as 
“the most serious threat to NATO ever” that “would mean the end of NATO.44”   
However, besides the independent European headquarter, the four countries offered few 
new ideas compared to what was being proposed in the context of the Constitutional Convention.  
For instance, it was suggested that the Franco-German brigade be expanded to include units from 
Belgium and Luxembourg and that a European command for strategic air transport be created.  
European training centers for airlift and helicopter crews would also be set up to harmonize 
tactics.  The establishment of EU-Fast (European Union First Aid and Support) to dispatch 
emergency humanitarian aid within 24 hours of disasters was also proposed, as well as the 
creation of a joint European “protection capability” to guard troops and civilians against the risk 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks.  The initiative was obviously extremely 
political because military realities were not even taken into account such as the poor state of the 
Belgian army or the fact that the only thing Luxembourg could bring to it was a reconnaissance 
                                                                                                                                                             
Germany also prevented any reference to an “independent” central military headquarter and kept London informed 
of the content of the final summit document.  (see Dempsey, Judy, “Germany and France to water down defense 
plan”, Financial Times, April 27, 2003 and Dempsey, Judy and Dinmore, Guy, “Defense Plan could rival NATO”, 
Financial Times, April 29, 2003) 
44 Fear about the ESDP is recurrent in American administrations.  Under the Clinton administration, then Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen told his European colleagues that if they did not start spending more on their military and 
work out a clear EU-NATO relationship, NATO could become a relic of history (cited in Security Watch, December 
7, 2000).  The fear has always been that the EU steps in security and defense would duplicate NATO’s extensive 
planning capacity.  Cohen even suggested that as part of a future NATO-EU link (this was in 2000, 2 years before 
the Copenhagen agreement), a common defense planning process involving all 23 NATO and EU countries was the 
only logical and cost effective way to insure the best possible coordination of limited forces and resources. 
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 unit.  The Belgian initiative was however mentioned in the Conclusions of the Thessaloniki 
Summit of June 200345.  
Once the Iraq war was over and parties begun to mend fences, Tony Blair46 met both 
Chirac and Schroeder in Berlin in September 200347 where an agreement on the question of the 
headquarters was found and finalized in November 2003, as well as acknowledged by the 
Brussels European Council of December 200348.   
Once again, such as at Saint-Malo, the agreement testifies to the compromise that 
occurred between the United Kingdom and France.  The United Kingdom presented its partners 
with the idea of a planning unit for the EU’s ESDP operations to be created as part of SHAPE.  It 
                                                 
45 The Council’s Conclusions state that the European Council noted a report by Prime Minister Verhofstadt on the 
meeting on 29 April 2003 on ESDP. 
 
46 Some commentators argue that the reason Blair agreed to the compromise was not only to mend fences with its 
partners, but also to make up for a loss of influence in Europe.  As Ilana BetEl writes, Britain is losing its senior 
position of power in both Europe and NATO, without having acquired the influence it gambled upon gaining by 
joining the US in the Iraq war.  Britain has realized that if it does not join – or even lead- the EU initiative, it will 
remain on the periphery of European decision-making.  […]  With the decision of Lord Robertson to decline a 
second term as a secretary general of NATO, it has lost its most significant high office and position of power on the 
Continent.  […]  Because Britain does not belong to the euro zone, it is not really possible for a Briton to hold any 
post in the EU higher than that of commissioner.  (see Ilana BetEl, “Britain sees defense as a way back to Europe”, 
International Herald Tribune, November 25, 2003    
47 In Berlin, Tony Blair was quoted as saying that he understood the need for a European military headquarter.  After 
the US expressed deep irritation, the British government gradually made clear its opposition to an EU military 
headquarter located outside NATO.  It also appears that the decisions taken by the British, French, and German 
leaders in Berlin were at odds with what their respective defense ministries wanted to see.  Blair’s defense ministry 
particularly thought that the British Prime Minister went too far towards possible duplication in planning between 
the EU and NATO (The UK Defense Ministry had already been greatly opposed to Saint-Malo).  The French and 
German defense ministries also have strong reservations about an independent EU planning headquarter, fearing 
their own national headquarter would be undermined.  In addition, Germany has recently completed the building of 
a new military headquarter in Postdam intending to use it as a multinational base for exercises, training, and EU-led 
missions.  (see Dempsey, Judy, “Europe’s leaders at odds with ministers on defense”, Financial Times, October 14, 
2003).  According to an internal document approved by the three leaders in Berlin, the EU should be endowed with a 
joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without resources to NATO resources and capabilities.  Our goal 
remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either in consensus with the 25 [member states] 
but also in a circle of interested parties.  (Benoit, Bertrand and Hall, Ben, “Europe’s big three closer on defense”, 
Financial Times, September 21, 2003). 
At Berlin, Blair also dropped its objections to the idea of “structured cooperation”, in which a group of countries 
would take the lead in creating more integrated defense structures and better capabilities while setting criteria for 
others wishing to join.  Blair movement was partially the result of its understanding of the situation that Berlin and 
Paris were going to move ahead in European defense regardless.  Blair previously resisted structured cooperation as 
divisive, by fear that France would use them to compete with NATO.   
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 was decided that a group of EU military planners will be established in the NATO building and 
that the EU strategic planners in Brussels will have a reinforced staff of operational planners for 
EU operations conducted without NATO assets, if all EU member-states agreed.  The EU 
military planning cell would only be used as a last resort and would not become a fully-fledged 
military headquarter.  The deal indicates that, when carrying out military operations, the EU will 
always in the first instance consider using NATO facilities.  If that is not appropriate, then the 
EU will resort to using the existing facilities in member-states.  Only as a last resort will it set up 
a planning cell to carry out an operation49.  As a further concession to the US and the UK, France 
and Germany also agreed that NATO could have a permanent liaison office at the EU military 
headquarter in Brussels.  In addition, Blair ensured that the EU’s new constitution would not 
contain a mutual defense clause and that defense decisions would remain subject to national 
veto.   
It took a lot of diplomacy from Tony Blair to persuade its US colleagues that the solution 
found did not mean that the EU was developing against NATO.  What was unacceptable for both 
the US and NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson was an EU operational planning staff 
independent of NATO, while abler EU military capabilities and even a mutual defense clause in 
the EU’s future constitution were acceptable.  Both the US and NATO were sticking to the 
Berlin Plus agreement –which meant that NATO was given a right of first refusal- arguing that 
this agreement already provided for the EU to do its operations, using the national operational-
planning assets of originally Germany, France, and the UK, as well as additional individual 
countries as they build their own capabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                             
48 It was first informally discussed (meaning the topic was not formally part of the agenda) among the Fifteen at the 
Naples meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in November 2003. 
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 These various meetings and decisions during a time of high tensions show how much 
Europe has become intertwined.  As the Financial Times rightly noted, Germany needed 
Britain’s support for NATO to play a greater role in Afghanistan; how Italy desperately wanted 
a success full EU Presidency […] so that Mr. Berlusconi will have to win over President Jacques 
Chirac of France to achieve that; and how Madrid needed the maximum of cooperation from 
Paris in its fight against ETA.  […]  It also needs Berlin to pick up the lion’s share of the costs of 
enlargement.  Britain, meanwhile, needs German support to keep the enlargement timetable on 
track as Paris grows reluctant to allowing in the Atlanticists from the former eastern block50.   
It also shows how much the UK and France are crucial to the development of the ESDP.  
When an agreement is found among the two in that field, the other member-states usually follow 
their lead. 
Finally, it emphasizes the key role of the US and therefore of NATO in the development 
of a more security-oriented EU. 
d) The EU Security Strategy 
In December 2003, the EU member-states agreed on the first EU Security Strategy.  The 
Security Strategy drawn by Solana’s office was first presented to the European Council of 
Thessaloniki in June 2003.  The member-states asked Solana to re-draft it for the December 
Council meeting.  Between May and December, three workshops were held, respectively in 
Rome, Paris, and Stockholm and bringing together diplomats from the EU and national capitals, 
as well as representatives from think-tanks and civil groups.  The sharpest exchanges occurred 
                                                                                                                                                             
49 The original Saint-Malo plan was that the two countries would put their fully developed joint service headquarters 
and their planning capabilities at the disposal of the EU for EU-led operations and to incorporate into them officers 
from other states.   
50 Dempsey, Judy, “UK and France push ahead on EU defense goals”, Financial Times, March 13, 2003 
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 over the use of force51.  While the June doctrine spoke of “preemptive engagement to avoid more 
serious problems” in the future, the December doctrine says almost nothing about the use of 
force.  References to preemption have been excised.  The possible use of first-strike military 
action was mentioned in the first draft, written principally by Robert Cooper, former foreign 
policy adviser to Tony Blair and now working for Javier Solana.  In the December strategy, 
largely at German and French insistence, it was excluded.  Instead, the term used is “preventive 
engagement” and “effective multilateralism”.   
The doctrine however still spells out how the EU must put teeth on its traditional soft 
power tools of political and economic pressure.  For example, the EU should be much more 
prepared to use carrots of assistance and the stick of sanctions to encourage better governance.  
When these measures have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
international law could be envisioned (the underlining is mine).  But the EU should also focus on 
spending more on defense, reducing the duplication of military assets such as tanks and 
helicopters, and increase civilian planning during and after crises.   
The EU Strategic Doctrine52 came at an interesting time in transatlantic relations.  Just 
after the bitter divisions within the EU and with the US over the Iraq war, the support for the 
doctrine reflected the need for a more muscular foreign policy to deal with weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), terrorism, and the conflicts of the post-Cold war area.  It came at a time of 
deep transatlantic divisions, just as the Document on European Identity in 1973.  Such as that 
                                                 
51 Dempsey, J., “Europe’s words of war”, Financial Times, December 4, 2003 
52 it is interesting to note that the agreement over the EU security doctrine really caused concerned in Iran, even 
though the EU was ready to continue its policy of “constructive engagement”, based on negotiating a trade and 
cooperation agreement in parallel to programs on human rights, terrorism, the Middle East Peace Process, the fight 
against weapons of mass destruction and a close cooperation with IAEA.  Iran was so preoccupied with the doctrine 
that it sent the chairman of the national security and foreign policy committee of the Iranian parliament to see 
Solana.  The EU developed its position in close cooperation with Washington, in order to prevent Iran to play on the 
divisions between the US and the EU.  In October 2003, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder went to 
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 document, it reaffirms the important of that relationship, while trying to define an independent 
EU course of action in the international arena.  Finally, it came at a time when the EU was itself 
deeply changing, just before the enlargement to 10 new countries.  The doctrine is the result of 
traditional EU comprises and was unanimously agreed upon because all the national foreign 
policy tendencies were reflected in it.  At the same time, this is probably why the doctrine is 
quite vague on how to go about implementing its concepts.  In the words of Judy Dempsey from 
the Financial Times, Gerhard Schroeder embraced the doctrine because of Berlin’s strong 
support for multilateral institutions53; President Jacques Chirac of France did so because it spelt 
out how countries, including the US, could not act alone and expect to be effective.  The 10 
candidate countries […] openly welcomed the doctrine because of the explicit support for the US 
and NATO.54  It is also interesting to note that the EU doctrine was presented ahead of the annual 
EU-US summit in Washington where it was also positively received. 
In a shift towards US strategic thinking, the EU adopted, together with the security 
strategy, a plan to combat proliferation of WMD and to give the fight against WMD priority in 
the EU’s relations with third countries55.  The US national security strategy, written in the 
aftermath of the attacks of September 11 forced Europe to think harder about the threat posed by 
rogue states and international terrorism.   
 The security strategy might prove helpful to define an EU strategic culture thanks to 
which member-states would be able to develop common assessments of situations.  If European 
cannot agree on threats and how to deal with them, EU foreign policy will never succeed.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
Teheran to pressure the leadership there.  They came back with an agreement that may not be completely 
independent from the new EU security doctrine.   
53 Originally, Germany opposed any reference to the use of force, but gave in after pressure from France. 
54 Dempsey, Judy, “Big powers Get Behind EU Foreign Policy”, Financial Times, June 20, 2003 
55 The first test-case of this new policy is the trade agreement that is currently being negotiated between the EU and 
Syria.   
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 exploration of the Yugoslav case below is a perfect example of bitter EU divisions and 
ineffectiveness.  What is more, as Gordon Adams notes, an ambitious European diplomacy can 
succeed only if military forces are an integral part of the overall strategy.  Today’s pursuit of an 
EU military capability lacks any link to a common vision – what are its forces for?56   
 Just days after the security doctrine was adopted, at the biannual US-EU Summit in 
Washington, the US and the EU (represented by the new troika, Romano Prodi, Javier Solana, 
and the Greek Presidency) agreed on ways to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.  Negotiations were tough to reconcile differences and although the use of force was 
not specifically mentioned, the joint statement noted that “other measures in accordance with 
international law may be needed to combat proliferation.”  Washington however accepted a 
greater support for multilateral regimes to combat the spread of WMD, while the EU recognized 
the new global threats posed by these weapons and terrorism.  The statement reads: 
“Proliferation is a threat […] also in the wider international system.  We call for a halt to 
proliferation activities in a way that is demonstrable and verifiable.  We need to tackle it 
individually and collectively […] through relevant international institutions, in particular those of 
the United Nations57.”  What was agreed was a reinforcement of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), making additional protocols such as enhanced inspections, the norm for nuclear 
cooperation.  The IAEA’s budget would also be increased “to ensure the credibility” of its 
verification system.  Export controls on materials and technologies related to WMD and their 
delivery systems will be strengthened, with tougher national control leading to criminal penalties 
for illegally exporting such material. 
                                                 
56 Adams, Gordon, “Europe should learn to fend for itself”, Financial Times, July 1, 2003 
57 Cited in Dempsey, Judy, “US and EU agree on halting spread of arms”, Financial Times, June 25, 2003 
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  Again, the episode of the security doctrine shows the importance of the transatlantic 
relation. 
e) Capabilities Shortfalls 
 One of the major problems of a real security and defense policy of the EU is the military 
capability shortfall of the EU member-states.  The EU is extremely weak with regard to strategic 
airlift, reconnaissance planes, air-to-air refueling, precision missiles, and helicopter operations 
and more general in the C3I.   As Daniel Keohane reports, European troops needed US planes to 
take them to Macedonia in 2001, because most European armies do not have adequate transport 
capabilities58.  With most defense budgets having been reduced since the end of the Cold War59, 
the problem does not seem to find an issue.  Some argue that the problem does not lie in the lack 
of spending but in the way the money is spent.  There is also the additional problem that some 
EU countries are unwilling to switch resources from national defense to a multinational force.  
As Missiroli and Schmitt note, the hardest challenge is not find some extra billions for defense 
but to overcome the current fragmentation of Europe’s armaments sector.  From the taxpayer’s 
viewpoint, it would be outrageous to increase defense budgets –rather than, say, spending on 
public services- as long as the duplication of industrial capacities, equipment, procurement 
agencies and defense-related regulations across the Union persists and creates such a waste of 
already scarce resources60.      
                                                 
58 Keohane, David, “A Lack of Military Muscle”, The Parliament Magazine, March 10, 2003 
59 There are multiple reasons for the decreasing defense budget: rigidity of fiscal policies (further increased by 
EMU); social and demographic structure of European societies; reluctance of governments to invest in military 
capabilities in the absence of any tangible threat.  Neither the wars in Yugoslavia nor 9-11 have changed that trend 
(except in France – see supra) 
60 Missiroli, Antonio and Schmidt, Burkard, “More Euros for European Capabilities – Budgetary Discipline and/or 
Defense Expenditure?”, Analysis – Institute for Security Studies, June 2002 
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 A step in the right direction was the agreement signed by France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Turkey61 to order about 180 military transport 
planes A400M.  The first planes are expected to be ready by 2010.  Another problem lies in the 
fact that not all EU countries have professional armies.  Germany is a case in point, with an army 
of conscripts, leftover from the Cold War when the most probable scenario was an attack from 
the Soviet Union through East Germany62.  European defense industry also needs to be 
rationalized.   
France also announced in 2002 a six-year plan to boost military spending in a drive to 
narrow the gap between the French and British armed forces63.  The plan covers the ordering of a 
second aircraft carrier and aims to eliminate backlogs in equipment purchases and maintenance.  
Its overall defense budget will rise from about 1.8 per cent of gross domestic product today to 
more than 2 per cent.  In February 2004, Jacques Chirac chose to build a conventionally powered 
second aircraft carrier, paving the way for possible industrial synergies with the UK.  The French 
President rejected alternative proposals to build an exclusively French vessel with nuclear 
propulsion to match the Charles de Gaulle.  This decision came after the Summit of Le Touquet 
between France and the United Kingdom in February 2003 where both leaders agreed to consider 
how to cooperate on aircraft carriers, both industrially and operationally, as the UK was planning 
to build two new conventional flagships.   
                                                 
61 Italy was part of the deal too but dropped out of it for budgetary reasons.  For the same reasons, Germany also 
reduced the number of planes it had ordered from 73 to 60. 
62 Under Gerhard Schroeder however, Germany’s armed forces have been transformed from a purely defensive force 
to one able to undertake overseas missions.  As of today about 10,000 German troops are abroad, most of them 
peacekeepers, mainly in Afghanistan and in the Balkans.     
63 The fear in France was really that the place of France in Europe would be weakened if the gap between French 
and British defense spending was to become too wide.  On July 14, 2002, Chirac stated that for a while now, we 
have failed to keep up with Britain.  This will lead to heavy consequences regarding our political power.  See Le 
Monde July 17, 2002.  The problem also lies in the fact that France has not completely adapted yet to the change to a 
professional army.  Indeed, France had for instance in 2001 1.4 more military and civilian personnel than the UK.  
The gap with the UK is even wider if one looks at the budget for research and development.   
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  July 2003 also saw the creation of a joint Franco-German training college for helicopter 
pilots and mechanics.  The pilots will conduct simulation exercises and training courses on 25 
Tiger attacks helicopters with the aim of harmonizing training and working methods between the 
two air forces.  France and Germany have ordered 80 Tigers.  French and German generals will 
take turns every three years in commanding the school.  The joint Tiger helicopter attack force 
will then be placed at the service of the EU’s nascent force.  
 Finally, in February 2004, the UK and France decided to join forces to create a string of 
highly trained, rapid-deployment units for combat in jungle, desert, and mountain operations.  
The initiative sets out a detailed agenda and timetable describing how and where the new units 
will conduct missions and at what level they will be trained.  London and Paris want the units to 
work closely – but not exclusively – with the UN.  Depending on the mission, they might have 
access to NATO resources.  The battle groups will consist of 1,500 troops deployable in 15 days.  
The missions will last up to 30 days (and be extendable to 3 months) and will be appropriate for, 
but not limited to, use in failed or failing states.  The initiative is open to other EU states, but the 
candidates must show a high degree of interoperability and military effectiveness.  The UK and 
France want the plan accepted by all member-states by June 30 and troops available by 2007.  
Germany will join the Anglo-French combat units, although Germany was initially lukewarm to 
the venture.   
This cooperation is the product of a December 2003 agreement between the three big 
states over “structured cooperation” in defense, after talks over the EU constitution collapsed.  
Although the initiative was spearheaded by the UK and France, Berlin and Paris have started 
51 
 recently cooperating on defense and postwar reconstruction efforts outside Europe.  In Iraq, 
France, Germany, and Japan have decided to combine their efforts in civilian reconstruction64.    
 Another example of the increased cooperation between Germany and France in defense is 
Afghanistan were it was recently agreed that the 5-member Eurocorps (France, Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain) would rotate the command of the 5,500 strong NATO-led 
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) from autumn 2004.  This was proposed by 
Jacques Chirac.  The question arose after Canada, who took over from Germany in February as 
the head of ISAF, announced it would reduce its contingent from 2,000 to 500 starting in August 
2004.  Eurocorps whose strength can reach 50,000 can be engaged in high intensity combat for 
the Brussels Treaty (WEU) or the Washington Treaty (NATO).  This last situation occurred 
when Eurocorps headed in 1998-1999 NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and in 
2000, NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR).  For Europeans, the idea of Eurocorps 
taking over from NATO in Afghanistan presents various advantages.  First, it would boost 
ESDP’s credibility65.  It would indeed show that Europeans do not only undertake small-scale 
and low intensity operations in their immediate neighborhood.  In addition, Franco-German 
cooperation would be reinforced.  The operation would use NATO’s assets.      
   
E. The Future 
Beginning in February 2002, a Convention on the future of the EU met under the 
chairmanship of Valery Giscard d’Estaing, former French President.  The Convention was in 
charge of preparing the ground for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that was held from 
October 2003 until December 2003 under the Italian Presidency.  The Convention submitted its 
                                                 
64 See Dempsey, Judy, “Germany to join Anglo-French combat units”, Financial Times, February 10, 2004. 
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 draft Constitution to the Thessalonica Summit in June 2003.  Although CFSP remained 
intergovernmental in the Draft Constitution, a number of changes were proposed.  
In foreign policy, the Draft Constitution suggests that the High Representative and the Relex 
Commissioner be combined and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs as he/she will be known 
should chair the GAERC.  The new Minister is to be the Vice-President of the Commission in 
charge of external relations.  In addition, the Draft Constitution recommends that “the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, for the field of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other 
fields of external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council”.  Such a reform should ensure 
that in the future the two arms of the EU external relations work better together.  Creating an EU 
foreign policy minister to promote European interests around the world should make a difference.  It 
is a build-up on the position of the High Representative.  The draft makes clear that the new foreign 
minister would be a member of the Commission but an agent of the Council of Ministers, whose 
meetings on foreign affairs he or she would chair. The main centre of gravity of his activities would 
lie within the Council of the EU.  The EU minister for foreign affairs would be answerable to – and 
get his mandate from – his fellow foreign ministers, not fellow Commissioners. 
In addition, the foreign affairs minister would be in charge of a diplomatic service composed 
of the EU delegations around the world.  The idea is to follow from the proposed merger of the jobs 
of Chris Patten and Javier Solana and make sure that officials ‘downstream’ work better together as 
well.  This new diplomatic corps would consist of officials from the Council, the Commission, and 
national diplomatic services – all working for the new EU foreign minister.  The importance of this 
idea is to create an integrated set of officials, coming from all relevant centers of power 
(Commission, Council and, member-states) to promote joined policies for EU external action.  EU 
                                                                                                                                                             
65 See Zecchini, Laurent, “L’Eurocorps pourrait prendre, au cours de l’été, la tête des opérations de l’OTAN en 
Afghanistan”, Le Monde, February 6, 2004 
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 nationals will in the future have the option of working directly as EU diplomats or join their 
respective national services.  
The draft constitution also groups all the provisions related to the EU’s external action under 
a single title.  This improves the readability and permits greater consistency of the EU foreign policy 
instruments. 
With regard to ESDP, enhanced cooperation are allowed in military and defense (the 
Nice Treaty explicitly rejected this option except in the case of armament cooperation or to 
improve military capabilities).  The Draft Constitution also speaks of “structured cooperations” 
that member-states with more developed capabilities can launch for more demanding missions. 
The Draft allows enhanced cooperation for mutual defense, until the time that the European 
Council unanimously decides to a common defense.  A list of member-states participating in this 
type of enhanced cooperation will be annexed to the Constitution when it is adopted.  If a 
member participating in this cooperation is attacked, he can ask for assistance from other 
participating member-states.  The Draft however emphasizes that in order to launch a 
cooperation in mutual defense the member-states will closely work with NATO.   
Second, a solidarity clause is introduced according to which if a member-state is the 
victim of a terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made disaster, he can ask for assistance from 
the other member-states.  Third, the Petersberg tasks are reformulated and go further than crisis 
management operations.  This was necessary because the member-states were interpreting 
differently the aim of the tasks.  Fourth, the Draft proposes the creation of an Armament Agency 
under the authority of the Council of ministers, thus intergovernmental.  The agency role will be 
to develop defense capabilities, research, acquisition and armaments.  The creation of the 
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 armament agency was however approved at the European Council of December 200366.  The 
decision established an important link between research and defense.  Money from the common 
budget will be allowed to be spent to promote research giving the EU more capabilities in ESDP.  
A turf battle followed between the British and the French as to who was going to head the 
agency.  This was indeed not without consequences as to the direction the agency was going to 
take.  For the Italians and the Germans, the agency had to be a small-scale coordination unit.  But 
France wanted the agency to define a European arms procurement strategy.  The UK’s position 
was somewhere in the middle.  It believed that the agency should help national defense 
ministries develop and harmonize armaments across the EU but that the French idea was going 
too far.  The decision was finally made in January 2004 by Javier Solana, because of the 
impossibility for France and the UK to find an agreement.  The head of the agency was going to 
be the Briton Nick Witney, while the head of the EU military HQ was going to be French.  
However the success of the agency will be dependent on how much money the member-states 
are willing to allocate to defense spending. 
 With regard to ESDP, the Draft Constitution definitely puts it in the intergovernmental 
realm.  The ESDP seems to be moving towards an informal organization based on the way 
NATO is working.  Such as in NATO, a traditional military organization and thus purely 
intergovernmental, but a hegemonic organization where one member-state clearly is primus inter 
pares because of its contribution to the organization, the Draft Constitution seems to define the 
ESDP on the same model.  The Draft refers several times to the member-states with the 
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during the course of 2004 in the filed of “defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments” 
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 capacities necessary to execute ESDP tasks.  Is ESDP becoming a defense policy de facto (and to 
a certain extent de jure) dominated by France and the United Kingdom?67 
 The constitutional talks in the IGC collapsed in December 2003, mainly over the general 
question of balance of power within an enlarged EU and more particularly over the questions 
that were already the left-over from Nice, i.e. the composition of the Commission and the 
weighting of votes in the Council of the EU.  The Irish Presidency of the first semester of 2004 
has been asked to see if talks can be continued, and an agreement might be found at the June 
Summit. 
 
F. Conclusions 
 This overview of the historical evolution of the attempts at inducing coordination 
behaviors/institutionalizing foreign policy at the EEC and EU level shows that the external 
environment and more particularly how the EEC/EU member-states saw their position vis-à-vis 
the US was one of the key variables to such a development.  When the transatlantic relationship 
seemed rocky, the member-states were led to the EC/EU table to attempt to speak with one voice 
or at least to find improvements in the coordination of their foreign policies.  Foreign policy 
however, lies at the core of national sovereignty and it is not surprising that another conclusion 
to be drawn from this overview is how France, the UK, and Germany really lied at the core of 
these developments.  The end of the Cold War was also a major element in the qualitative jump 
from EPC to CFSP, such as the Kosovo War was for ESDP and the Iraq War for the further 
developments/refinements to Saint-Malo. 
                                                 
67 It is interesting to note that the “coalitions of the willing” proposed by American Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld and designating a group of nations ready to conduct a military operation as a coalition (by opposition to 
the involvement of organizations as a whole, such as NATO for instance) seem to find their place within the EU in 
the ESDP framework. 
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  However, these developments have also been influenced by more intra-EU factors, 
especially when the question was who should be at the core of the EU foreign policy.  The 
answer to the question was dependent on the preferences of the member-states and of the 
existing EU institutions, with the Commission trying to defend its power.  Because member-
states preferences diverge, the result always has been a compromise between more federalists-
leaning members and more intergovernmentalist ones, or between those favoring a Europe-
puissance and those favoring a weaker Union or more precisely a Europe that stays close to the 
US.  The key position of foreign policy for the definition of national identities also explains why, 
despite the Maastricht Treaty, a clear continuation is visible between EPC and CFSP, with 
member-states keeping the upper hand in the decision-making process.  The increased 
institutionalization of foreign policy at the EU level has also consequently led to increased 
bureaucratic battle between key EU institutions, mainly the Commission and the Secretariat 
General of the Council. 
Nevertheless, despite opposing interests and bureaucratic conflict, it is striking how 
quickly and steadily, since the end of the Cold War particularly, the process has evolved.  It is 
also striking how these internal EU evolutions were shaped by the learning process of policy 
mistakes or the need to improve the coherence of the process.  Forster and Wallace have rightly 
noted that the CFSP has developed by learning in doing.68  From the awkwardness to 
maintaining the EPC Secretariat outside the General Secretariat of the Council to the creation of 
a High Representative and Policy Unit in the same secretariat, from a completely separate 
foreign policy coordination in the EPC to the creation of a united roof in the EU and a joint right 
of initiative for the Commission, the learning process to attempt to improve effectiveness is 
                                                 
68 Forster, A. and Wallace, W., “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, in Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (eds.), 
Policy-making in the European Union, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pg. 477 
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 evident.  Finally, it is interesting to note how the conjunction of these two seemingly divergent 
elements – the willingness to improve effectiveness and the attachment to national sovereignty – 
has led to a steady reinforcement of the Secretariat General of the Council.  Without preempting 
the final conclusions of the thesis, it appears, and the Draft Constitution reinforces the validity of 
this remark, that the Commission is now faced with a new rival institution in external relations. 
As a final point, the historical overview of the EU foreign and security policy has also 
emphasized the key role played by the US since its post-WWII involvement in European 
security, through the creation of NATO, but also through the American support of European 
integration.  Scholars such as Winand69, Gillingham70, and Trachtenberg71 have convincingly 
documented the US close participation in the reconstruction of Europe at the end of WWII.  One 
of Winand’s conclusions in explaining the diminishing interest of Johnson and Nixon in the 
European integration project is the lack of progress of Europeans themselves towards the twin 
goals of economic and political integration.  […]  In recent years, however, the Single European 
Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and other significant developments in Europe have revived the 
interest of the American administration and American academic and business circles in 
European integration72.  If the US loses interest in the EU when the project is struck by 
integration fatigue, then the US intimate involvement in the development of the CFSP and more 
particularly ESDP is all the more understandable.      
CHAPTER THREE - Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
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 Our object of study generally defines the theoretical framework used in a research 
project.  In the case of this dissertation, the object of research being the decision-making 
processes of the EU CFSP (or in Kenneth Waltz’ terminology, the second image73) it seems 
natural to turn to theories that have attempted to conceptualize the inner working of how foreign 
policy is made.  The pace of developments in the second pillar has however been so incredible in 
the past five years, that our intellectual capacity to understand the evolutionary nature of EU 
foreign policy is continually being challenged.  To that extent, scholars of international relations 
have not yet succeeded in developing concepts and theories that allow for a full understanding of 
the foreign policy cooperation within the EU and the EU’s role in the international system.  As 
Roy Ginsberg notes, […] a general theory of EFP cannot be deduced given the historical 
uniqueness and infinite complexity of EFP.  An inductive exercise is preferred.  It allows for an 
incremental building of conceptual knowledge, which must precede a fully blown analytical-
conceptual approach.  In the future, a middle range theory or middle range theories of EFP may 
be induced from what we know of explanatory concepts74.  As will be explained below, the need 
to empirically understand how CFSP works before being able to produce a theoretical 
understanding of it also explains the choice of foreign policy analysis (FPA) as the main 
theoretical framework for the thesis.   
This chapter is divided in two sections.  The first is an overview of the relevant literature 
on CFSP.  The second deals more particularly with FPA and the link I see between this approach 
and the study of European integration, more particularly the institutionalist literature. 
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74 Ginsberg, R., op. cit., pg 450 
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 1/ CFSP in the Literature: Empirical and Conceptual Studies 
When the process of integration began to slow down in the 1970s, theorists lost interest in 
intergovernmental Europe.  However, interest in the EEC external relations (coinciding with the 
EPC debut at the 1973-75 Helsinki security and cooperation negotiations) began to develop75 and 
continued through the eighties and the signing of the SEA76.  The end of the Cold War and the 
negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty and including the creation of CFSP led to a new 
wave of conceptual studies on the EEC/EU foreign policy77.  On the empirical side, chapters 
about CFSP in books such as the volumes edited by Wallace and Wallace78, Andersen and 
Eliassen79, Peterson and Shackleton80 all describe the way CFSP is working as well as its 
shortcomings – without however providing a systematic treatment of specific cases in which 
CFSP has been activated.  In addition, since the Yugoslav Wars of the early nineties were the 
first real test of the EU CFSP, extensive coverage of the EEC/EU’s role in the crisis and more 
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 particularly its member-states has been written81.  The changes brought to CFSP in the sub-
sequent treaties and European Councils have also been reviewed in the literature82, mainly 
however from a traditional legalo-descriptive perspective.   
On the theoretical side, CFSP is however rarely conceptualized as such, but is used as an 
example among others in studies aimed at theory building about European integration.  The 
CFSP then becomes one policy, along with other EC/EU policies used to reinforce the basic 
argument about the direction in which the EU is going.  Michael Smith’s contribution on EU 
foreign and security policy83 in the volume edited by Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 
shows how even the EU second pillar, legally intergovernmental, has become institutionalized 
over time.  This argument fits well with Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein’s intent to revamp 
the supranational approach to the EU with a revised kind of supranationalism.  It does not 
however provide for a detailed empirical study of CFSP in the working.  
As Roy Ginsberg notes however, literature to date yields ambiguous results.  Scholars 
concur that the EU has an international “presence” (it is visible in regional and global fora) 
and that it exhibits some elements of “actorness” (it is an international actor in some areas but 
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 not in others).  Yet, there is much less consensus over how to measure the inputs, outputs, 
formulation, execution, causes, effects, progression and regression of European Foreign Policy.  
Theorists struggle with defining and categorizing EFP behavior.  The EU is neither a state nor a 
non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organization nor an international 
regime.  Agreement eludes scholars over which concepts imported from international and 
comparative politics are germane, which methods of inquiry, evaluative criteria and levels of 
analysis are most appropriate, and whether EFP analysis ought to be placed within the context 
of the study of comparative foreign policy where the emphasis is on single states84.  A choice has 
to be made as to which research question is to be answered: is the researcher more interested in 
seeing how the EU produces foreign policy or is the researcher more interested in what the EU 
produces and the impact of such policy outputs?  Depending on the choice made, the theoretical 
instruments will vary and the locus of the analysis will vary too.       
The EU as an external actor (and not only in its CFSP) has indeed been approached with 
different theoretical perspectives from European integration theories, from comparative politics, 
and from international relations theories85.  From an integration theory perspective the debate has 
been whether the creation of the CFSP was going to follow neofunctionalism (à la Haas86) or 
was to remain intergovernmental (à la Hoffmann87).  Neofunctionalist scholars tend to focus on 
the role of the Commission in the EC external relations, while intergovernmentalist scholars tend 
to focus on the role of the member states in the CFSP.  Although initially EU integration theories 
were an offspring of the field of international relations, they have in the 1980s begun to take a 
                                                 
84 Ginsberg, R., “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical 
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, n. 3, September 1999, pg. 432 
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 life on their own.  However, since the “action” (i.e. the uniqueness of the EU in terms of 
institutional design) was taking place in the first pillar where the Community decision-making 
was the main novel process, EU integration scholars have rarely paid attention to the EEC/EU as 
a foreign policy actor. 
From the perspective of comparative politics, the debate is whether the EU could best be 
described as a federation or as a confederation, with a focus on the “domestic politics” of the EU 
and an emphasis put on the comparison between the national state and the EU.  Contributions by 
Paul Taylor88 and William Wallace89 described the EU as a form of consociational confederation.  
The debate was revived in the 1990s by authors such as Alberta Sbragia90, Simon Bulmer91, and 
Frederick Lister92.  If a federalist approach is adopted and if the United States is taken as a point 
of reference, then it should be expected that the EU foreign policy will be conducted by the 
central or federal government, with more economic decisions being taken by the state 
governments.  However, not only does the EU present a more complex mixture of competencies 
and decision-making processes, but the opposite is actually what is happening at the EU-level.  
Ben Tonra for instance argues that the EU CFSP is best analyzed as a foreign policy 
condominium, by opposition to a foreign policy in the state-centric sense.  Indeed, constructed 
from the joint sovereignty of the Union (in the legal person of the Community’s External 
Relations) and the Member States (in their treaty commitment to CFSP), this condominium is a 
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 necessarily complex creation of political and bureaucratic structures.  These structures are 
located in national capitals, from within the acquis of the European Communities and from the 
Brussels-based intergovernmental structures created to sustain the office of the High 
Representative and the European Rapid Reaction Force.  The key issue for analysts of the CFSP 
is the coherence of policy resulting from this condominium – where coherence is assumed to be a 
necessary criterion of policy effectiveness.  The commitment of most member state governments 
to the Union’s CFSP is rooted in their belief that coordinated and concerted collective action is 
more effective than the disparate foreign policy efforts of member states acting individually93.  
Coherence and distribution of competencies are indeed key questions for scholars of comparative 
federalism.  Approaching the study of the second pillar from a comparative politics perspective, 
has however been rare, as the elements of comparison between the state and the EU have 
traditionally been located in the first pillar. 
Finally from an international relations theory perspective, the debate has mainly been 
whether the EU is best characterized as an actor or as a presence on the world stage, an attempt 
to conceptualize the international influence of the EU or the EU relationship/power/status vis-à-
vis third actors.  Allen and Smith94 have developed the notion of “presence” to instigate a new 
vigor in the debate and move it beyond the legal-institutional analysis of the 1970s and 1980s 
and towards a focus on Western Europe’s tangible and intangible presence in the international 
arena.  They suggest that by using the concept of international presence, it is possible to study 
the impact of the EU in different policy areas of the international system.  Charlotte Bretherton 
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 and John Volger95 look at the EU in terms of “actor capacity” defined by autonomy, ability, and 
legitimacy.  Although in the EU-as-an actor approach, the working model has been implicitly or 
explicitly the state, scholars have increasingly moved beyond a nation-state model to identify a 
distinctive non-state but nevertheless collective entity, with the EC and later the EU providing 
the focus of the analysis.   
Important though this triadic body of work has been in developing our conceptual 
understanding of the EEC/EU role in international affairs, these approaches are limited in three 
respects.  First, the focus is on outcomes rather than processes, be it what kind of actor the EU is 
or what kind of impact the EU has on the world.  For instance, as Bretherton and Vogler admit in 
their study, they are essentially concerned to assess the overall impact of the EC/EU on world 
politics96.  They are much less concerned with analyzing the processes through which the 
external policy of the EU is formulated.  This first limitation is also a traditional criticism of 
those studying the EU from an international relations perspective.  Indeed the main research 
question in this case is related to how much integration is occurring in any particular field of 
integration.  IR scholars and early integration theorists scholars have been more interested in the 
big picture of the integration process, rather than in the way integration was proceeding on an 
every day basis.  Comparativists studying the EU have attempted to deal with this criticism by 
studying the “domestic politics” of the EU, thus looking at another level of analysis.  Ben 
Rosamond rightly writes that […] the discussion between comparative policy analysis and EU 
studies is likely to generate a mutually beneficial intellectual conversation.  From the viewpoint 
of scholars of the EU, drawing from the insights of public policy literatures will avoid two 
fundamental caricatures of the EU: the focus on singular moments of change or crisis and the 
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 tendency to portray the dynamics of integration as centering on an opposition between the poles 
of nation-state and “superstate”97.  Unfortunately, this important body of literature has very 
much left the EU second pillar unexplored.  
Second, the actor, presence, or international identity approaches assume that the EU can 
be appropriately analyzed and evaluated as a single actor.  For instance in her recent book on the 
EU foreign policy, Hazel Smith states that this book takes as its premise that the European 
Union is an important actor in world affairs and that it makes and implements foreign policy and 
that it does this as a complex but relatively cohesive actor98.  While this approach “black-box” 
the EU, it is able to identify the impact the EU has in world politics.  It is however not able to 
identify the mechanisms that could lead to a common position on foreign policy issues among 
the member-states, neither does it have as purpose to dissect the EU to see who does what.  My 
assumption in the thesis is that the EU is more appropriately analyzed in foreign policy terms as 
a non-unitary or desegregated entity in world politics.  To show this the focus of the thesis will 
be less on outcomes and rather on processes.   
Finally, none of these approaches have focused on the second pillar per se and none took 
as their research object the decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP.  This stems mainly from 
the fact that the usual conclusion of this literature - be it a study of outcomes or a study of 
processes- is that an effective and efficient EU CFSP should not be expected because it is de jure 
and de facto intergovernmental.  Traditionally, scholars, the media, and national and European 
officials have focused on the CFSP decision-making process and/or outcomes to criticize the 
CFSP as a whole and consider it as an intergovernmental process whereby the member-states 
make no concessions that would go against their national interests.  The CFSP is considered a 
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 prerogative of the member-states.  Several modes of decision-making or absence of decision-
making are usually given to reinforce this late opinion in the literature.  First, at the EU level, 
member-states do not discuss issues they do not want the EU to deal with.  To that extent, Iraq is 
a perfect example.  Second, although they discuss international issues, they rarely act together 
under the EU “umbrella”.  Third, when a decision is taken, it often represents the lowest 
common denominator, and thus tries to accommodate almost all the interests of all the member-
states.  In addition, member-states do not often implement the decisions they have taken because 
of a general lack of commitment.  At the national level member-states feel free to adopt 
unilateral action with or without notification to the EU99.  Again, the thesis is challenging this 
assumption.  
From this brief overview of the existing literature, the question then becomes which 
framework can be helpful in approaching the CFSP from a process perspective?  Where do we 
look?  On the one hand, decision-making has been heavily analyzed in the EU first pillar, but 
ignored in the second pillar.  On the other hand, national foreign policy decision-making has 
been an object of study since the 1960s. 
In conclusion, what seem to emerge from the overview of the literature on CFSP are the 
following characteristics: a certain doubt about how to approach the topic; an under-theorization 
of the CFSP as such; and a lack of empirical research about the CFSP, thus pointing to both an 
empirical and a theoretical gap. 
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 2/ FPA: Born to Study the State – Reborn to Study the EU? 
A. FPA as a Sub-Field of International Relations Theories 
There have traditionally been two distinctive approaches to the study of foreign policy at 
the national level.  First those approaches that “have something to say” about foreign policy, 
such as realism, liberalism, or constructivism, but only in the framework of a general theory of 
inter-state relations or of international relations in a broader sense.  Second, the approaches, such 
as FPA, that study foreign policy per se including its outcomes, processes, and influences.  
Although I here distinguish between the two approaches for the sake of clarity, it is only fair to 
underline that over the years of scholarly work, both perspectives have interacted and borrowed 
from one another.  Structuralist approaches of international relations acknowledge the 
importance of domestic factors on foreign policy outcomes, while foreign policy analysts agree 
that to explain some foreign policy outcomes, systemic factors need to be taken into 
consideration. 
FPA brought two major developments to the study of national foreign policy.  First, 
foreign policy ceased to only be the study of outcomes, but also became the study of processes.  
This meant looking at the decision-making processes and integrating concepts of the field of 
public policy and public administration100.  Second, the “black box” state-centered approach 
shifted to a more sociological and pluralist approach.  This meant a richer empirical observation 
of the various actors in the process and their strategies.  It also meant a dialogue with other 
disciplines, such as psychology for instance (when studying leaders) or sociology.   
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 The establishment of the sub-field of FPA corresponds to the behavioral turn in 
explaining foreign policy, traditionally associated with the work of Graham Allison101, 
Alexander George102, Morton Halperin103, James Rosenau104, Irving Janis105, and Richard 
Snyder106.  The notion of “behavioral turn” refers to the fact that instead of emphasizing the role 
of the international system in explaining national foreign policies, the main explaining variable 
became the “behavior” of internal components.  Foreign policy analysts have suggested the 
relevance of learning about the stories behind foreign policy decisions and it is now broadly 
accepted that different levels of analysis – individual factors, inputs into the decision process, 
and institutional as well as cultural and societal factors – converge to shape foreign policy 
outputs.  Through these efforts, foreign policy analysts have made the case for middle-range 
theorizing.  FPA is today however not a homogeneous body of literature and draws on multiple 
theories, employs a range of methodology, focuses on the complex interactions between foreign 
policy factors, and links scholarly research to practical policy concerns. 
FPA has been in crisis since the 1980s and waned from the agenda of international 
relations scholars.  It has however witnessed a revival, as special issues of leading international 
relations journals have shown107.  The main criticisms directed to this “first generation108” of 
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 FPA scholarship were that it was too US-centered; that it did not follow up on new developments 
in mainstream international relations theories; that it was too state-centric in that it did not 
integrate the major changes of the international system such as the emergence of other 
international actors in the system; and that it was unable to generate a general theory of foreign 
policy.  These criticisms have/are however being addressed and a recent symposium in 
International Security Review can now speak of a FPA agenda for the 21st century.  
One interesting contemporary development of FPA lies in its inclusion of constructivist 
elements.  For instance, in a recent article, Juliet Kaarbo argues that FPA would gain to develop 
a connection with constructivist research on identity and ideas.  Following the criticisms 
developed by international relations constructivists against structural and material perspectives 
and their new focus on the role of norms and identity in world politics, foreign policy analysts 
have embraced concepts such as national identity109.  Inversely, international relations 
constructivists have incorporated notions that have traditionally been at the center of FPA 
approaches, such as organizations, institutions, and processes.  As Kaarbo writes, it is this 
development that most stands out across the past five years110.  She goes on to state that this view 
[constructivism] of the social world fits well with the foreign policy analysis literature.  That 
literature focuses on the linkage between social structures and calculating agents.  Bureaucratic 
politics, for example, seems almost a paradigmatic example of social constructivism.  In short, 
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 FPA looks at the interface between institutions, agents, and rules with the aim of showing how 
these led to the foreign policy choices made by the collective agents known as states111 – or in 
our case known as the EU.   
 
B. FPA, CFSP, and the Process of EU Integration 
The idea of a CFSP, if studied as an independent policy and not only as the result of 
national interests’ aggregation, raises a number of issues for international relations scholars.   
First, it runs counter the classical realist idea of foreign policy (upon which much of the 
early FPA literature was based), as the expression and pursuit of national interests.  There seems, 
at first, to be incompatibility between the concept of foreign policy and the idea of its 
communautarization or regionalization.  After a decade of CFSP, the empirical record tends to 
show that foreign policies might come closer in some instances, while certainly not becoming 
one single European foreign policy.  However in the EU, as Frédéric Charillon underlines, la 
politique étrangère a été érigée au rang d’objectif politique prioritaire et explicite.  […]  
L’originalité européenne provient d’abord du fait que la régionalisation de la politique 
étrangère y est institutionalisée, et comporte de ce fait un certain nombre de contraintes.  […]  
Le traité de l’Union européenne implique même une double obligation de cohérence: entre les 
Etats membres d’abord, entre les dimensions de l’action extérieure ensuite.  […]  En proclamant 
qu’on ne saurait cloisonner la diplomatie, la défense, le commerce extérieur, l’aide au 
développement, la coopération scientifique et technique, etc., on réinvente déjà la politique 
étrangère des réalistes, et on finit d’enterrer la distinction interne/externe qui leur est chère.  Si 
les résultats ont souvent été minces, l’ambition est réelle.  […]  Une machine est lancée, qui 
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 change la marge de manoeuvre des décideurs112.  The willingness of 25 nation-states to 
cooperate in foreign policy and their constant creation of institutional mechanisms to give birth 
to a CFSP is in itself an amazing empirical development and a challenging theoretical 
development in international affairs.  
Second, a gap needs to be filled in the literature about the way CFSP is working on the 
ground.  As mentioned in the section devoted to the literature review on the CFSP, our 
knowledge has been enhanced with regard to the outcomes of the EU or its influence on third 
parties.  The question however as to how these outcomes have come about has rarely been 
analyzed, especially when these outcomes are the products of second pillar decision.  This type 
of analysis is particularly overdue when one compares it to the enormous developments that have 
occurred in the institutional framework of the second pillar (see chapter two).  
Theoretically thus, the aim of the dissertation is to generate a set of concepts and models 
that characterizes the distinctive patters of the decision-making process of the CFSP or in other 
words, what Robert Merton called “middle range theory”113.  Since the aim of the thesis is to 
understand processes of the EU’s CFSP, FPA is a logical choice for a theoretical framework114 as 
the foreign policy analyst is less concerned with explaining and evaluating policy outcomes and 
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defense, external trade, development aid, scientific and technical cooperation, etc., cannot be compartmentalized, 
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dear disappears.  Even if results have often been few, the ambition is real.  […]  The engine has been started and has 
changed the decision-makers’ room of maneuver.”   
113 Merton, R., Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Ill.; Free Press, 1957 
114 However, as mentioned earlier, to explain the difference in decision-making processes between the Balkans and 
the Middle-East, notions of capabilities and power, as well as the role of an external actor into the EU decision-
making process, will have to be taken into account in the analysis.  
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 more concerned to understand the policy process itself – how policy emerges, from whom and 
why115.   
 
a) Formal and Informal Processes 
 
Traditionally, FPA has focused the approach away from formal constitutional or legal 
rules to processes and functions.  FPA allows putting the emphasis on the fact that the ways in 
which institutions act in a given situation or are used by agents are as important if not more than 
their formal roles.  This is partly explained by the fact that it is impossible to create institutional 
agreements that will provide precise guidance for all contingencies in complex social situations.  
The latter assumption is especially true with texts such as the EU treaties that are very broad by 
nature and with policy areas such as foreign affairs where crisis situation are as much the norm 
as non-crisis situations.  In addition, foreign policy is an area that is usually less legalized than 
other policy areas.  As Farrell and Héritier have written, insofar as power is delegated to actors 
with different interests, there will necessarily be ambiguities in the constitutional framework 
governing these actors, which actors will seek to exploit for their own specific purposes116.  
At the national level, constitutional stipulations or government regulations provide 
guidelines about which units of decisions should be involved.  However, real-world allocations 
of decision responsibility in foreign policy tend to diverge, sometimes drastically, from those 
described in bureaucracies’ organizational charts or in constitutional texts.  The formal rules do 
not automatically determine the composition of a decision unit or defines all the roles it will have 
to play in concrete situations.  As Stern and Sundelius write, effective decision units are instead 
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116 Farrell, H. and Héritier, A., “Formal and Informal Institutions under Codecision: Continuous Constitution 
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 formed in a complex interplay between the codified requirements of governing, other embedded 
features such as (often informal) institutional rules and practices, and contextual factors.  
Understanding how and why a particular decision unit is formed to deal with an identified 
problem commonly requires intensive empirical analysis117.  That is indeed the reason why the 
three case studies in the thesis will be richly illustrated to precisely grasp the everyday decision-
making in the CFSP.   
Kegley advocates using the concept of “decision regimes” to capture these institutional 
dimensions118 and the fact that the game of foreign policy making tends to be played according 
to identifiable shared decision rules.  To be more specific, Kegley has identified two types of 
decision regimes: a “procedural decision regime” and a “substantive decision regime.”  While 
the former is concerned with decision-making processes, the latter is concerned with the goals of 
foreign policy, i.e. its content.  This dual notion is useful to understand the CFSP because it 
shows how different actors intervene in different policy areas or how the same actor may have 
different roles depending on the issue.  Both decision-making regimes are intrinsically linked: 
the formation of substantive decision regimes may vary across policy sector, so that the rules and 
principles for the management of foreign policy may vary across issues areas.  As the case-
studies will show, the actors involved in the EU CFSP in the case of the Balkans and the case of 
Middle-East, are more or less the same, but their role varies, as does their respective importance.   
Processes as well as roles of institutions have been at the heart of the study of the EU for 
those approaching it from a comparative politics perspective – at least in its first pillar.  The 
same level of conceptualization is definitely lacking in pillar two.  Jørgensen rightfully writes 
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 that theorizing about the CFSP is not easy.  Most leading theories of European integration aim 
to explain integration generally, and are therefore not particularly well suited to explain a 
specific and distinct instance of integration such as the CFSP.  Explaining the making of specific 
policies within the CFSP “umbrella” requires theories or approaches developed with that 
purpose in mind, for instance public policy analysis or theories of foreign policy-making.  
However, neither foreign policy nor defense policy are generally considered part of the portfolio 
of European public policies, which includes well-known domestic policies such as agriculture, 
environment, or competition policy but not “un-civilian” foreign or defense policies.  As a 
consequence, analysts interested in applying theories of European public policy-making have a 
hard time finding illustrative examples119.  The dissertation will fill this particular gap, by linking 
FPA with the institutionalism scholarship, as developed within the body of EU integration 
literature, particularly the stream called the new institutionalism.  Although institutionalists have 
taught us that institutions matter, they have gone beyond such a position and have developed 
complex arguments that show under which conditions institutions matter, the way they matter, 
and the effects they have an outputs120.  They have also shown that norms and procedures at the 
EU-level are build over time, sometimes with unexpected consequences.  Those studies have 
emphasized that the boundary between an institutionalized and a non-institutionalized process is 
different from the boundary between intergovernmental and supranational.  A policy might 
legally be intergovernmental, but so institutionalized that integration among the participant units 
has indeed de facto occurred, although a different type of integration than the one scholars of the 
EU first pillar are familiar with.  A system of governance therefore develops which helps the 
participant units to come to a common agreement.  FPA would thus provide the overall 
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 framework for the study of CFSP processes, while institutionalism would be its natural 
complement to grasp the particular place and roles of the Commission, the Council, the 
COREPER, the PSC, and the High Representative.  It is to this dialogue that I now turn. 
 
b) Links with Other EU Integration Approaches 
 
There are several competing attempts to conceptualize the EU system.  Succinctly, one 
side views the EU as a “traditional attempt” at international cooperation.  The other views the 
EU as comparable to a state.  Instead of siding with one or the other, this thesis sees the EU as 
part of the “governance” literature121, pointing to the fact that the EU has developed a regional 
system of rules that it is important to understand.  Governance is usually defined as being about 
the exercise of authority with or without the formal institutions of government.  This approach 
warrants analysis of the EU institutions and the plethora of different rules for decision-making.  
It emphasizes multi-level, competing, and overlapping central EU institutions, lack of clear 
authority center, and complex networks.  It also assumes that no single actor has all knowledge 
and information required to solve complex problems and no single actor has a complete 
overview of all instruments available or needed to solve a policy issue.  Although in foreign 
policy at the national level governance is usually not considered useful to understand the 
decision-making processes because hierarchy among actors involved and governments are still 
very much the norm (particularly when one comes closer to military issues), at the EU level the 
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 notion of governance will help conceptualize the empirical findings of the thesis.  The 
governance turn in EU studies122 thus puts the accent on the complexity of the EU, but also on 
the fact that this complex institutional design that is the EU does not prevent policies to be 
formed and implemented.  The EU is thus definitely here a polity, even if a new form of it.  The 
question thus becomes, in the EU-type of governance, how are decisions taken? 
 The study of EU decision-making has witnessed an increased interest, especially since 
the re-launch of the integration process in the eighties with the Single market and the Single 
European Act.  Various scholars123 have brought a policy-making perspective to the study of EU 
integration.  Although they offer different approaches, they all evolve around the same premise: 
EU integration is not only about more or less integration (cf. international relations approaches to 
the EU).  Rather, the EU political system is extremely complex and different policies respond to 
different decision-making processes, so it cannot only be studied from a set of well-defined 
approaches.  The “behavior” of EU institutions in the first and second pillar is different, 
stemming at least in part from the fact that they obey to different legal rules, although focusing 
on legal rules alone is not sufficient to understand the behavior of an actor.  It has been showed 
for instance that although the Commission has a shared right of initiative with the member-states 
in CFSP, it is not keen in using that right and prefer to attempt to increase its role in more subtle 
ways124.  Even within a pillar, institutional behaviors and decision-making processes vary from 
one issue to the other.   
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 Usually within this body of literature concerned with the EU decision-making processes, 
an important distinction is made between two types of decisions.  One is the few but important 
history-making decisions, leading to treaty revisions.  The important work of Moravcsik125 with 
his revitalization of intergovernmentalism falls in that category.  The second is the large number 
of “every day” policy-making and legislative decisions in different policy sectors, with the 
previously cited work of Wallace and Wallace, Peterson and Bomberg, and Richardson.  There is 
of course a dynamic relationship between these two types of decisions.  On the one hand, treaty 
revisions change the rules of the game for everyday decisions.  It was the Amsterdam Treaty that 
for instance created the position of the High Representative for CFSP.  On the other hand, treaty 
revisions contain elements that may turn out to produce unintended consequences later, as 
Pierson126 has forcefully argued.  The persistence of the member-states to keep the Commission 
at bay in CFSP might have succeeded, but it has conjointly led to the reinforcement of the 
Secretariat of the Council, a new body member-states have to deal with.   
The case-studies in the thesis are more concerned with the second type of decisions.  In 
the first pillar, decision-making has been extensively studied.  In foreign policy, at the nation-
state level, FPA has used some concepts of domestic politics mainly applied to “low politics.”  
The dissertation seeks to combine both approaches and thus to study foreign policy in the 2nd 
pillar of the EU, the way the first pillar has been studied.  Jachtenfuchs comments to that extent 
that as the Euro-polity grew more and more important, it became more interesting for 
researchers who were not genuinely interested in the European integration process as such, but 
had very different specializations such as comparative politics or policy analysis.  In the latter 
field in particular, the development of the European Union seemed to abolish the conditions for 
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 an established division of labor within political science according to which students of domestic 
and comparative politics, on the one hand, and students of international relations on the other, 
dealt with rigidly separated fields of inquiry.  Whereas the first had to do with matters within one 
or more states, the latter were concerned with what happened between states and remained 
largely unconcerned with domestic affairs.  […]  In the European Union after 1985, […] the 
integration process blurred the distinction between domestic politics and international relations, 
and brought into question the assumption of the internally and externally sovereign nation-
state127.     
Even though the notion of international actorness has traditionally - lets say historically - 
been linked to the nation-state, the emergence of an actor such as the EU is bringing new 
opportunities for IR theory and for this subfield of IR called FPA.  Indeed, it is at this meeting 
point - the EU as a foreign policy actor and the EU as a “new type” of actor in the international 
system – that FPA and the institutionalist literature can gain from scholarly dialogue.  This 
literature is the evident link with EU studies in that they both emphasize the non-unitary aspects 
of the state in foreign policy on the one hand, and the EU in Community matters on the other.  
Such a premise of a scattered actor pushes the researcher to analyze where decisions are taken 
and which actors are important at what particular level of decision-making, by pointing to 
overlapping competencies among multiple actors and the interaction of those actors across 
levels.  Member states, while still powerful in the EU second pillar, are only one set of actors 
among a variety.   
All in all what FPA combined with institutionalism emphasizes is the diffusion of power 
within the EU.  As was explained above, FPA was created as a reaction to systemic approaches 
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 of the study of foreign policy that considered the state as a “black box.”  I argue that the EU is 
not a unitary actor either, especially since the EU is still an entity in formation.  Non-state actors, 
such as institutions, are looking to increase their own power in the EU’s CFSP decision-making 
process and the member-states are still trying to influence the process of policy formation and 
implementation.  The same is true of each institution participating in the decision-making 
process of the CFSP; neither are they unitary actors.  One example that will be shown in the 
case-study is the case of the Secretariat General of the Council.  Since the High Representative 
structure has been integrated within it in the Amsterdam treaty, various bureaucratic structures 
have appeared that do not always cooperate: the Policy Unit, Solana’s cabinet, and the DG CFSP 
in the Council.  Therefore just as FPA did for the state, it is necessary to look inside the EU in 
order to understand what type of governance is emerging in CFSP.  
 
c) Adapting FPA for the Study of the CFSP 
 
FPA needs to be adapted from its state-centered approach to a non-state actor.  This 
research therefore build more particularly upon a recent and well-due attempt to apply FPA to 
the EU, that of Brian White128, as developed in its contribution to the European foreign policy 
system.  In keeping with the systemic approach of FPA, Brian White speaks of a “European 
foreign policy system” encompassing the Community foreign policy (first pillar - external 
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 actions), the Union foreign policy (second pillar, i.e. CFSP), and the national foreign policies of 
the EU member-states.  The notion of foreign policy as a system is quite useful in that it is less 
normative and allows going beyond the debate between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism.  It also points to the fact that CFSP is a collective enterprise trough which 
national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions.  As Ginsberg 
writes, the EU is now moving beyond having a modest external relations system to having a 
more ambitious “foreign policy system” as the acquis communautaire/acquis politique expand 
and the functioning of the inter-pillar decision-making process improves129. 
This thesis threats the second element of White’s approach and the way it is working 
empirically130 as the independent variable.  Of course to grasp the mechanisms of CFSP, 
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secondary role in the EU decision-making process.  
For constructivists the EU matters.  Constructivism would for instance be able to explain why the EU is 
strengthening its CFSP, with an analysis based on norms and identities.  It would give a role to big states as well as 
small states.  With regard to this research, two critics can however be put forward: i) constructivism places us again 
in the perspective of a grand theory of international relations; ii) besides the common tread putting the emphasis on 
norms and ideas in international relations and making interests endogenous to the state and not extraneous, 
constructivism is not a coherent body of literature.  However, constructivism is certainly the IR theory that would be 
most helpful to establish a connection between IR and comparative politics, most particularly with the development 
of the approach entitled “sociological institutionalism.”  Such approaches would indicate that foreign policy making 
within the CFSP is a dynamic process where interests and objectives emerge as a result of interaction at the 
domestic, national, and European level.  Consequently, the clear distinction between the national and the European 
might gradually be blurred, even in the area of high politics.  A process of Europeanization of foreign policy in 
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 references to the member-states foreign policies goals will be needed.  White's work is 
interesting in that it applies a revised "foreign policy analysis" to the study of European foreign 
policy.  Revised in the sense that it is less state-centric, accepting the importance of other actors 
in the international system (White studies the European foreign policy system) and that it 
analyzes governance rather than government (since the EU is not a state per se).  As White puts 
it, the focus on policy at the international level is arguably what is important to the foreign 
policy analyst rather than whether the actor is a conventional government or not131.  
However, although White's FPA is a constructive step in the attempt to revive this 
approach, some elements are still missing from his analysis: a more specific focus on the EU 
second pillar per se; a less descriptive and static approach (that is a general critic of FPA)132; and 
a stronger empirical study to identify different models of governance within the CFSP.  
 
d) The Argument – CFSP as Institutionalized Governance 
 
As was exposed in chapter two, since the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998 and 
the European Councils of Cologne, Helsinki, and Feira, member-states have reinforced the CFSP 
and have added a military dimension to it.  This does not mean that they have given up their 
sovereignty in foreign affairs.  If we however accept the premise according to which the EU is 
more than the sum of its fifteen member-states and that CFSP is not reducible to its component 
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 parts, it seems empirically and theoretically useful to analyze how the EU as an independent 
actor per se manages and implements its foreign and security policy.  
The argument offered in this thesis is that, in certain areas of foreign policy, the second 
pillar decision-making process, although still de jure intergovernmental, is de facto working 
according to another system of governance.  This system will be labeled here 
transgovernmentalism and transinstitutionalism.  Although this system of governance is not 
replacing the member-states foreign policies, but exists in addition to them, it challenges our 
traditional understanding of foreign policy as belonging exclusively to the nation-state, as well as 
of the CFSP as being only intergovernmental.  In order to understand when the CFSP decision-
making is intergovernmental and when it is transgovernmental, the importance of the CFSP 
policy-making mechanisms are underlined, by showing that the member-states need to find an 
agreement among themselves first in order to delegate the implementation of the CFSP to the EU 
institutions and then the EU institutions are able to take on some autonomy.  But if no agreement 
exists at the outset, the EU as such will not have a foreign policy.  CFSP mechanisms thus have 
values as “enabling” joint action where there is a prior intergovernmental agreement.   
Integration does not necessarily mean supranationalism.  Within intergovernmental 
structures, integration can also take place, as our case studies will show.  As Brach and Øhrgaard 
argue, […] a theory which fails to specify the dynamics of trans- and intergovernmental 
interaction can hardly be expected to provide a satisfactory explanation of governance, let alone 
integration, in a policy domain where such interaction [i.e. CFSP] is the main feature of policy-
making.  Some scholars have already identified the “socialization effect133”: even though the 
second pillar is de jure intergovernmental, it is the same diplomats from the member-states 
foreign ministries who get together to discuss foreign policies issues; they thus get to know each 
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 other quite well, and get socialized into working together.  This socialization leads to a certain 
level of “coordination” between them.  This kind of “socialized integration” might not look as 
clear as the “regular” integration process, but as Kenneth Glarbo argues, there is certainly a 
social integration that is taking place in CFSP; because as such, institutions in themselves hold a 
latent promise of social integration134.  Other phenomena are also at work that can only be 
understood by empirically studying cases in which the EU played a role with the new 
instruments at its disposal since 1999.   
The three case-studies show the conditions under which EU institutions might find (or 
not) a niche to gain power in the EU “intergovernmental” second pillar, thus transforming a 
purely intergovernmental system into a new mode of governance.  The case studies will thus 
answer the following question: which institutions and mechanisms matter in the decision-making 
process of the second pillar and how do these institutions affect the behavior of agents?   
 As both the studies of White135 and of Manners and Whitman136 have shown, 
interconnections have developed between national foreign policies and European foreign policies 
within transnational and transgovernmental networks.  White particularly stresses the futility of 
intergovernmentalism and uses the notion of “Brusselization.”  As he explains, even if the 
European Commission enters the field of traditional foreign policy, “Brusselization” does not 
mean communautarization but, rather, that Brussels-based actors and institutions are 
increasingly dominating both foreign policy making and policy implementation137.  In this 
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 research the terms of transgovernmental and transinstitutional are preferred as they allow for a 
more precise conceptualization of the role of both EU institutions and member-states actors. 
 
3/Conclusions 
This chapter began with an overview of the existing literature on the CFSP and since that 
particular literature is very thin, the literature on the EU as an international actor.  This first 
section showed how our understanding of the external relations of the EU (mainly 1st pillar of the 
EU, with some involvement of the 2nd pillar) has become clearer, while at the same time the 
CFSP was left mainly aside by scholars.  It also showed that when scholars have studied the EU, 
they have mainly conducted an analysis of the CFSP outcomes, rather than its processes, as has 
been done for issues encompassed in the first pillar.  A gap thus needs to be filled there. 
The chapter then went on to ask which approaches at the state-level have been used to 
understand decision-making processes in foreign policy.  The analysis therefore turned to 
Foreign Policy Analysis, which was briefly introduced.  In a second sub-section, it was asked 
what the links between FPA and the EU were and how FPA could prove useful to study the 
CFSP.  The reasons given where the non-unitary structure of the EU and of its institutions, the 
importance of informal processes in the CFSP, and the importance of institutions in the European 
integration process as a whole.  It was also shown how FPA and the governance turn in EU 
studies with its emphasis on the institutionalist literature could gain of scholarly dialogue. 
Finally the central argument of the thesis was introduced, according to which in certain 
policy areas of the EU foreign policy, intergovernmentalism is not the main decision-making 
process that is at work.  A new system of governance is emerging that transcends pure 
intergovernmentalism.  This new system was labeled transgovernmentalism and 
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 transinstitutionalism to emphasize it being located between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism.  These notions also allow to show that the EU does indeed have a CFSP in 
certain areas, that is different from the aggregation of the fifteen member-states.       
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CHAPTER FOUR - Major Attempt at Implementing the CFSP: The Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia 
  
As Andreas Kintis notes, the war in former Yugoslavia was seen both as a challenge and 
an opportunity.  It was seen as a challenge because the member states of the EU were compelled 
under the circumstances to develop structures for foreign policy cooperation that were effective 
enough to identify and pursue joint initiatives affecting the complicated process of disintegration 
in Yugoslavia.  It was seen as an opportunity because the EU could, through a common foreign 
policy, maximize its influence in the Balkans and be seen as a component of the new European 
geostrategic landscape with substantial troops on the ground in its own backyard, able to 
achieve a political settlement of ethnic conflicts over territory without the military power and 
political leadership of the United States138.   Irony had it that as soon as the EU decided to set up 
a CFSP, war broke out in its neighborhood, namely in Yugoslavia.  Although hostilities began 
before the Maastricht Treaty was implemented, at the very time member-states were negotiating 
the creation of a common foreign policy, they were acting independently, presenting the EU with 
faits accomplis.  Even more ironic was that Germany was one of the very first states to break any 
attempt at coordinating with its EU partners a policy towards Yugoslavia, as it was the first to 
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 recognize the independence of both Slovenia and Croatia – opposed by most of its partners -, 
while at the same time being one of the strongest proponents of an EU’s CFSP.   
This chapter of the thesis does not intend to cover in detail the EU actions in the 
Yugoslav wars139, as this has been done in detail in other places.  It is more intended to provide 
the reader with a background against which the EU post-1999 actions in the Balkans can be 
compared.  The time span covered here is from 1991 to the Dayton Agreements of 1995.  The 
first section describes the external and internal EU context in which the crisis started and 
developed.  The second section looks at the EEC and later EU role in the crisis and identifies 
three distinctive periods: the start of the crisis where the EEC led its own peace efforts; a second 
period where the failures of the EEC/EU led it to increasingly seek a UN involvement in the 
crisis; and finally the third and final period in which the EU as such disappeared from the 
political front to be replaced by the member-states (more particularly France, Germany, and the 
UK), as well as the leadership of the US.  The third section looks at the issue of the use of force, 
one of the main bones of contention among EEC/EU member-states.  The fourth section analyzes 
the civilian aspects of the EU involvement in the crisis, in which the Commission played an 
important role.  Finally the chapter draws lessons from the conflict for the future of the CFSP.  It 
should be kept in mind that from the beginning of the crisis until November 1993, the EEC 
action was still formally conducted within the framework of the EPC, since the Maastricht 
Treaty was still going through the process of ratification in the different member-states.  It is 
only after November 1993, that the CFSP can be tested more realistically.  
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 1/ The Context 
 As Brian White writes, […] it would be difficult to imagine a more complex, intractable 
issue to serve as the first serious test of CFSP […].  It was soon apparent that it would test the 
most sensitive aspect of the fledgling CFSP, namely the ability of member states to agree on the 
use of military force.  It would expose, therefore, the most serious and divergent interests of 
member states; and, given the significance of the issues, it would require the EU to work 
harmoniously and effectively with a growing list of other international actors who were “sucked 
into” the expanding Balkan crisis, including the UN, NATO, the United States and Russia140. 
Christopher Hill identified the notion of the “capability-expectations” gap141, conceptualizing the 
fact that the expectations from third parties towards the EEC/EU to find a solution to the 
bloodshed were enormous; however in reality, the EEC/EU capabilities were completely 
underdeveloped for such a situation.  With statements such as “This is the hour of Europe, not 
the hour of the Americans” by Jacques Poos, then Foreign Affairs Minister of Luxembourg, at a 
time when Luxembourg was holding the rotating EU Presidency, the expectations were indeed 
extremely high.  However, not all the spectrum of capabilities used in foreign policy were 
available and, when capabilities were available, political will lacked and the EEC/EU got bug 
down in procedural and bureaucratic issues.  In the end, the EU failed to deliver. 
 Why was the EU interested to intervene at all?  First, the systemic environment 
corresponded to the early days of the post-Cold War and the energies were turned to the shaping 
of a “new international order”, in which the EU and its member-states were eager to participate 
by spreading values of democracy as well as economic liberalization.  In addition, two EU states, 
namely Italy and Greece, had a border with Yugoslavia.  These two states were particularly eager 
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 to maintain stability in their vicinity.  Third, the Gulf War had essentially been “an American 
show”, with no coordinated action from the EEC; therefore the EU was even more eager to turn 
problems on its continent into “a European show.”  The first Bush administration at the start of 
the crisis was also more than willing to let the Europeans/EEC take the lead in a conflict in 
which they did not want to get involved.  Fourth, the EU as a whole was wary not to see the 
Balkan instability spread to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe that also had 
minorities within their borders and that one day would become EU members.  Finally, the EEC 
member-states where negotiating a new treaty revising the original Rome Treaty and proposals 
were put forward to transform the EEC into a more political union equipped with a foreign and 
security policy. 
 
2/ The EEC/EU in the Crisis 
The EU action towards the crisis can be analyzed in three periods.  During the first period 
(1991-Spring of 1992), the EEC took the lead in attempting to broker peace deals.  Second, from 
the summer of 1992 until 1993, the EU worked increasingly closely with the UN.  Finally in the 
last period, the US took the lead, while the EU as a unified actor disappeared from the scene and 
France, the UK, and Germany became the major actors through the Contact Group. 
 
A. The EEC in a Leadership Position 
When the Yugoslav wars broke, the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) reforming the 
Rome Treaties was going on and major issues still needed to be resolved with regard to CFSP.  
In addition, once the Treaty was signed in December 1991, problems of referenda arose and the 
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 EU leaders got bog down with domestic problems.  However, there definitely was a 
determination to respond to the crisis – particularly to parallel the EU economic and political 
involvement in Central and Eastern Europe.  It is particularly remarkable how the Yugoslav 
crisis, following the absence of EEC involvement in the Gulf War, led to an important European 
activism in foreign policy.  There was also a sense that the crisis could be resolved by economic 
and diplomatic means only.  This feeling was reinforced by some initial success in deploying 
these instruments in the first half of 1991.  In addition, economic (1st pillar) and diplomatic 
means (dispatch of the Presidency or Troika, declarations) was what the EEC was familiar with 
since the inception of the EPC.  The European Commission, under the leadership of Jacques 
Delors, was particularly interested in being involved in finding a solution to the crisis for two 
reasons.  First, empowered by his recent success of being assigned the role of coordinating all aid 
to the former satellite countries of the USSR on behalf of the international community, he 
wanted a similar role for the rest of Europe, i.e. the Balkans.  Second, Delors was pushing within 
the IGC for the Commission to receive the same role it has in the EEC in the future foreign 
policy.  
The EEC had responded to the threat of independence from Slovenia and Croatia by 
offering diplomatic support for negotiations that would lead to maintain Yugoslavia territorial 
integrity, while also offering economic incentives in the form of loans for infrastructure projects 
and the PHARE program.  Initially indeed, the tendency in the EEC was to maintain territorial 
integrity and to favor democratization and economic liberalization.  The idea was that 
Yugoslavia should follow the example of European integration, a showcase of the virtues of 
economic integration.  The possibility of Yugoslavia moving to the path of EU accession down 
the line was even raised.  At the time Yugoslavia was under consideration for an Association 
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 Agreement of the type that was being negotiated with some of the newly independent Central 
and Eastern European countries.  However, diplomatic and economic instruments did not prove 
enough: Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991, which provoked the first 
war when the Yugoslav army (mainly Serb) launched operations against the breakaway 
republics.   
Faced with this new situation on the ground, the EEC needed to change its position.  The 
European Council of June 1991 decided on a number of options: sending the “Troika” to 
Belgrade, which included the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands; 
suspending Community aid if the Troika did not come back with the prospect of a ceasefire; 
invoking the CSCE’s (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) emergency 
consultations procedure.  The Troika went to Belgrade three times, and in the end, diplomacy 
succeeded in bringing about an agreement, the so-called Brioni Agreement signed in July 1991.  
In the meantime sanctions were established:  an embargo on armaments and military equipment 
to the whole Yugoslavia was imposed and the EEC decided to suspend its second and third 
financial protocols with Yugoslavia, although this was not put into effect because agreement was 
reached before it could happen.  Under the agreement, the EEC was to provide observers made 
up of civilian and (unarmed) military personnel (the ECMM – Economic Community Monitoring 
Mission) to monitor the ceasefire in Slovenia, from which the Yugoslav army was to withdraw 
and “if need be” in Croatia.  Both Republics were to hold off on their declaration of 
independence for three months.   
The mission of the EEC Troika marked an important institutional development for the 
EPC.  It was indeed the first time that the Troika was delegated power to negotiate with a 
considerable room of maneuver to depart from the mandate that had been conferred to it by the 
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 twelve member-states.  As James Gow however notes, although allegations persisted that both 
sides had breached the ceasefire agreement, on the whole it held because the JNA, in the 
absence of Serbian backing, had effectively conceded Slovenia142 and not because of the EEC 
actions. 
 The Brioni Agreement “resolved” the situation in Slovenia, but not in Croatia.  In 
addition, pressures were mounting for equivalent treatment for Macedonia and Bosnia, whose 
ethnic composition clearly made it a candidate for future atrocities.  As Edwards underlines, the 
primary hope remained that the EC/Twelve, whether through the threat or use of sanctions if 
promises of increased aid proved unavailing, as well as through the use of monitoring missions, 
could bring all the parties together to restore peace before the conflict spilled over into other 
areas143.   
The cease-fires in Croatia and Bosnia were broken one after the other and the Serbian 
federal leadership became more and more intransigent.  The Netherlands (at the time at the helm 
of the EEC) then proposed to convene a peace conference, not only to bring pressure on the 
parties, but also to face German demands to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.  One of the 
preconditions for the conference was that none of the republics would be recognized before a 
general agreement was found that would be accepted by all of them.  Talks at the Conference 
would also be based on three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, protection of the rights 
of all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations.  Although no cease-
fire was achieved before the opening of the conference, it was still decided to go ahead144.   
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 In September 1991, the Hague Conference established a mission under Lord 
Carrington145, which sought to negotiate a Yugoslav-wide settlement.  An arbitration committee 
was also set up that included three Community judges led by the French judge Robert Badinter, 
President of the French Constitutional Council and which was to define the conditions for the 
Republics independence.  All these diplomatic activities allowed the EU to maintain the 
collectivity of action of its member-states.  However, soon, the Conference was undermined by 
the problem of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.  In addition, although Carrington succeeded 
in obtaining the signature of the Croat and Serb leaderships on various ceasefires, it became 
clearer that a lasting ceasefire was not a possibility.  
At the beginning of October 1991, the EC discussed the possibility of removing 
recognition from Yugoslavia and its official representatives.  A day after this was discussed, and 
after the Serbian forces suffered some setbacks, Carrington was able to produce the most 
significant concession from the Serbian leadership.  Milosevic agreed to a statement seeking a 
political solution on the basis of the independence of those wishing it.  The solution was to 
include a loose alliance of sovereign or independent republics and adequate arrangements for 
minorities and possibly special status for certain areas146.  Again however, violence continued 
on the ground. 
Germany was nevertheless determined to recognize both Croatia and Slovenia, mainly for 
domestic reasons linked to sympathy towards the question of self-determination following its 
own recent reunification.  In addition, Germany was calculating that if the Republics were 
recognized it would be easier to intervene against the Serbs because the conflict would then 
become internationalized.  Germany thus pushed hard for its EU partners to fall in line with 
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 German thinking.  In December 1991, a compromise was found at the European Council of 
Maastricht according to which the EEC would back off taking a decision on recognition until the 
arbitration commission led by Badinter would suggest guidelines for recognition147.  However, 
the German government did not wait for the commission’s results and unilaterally recognized 
both republics, which led the EEC as a whole to recognize both republics one month later in 
January 1992.   Bosnia was recognized in April 1992, even though the Bosnian Serbs boycotted 
the referendum and used intimidation and force148.  German unilateralism undermined the 
ongoing mediation efforts.  The issue of German recognition illustrates the procedural problems 
created by the perceived need to maintain a consensus at all costs and the propensity of 
individual member states to pursue their own interests rather than a common policy on this 
issue149.  In addition, the mistake all along for the EEC was to have recognized the Republics 
without the willingness to enforce that decision with the use of force.  It is nevertheless 
interesting to note that Germany waited until the end of the IGC to recognize Croatia and 
Slovenia.  This shows how being a member of the EEC/EU might influence if not the decision 
that a state sees as fundamental, at least the timing of such decision. 
To now evaluate the EEC as a whole in this period, coordination of European states 
acting within EPC was central.  This cooperation also led to institutional and operational 
innovations, such as the ECMM, the Carrington conference, and the Badinter commission.  This 
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 “logic of innovation” had two characteristics.  First, the Council lied at the center of the decision-
making process.  Both the Commission and the Parliament were marginalized, except for 
technical advise, such as the appropriateness of imposing trade sanctions for instance.  Second, 
this logic led to ad hoc solutions very much in opposition to what was negotiated at Maastricht 
under the label of common action. 
 The failure of Carrington to reach an agreement supported by the Serbian leadership led 
as soon as November 1991 to an incremental involvement of the UN.  France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom began to push for measures to be taken by the UN.  By mid-November it was 
Cyrus Vance, the UN envoy to Yugoslavia and not Lord Carrington who was leading the 
negotiations to halt the fighting.  Carrington and the EEC continued however to work in the 
shadow.  In addition, with the Dutch Presidency coming to an end in December 1991, Carrington 
asked Jose Cutilheiro, the former Portuguese Ambassador to the Conventional Forces in Europe 
arms control talks in Vienna to head the separate set of talks on the future of Bosnia within the 
framework of the EC Conference.  The move was also justified by the fact that in the first 
semester of 1992, the EC Presidency fell to Portugal.  This thus established a more or less 
permanent link between the Conference and the Presidency of the EC.  
 
B. The EEC/EU and the UN 
Soetendorp notes that as the EU member-states were unable to agree on an armed 
peacekeeping force they turned to the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to 
take over the responsibility for the effort to impose a durable ceasefire backed by a UN 
peacekeeping force.  This marked, in fact, the end of an independent EU intervention in former 
Yugoslavia.  From then on any involvement of the EU member-states would be part of the 
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 international effort to seek a peaceful solution to the war in former Yugoslavia, through 
successive international conferences which were co-chaired by the EU and the UN, or by means 
of mediation carried out by a joint team composed of an EU and a UN representative150.  
Although cease-fires were still not holding and the conflict worsened, the EEC did not 
abandon the issue.  On the contrary as Soetendorp’s quotation shows, mediation efforts were 
developed together with the UN151.  The failure of the Carrington mission152 led a year later to a 
more permanent “conference diplomacy” vehicle based in Geneva, under the co-chairmanship of 
David Owen (EEC – replacing Lord Carrington) and Cyrus Vance153 (UN).  The conference’s 
aim was to find a political settlement in Bosnia, where the problems now had become acute.  A 
plan (Vance-Owen Plan, replaced by the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, Stoltenberg, being Vance’s 
successor) was agreed upon in January 1993154, containing three main principles to solve the 
situation: a declaration on constitutional principles; a Bosnia divided into ten provinces, three 
governed by Bosnian Serbs, three by Muslims, two by Croats, and two mixed, with the 
international legal identity remaining exclusively with the central government; and proposals 
relating to the cessation of hostilities and other military matters.  For the EEC, this represented 
the only practical solution.  However the plan did not succeed in securing support on the ground 
and from other players such as the US and Russia, and was thus never formally agreed upon.  
Alain Juppé, the French Foreign Affairs Minister appointed in March 1993, decided to 
launch a new initiative to break the stalemate.  He was supported in this by Germany who had 
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 been keeping a low profile on the issue after the episode of Slovenia and Croatia recognitions.  
The initiative155 was formally agreed upon by all the EU member-states at a General Affairs 
Council (GAC) meeting in November 1993 and was followed by meetings in Geneva, with 
representatives of all sides, including UN military commanders and observers from both the US 
and Russia.  The talks however broke down again in December 1993156, because the EU had no 
credible force to implement and enforce the plan157.  In addition, the “logic of the directoire” was 
already moving forward when the US, the UK, Spain158, and France agree towards the end of 
1993 to the protection of security enclaves in Bosnia. 
This period also saw an increased division of labor between the EEC who kept the role of 
diplomatic mediator and the UN who started to negotiate a cease-fire and the deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission159. 
 
C. US Leadership and EU Member-States 
The Sarajevo market massacre of February 1994 where the Bosnian Serbs shelled a 
market changed the context and allowed all the outside parties to push for a peace settlement 
culminating in the Dayton Agreements of 1995. The Serbs were finally delivered a credible 
ultimatum to lift the siege on Sarajevo and withdraw or face air strikes against their positions.  
As Geoffrey Edwards points out, on the one hand, it [the period] saw a rapprochement between 
the French and the United States over the role of NATO.  On the other hand, it saw a Russian 
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 initiative that allowed some cover for the Serbs to withdraw160.  The decision to allow airstrikes 
still took some time to take, as both France and the UK had most troops on the ground (as part of 
the UN peacekeeping mission161) and feared for the lives of their troops. 
As the focus was increasingly on outside actors, the role of the EEC/EU was reduced. 
The creation of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1994 comprising the US, 
Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany meant the end of the EU involvement as a 
whole.  The Contact Group was an American idea.  If the US was to get more involved in the 
conflict, it did not want to have to deal with the EU as a whole (particularly at that time, Greece 
was holding the EU Presidency and Greece was a difficult partner in the conflict in that it 
opposed military intervention in the region, because of Slavic solidarity), but only with the most 
important states.  France and the United Kingdom were of course crucial, as member of the UN 
Security Council, while Germany was another important player in Europe, even if not militarily. 
As Brian White underlines, from the outset, the EC/EU had to work with a growing range of 
different actors and was increasingly dependent upon them to achieve success.  This inevitably 
weakened a distinctive EC/EU contribution to the peace process.  The key problem here was that 
the more high profile other actors became, the more the interests of particular EU member states 
rather than any sort of collective policy were magnified162.  The creation of the Contact Group 
also stemmed from the realization that no solution could be imposed that was not supported by 
the Europeans, the US, and Russia.  Once the Contact Group was set up, the objective became to 
coordinate policies among those five states, so that they could submit proposals to the UN that 
were already supported by four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
(China generally kept a low profile during the crisis). 
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 This move from collective diplomacy to directoire diplomacy did not however mean that 
actions were taken faster.  Differences still existed within the Contact Group.  On the one hand, 
France and the United Kingdom pushed to remain neutral vis-à-vis the parties, were more 
opened to negotiations with Belgrade, and more sensitive to the risks any military air campaign 
would pose for the UNPROFOR.  On the other hand, the US and to some extent Germany, 
favored the Bosnian government, pushed for an end to the arms embargo and for the use of 
military air strikes, which briefly occurred against Bosnian Serbs positions in 1995.  The Dayton 
Agreement, signed in Paris in 1995, that led to the end of the wars is usually considered the 
result of a change in the balance of military force on the ground favoring Croatian and Muslim 
troops. 
 This period of increased American leadership did not correspond to EU inaction.  The EU 
as a whole continued to manifest itself through a declaratory foreign policy that had no direct 
effect on the ground.  At the beginning of 1994 the EU kept on supporting the efforts of the 
European mediator, Lord Owen and the UN Special Representative Thornvald Stoltenberg 
within the framework of the International Conference.  The European Council of February 1994 
requested a meeting of the Atlantic Council in order to find efficient means to stop the shelling 
of Sarajevo, including air strikes.  In the spring, the EU foreign affairs ministers asked for more 
diplomatic efforts from the UN, the EU, the US, and Russia.  The EU condemned the Serbian 
attacks against Gorazde and called for the respect of the UN Security Council resolutions.  In 
May 1994, Warren Christopher, the American Secretary of State, convened a meeting to re-
launch the peace negotiations.  The troika (Belgium, Greece, Germany) and France, the UK, and 
Russia participated.  Autumn 1994 saw the biggest tensions in the transatlantic alliance, when, 
under pressure from the Congress, the White House announced the end of the American 
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 participation in the operation controlling the embargo.  The WEU reacted very firmly to the 
announcement in November 1994 because the organization was completely dependent on NATO 
and the US for the command and communications of the operation.    
 At the Essen European Council of December 1994, the EU heads of state and of 
government condemned the violation by the Bosnian-Serb forces in the enclave of Bihac.  The 
Council also reiterated its support for the UNPROFOR mission, but noted that the troops might 
be recalled if risks became too high for their safety163.  The EU in addition called on the Bosnian 
Serbs to accept the peace plan of the Contact Group.  When several months later, UN soldiers 
and observers were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, the EU called for their immediate 
release and warned of the important consequences to be faced with, without precision of which 
consequences164. 
 With regard to the situation in Croatia, CFSP positions underlined EU support for the 
other international organizations’ attempts to put pressure on the Zagreb government.  The 
difference was that in the Croatian case, no mention was made of possible sanctions or the use of 
force.  At the beginning of 1994, Croatian President Tudjman told UN Secretary General, 
Boutros-Ghali, that he planned to put an end to the UNPROFOR mission, which he saw as de 
facto backing the Serbian secession in Croatia.  The EU reacted negatively to Tudjman’s 
proposal.  In a declaration165, the EU underlined its support for the political solution for the 
Croatian territories controlled by the Serbs presented by the International Conference in 
cooperation with the US and Russia.  Three months later, after Croatia agreed to keep the 
UNPROFOR mission, the GAC authorized the beginning of negotiations for a cooperation 
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 agreement between EU and Croatia.  However, when Croat forces launched an operation in 
Eastern Slavonia violating a cease-fire agreement, the EU only deplored the action that 
compromised the international efforts to find a solution to the Krajina issue.  When the 
autonomous Serbian republics of Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina announced their decision to 
merge, the EU declared that decision null and void.  The alliance between Croat and Bosnian 
forces whose objective was to take back territories from Serbian militia in Bosnia, was not 
condemned by the EU.  On the other hand, the EU condemned the attacks by Croatian forces on 
the territories held by the Serbs in Croatia.  The EU even decided to put en end to the dialogue 
with Zagreb regarding the trade and cooperation agreement, as well as the implementation of the 
PHARE program.   
 Finally with regard to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the EU suspended some of the 
sanctions against the country after Milosevic decided to close Yugoslavia’s borders with Bosnia 
and showed willingness to break with the Bosnian Serb leadership.  The EU also reinforced its 
boycott of Bosnian Serbs who still refused any peace agreement.     
 
3/ The Question of the Use of Force 
 Since the onset of the conflict, military intervention was the key problem for the 
development of an effective EC/EU action.  Generally, it can be said that the EC was indeed 
united with regard to the objectives in the war – or at least was making efforts to show unity (in 
the case of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia supporting a member-state that held an 
opposite view) and with regard to peace plans (at least during the first phase), while the use of 
military force was the divisive issue among the member-states.  
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 The initial involvement of the EEC was through the European Community Monitoring 
Mission (ECMM) and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).  Both were attempts at 
peacekeeping.  However, the failure of both attempts lied in the fact that the operations were 
peacekeeping operations in a place where no peace existed on the ground.  The ECMM (which 
was a novel instrument for the EEC) was established in July 1991 to broker and to try to 
maintain cease-fires between different sets of combatants.  As Edwards notes, at the local level, 
they (the monitors)  were not wholly unsuccessful in negotiating ceasefires, but they were clearly 
a minimal response that reflected the absence of any consensus among the EC/Twelve to pursue 
any larger-scale, military intervention166.   
However by 1992/1993, the ECMM was increasingly involved with the work of the 
UNPROFOR in various humanitarian missions167.  UNPROFOR was initially set up to provide 
the conditions for peace and security in the context of the 1991 Conference on Yugoslavia 
primarily by maintaining a ceasefire in Croatia168.  It was established by UNSC resolution 713 
and marked the actual involvement of the UN based on the EC agenda.  For the first time, the EC 
acted as a regional agency of the UN who endorsed the EC peace-keeping efforts notably by 
imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia.  It is interesting to note that already at the time, 
France wanted to send an emergency force to the region, but the UK threatened to veto the 
resolution by fear of seeing body-bags coming back home.   
A second UNPROFOR mission was established in 1992 with the mission of providing 
support and protection for the delivery of aid and humanitarian operations.  By the end of 1993, 
there were 23 000 troops involved in Bosnia and Croatia with about half of them European.  
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 France and the United Kingdom made the largest contributions to UNPROFOR in terms of both 
military personnel and commanding officers.  NATO also played a role in UNPROFOR.  
Although the operations were formally carried out under the authority of the UN, NATO’s 
Northern Army Group Forward Headquarters in Germany was moved to Bosnia to form the 
UNPROFOR Command169.  In addition, since German troops were not allowed to participate in a 
conflict outside the NATO area, they were replaced by French troops.  This de facto cooperation 
between French troops and NATO later on played an important role in Chirac’s decision to begin 
a rapprochement with NATO. 
 Although both these operations certainly helped alleviate the sufferings of the civilian 
populations, they failed to implement a real peace on the ground because of their lack of military 
involvement.  Soon therefore the question arose as how to best transform the peacekeeping 
operations into peacemaking operations using military force to impose peace on the combatants.  
The potential use of military force by the EEC/EU posed however numerous problems, not only 
of principles, but also procedural and operational.  Since the EEC had no military instruments 
per se, the matter was deferred to the WEU (which in the Maastricht Treaty was labeled as the 
future military arm of the EU).  France – mirroring its position in the IGC about the links 
between the EU and the WEU170 – called very early on for the WEU to be involved militarily. 
Germany was also in favor of using military force, but its position was weakened because of the 
restrictions placed by the German constitution on the use of German troops since Yugoslavia was 
out of the NATO area.  In addition, the historical memory of Germany and Croatia fighting 
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permanent cease-fire and security guarantees for UN forces.  
169 In addition, the implementation of the no-flight zone over Bosnia, the close air support for UNPROFOR, and the 
UN “safe areas” were all directed from a headquarter located at a NATO air base in Italy. 
170 It is often said that France’s interests in Yugoslavia were not clear but its interest in using Yugoslavia as an 
instrument were extremely clear.  
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 together for the Nazi cause during WWII did not preclude well of a German involvement in the 
region.  The UK on the other hand –together with Spain and Greece-, was not warm about the 
idea of sending an intervention force in the conflict, because of its own bloody experience in 
Northern Ireland and because of the position the British delegation was holding at the IGC.  
Indeed, for the UK NATO had to remain the cornerstone of European security.  As Richard Rupp 
puts it, the British government maintained that the costs associated with an intervention capable 
of restoring peace and stability to the region would be intolerably high.  British policymakers 
cited several factors in making the case against large-scale military intervention, including 
German experience in the Balkans during World War II, the difficulties in fighting a guerrilla 
war on Bosnian terrain, and Britain’ s own ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland.  Britain’s 
political leadership reasoned that the conflict in Bosnia was a civil war that would have to play 
itself out in the region’s villages and mountainsides171.  However, the UK was indispensable to 
the success of the operation.   
Talks within the WEU proved extremely painful and did not lead to anything consequent. 
The WEU drew up a range of military options at the request of the EU (primarily aimed at 
protecting the international and EC monitors) first in August-September of 1991 and then again 
in the autumn of 1992, but no agreement came on any of them.  The options went from sending 
armed escorts to accompany the EC monitors to committing up to 50,000 troops in a fully-fledge 
military operation.  The pattern that emerged was on the one hand, France who strongly favored 
a WEU involvement and on the other hand, the United Kingdom who strongly opposed it, with 
the other member-states leaning towards one or the other position.  In the end, the debate was 
transferred to the UN Security Council under French insistence.  Together with the setting up of 
                                                 
171 Rupp, Richard, “The Balkan Conflict: The Test Case for European Security Cooperation”, in McKenzie, Mary 
and Loedel, Peter (eds.), The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests, and 
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 the Contact Group, the failure to agree in the WEU marked the end of an independent EU 
intervention in former Yugoslavia.  
 Once the debate ended up in the hands of the UN Security Council, it still took about two 
years to find an agreement on the use of force in the conflict.  Different Councils resolutions 
allowed for the establishment of a “no fly zone” as well as the authorization to enforce the zone, 
and later on an agreement on allowing UNPROFOR to take all necessary measures to defend 
itself.  It can be said that although the use of force against Serbia was agreed in 1993172, it took 
several more months to actually enforce the decision because of strategic disagreements with the 
US, internal divisions within the EU, and fear of endangering both troops and humanitarian aid 
on the ground.  In early 1994, it actually took a French threat to withdraw its troops from 
UNPROFOR to stimulate the EU Council (Greece disassociated itself from the decision) to call 
for an early NATO Council meeting.  The UN Secretary General also requested the use of 
NATO airstrikes, attached for the first time to an ultimatum to the Serbs to lift the siege of 
Sarajevo.  The first use of force occurred in April 1994 and was extremely limited (around 
Gorazde). 
 The irony is that the EU Council of February 1994 under Greek Presidency called for 
NATO and not for the WEU to organize a military response, as could have been the case under 
article J.4 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty.  This amounted to recognition that only NATO had the 
necessary military capabilities for such an operation. 
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172 UNSCR 816 of March 1993 authorizing to enforce the “no fly zone” over Bosnia (UNSCR 781 – October 1992) 
using all necessary means. 
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 4/ Civilian Aspects of EU Involvement  
If the EEC/EU military involvement in the conflict was non-existent, its civilian 
involvement was definitely present, even though it was not always successful in its 
implementation.  The EEC had accumulated experience in the first pillar; in addition, it could use 
the stick of sanctions against Yugoslavia.  Indeed, the later was having over than 50% of its trade 
with the Community.  In the spring of 1991, Belgrade was warned that in the absence of a 
peaceful settlement of the crisis, credits and other forms of assistance were threatened and that 
the EEC would not negotiate a privileged association agreement with Yugoslavia.  This was 
followed in July 1991 by an arm embargo and in November of the same year, by the suspension 
of an existing trade and cooperation agreement after the breakdown of the Hague peace 
conference first against Yugoslavia as a whole, then in December against Serbia, with counter-
measures so that Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and later Macedonia would not be affected173.  A 
more comprehensive set of sanctions was agreed upon in June of 1992 against Serbia and 
Montenegro in the framework of UN Security Council resolution 757.   
However sanctions were neither effective, nor credible.  Often, the EEC/EU threatened to 
upgrade them, but the threat was not followed by implementation.  For instance, the EC’s 
position was weakened when, following German pressures, the Croat government was only 
given a warning not to continue to use Croat force in Bosnia or to pursue “ethnic cleansing” 
rather than face sanctions.  In addition, even though sanctions can be useful and necessary in a 
conflict in which both sides have economic relations, they are only part of a continuum of 
instruments that includes eventual use of force, if parties do not comply.    
It is however on the sanctions side, that the WEU went into action – with the decision of 
July 1992 (only operational in June 1993) to deploy naval forces under the auspices of the WEU 
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 in the Adriatic and on the Danube in order to monitor the blockade against Serbia174.  The other 
collective action taken by the WEU was the help given to the organization of a police force in 
Mostar175.  In addition, in October 1993, the EU took its first joint action under CFSP – a 
decision on civil action in Bosnia, only common denominator member-states could find since the 
disagreements among them were irreconcilable with regard to the use of military force.  This 
joint action was doomed however because it was ill-prepared and not well implemented.  The 
joint action dealt with humanitarian aid to Bosnia.  It was taken to alleviate the consequences of 
winter on the populations but did not fulfill its objective.  On the one hand, despite the agreement 
among the parties negotiated by the EU in Geneva in November 1993 regarding the free 
movement of humanitarian convoys, combats started over in December between Croats and 
Muslims in Central Bosnia, while Serbs broke the Christmas truce.  Even though the joint action 
referred to military support for the transportation of humanitarian aid, the EU did not ask the 
UNPROFOR or the WEU for help.  Therefore, because of the situation on the ground, the 
implementation of the action was stopped.  On the other hand, institutional problems about the 
financing of the action signed the death of this first CFSP implementation.  This institutional 
imbroglio reflected a fear from the Community institutions, to see first pillar questions such as 
humanitarian aid being contaminated by the second pillar.  Even under the EPC regime, 
humanitarian aid always fell under the first pillar176.   
The European Council of Birmingham in October 1992 tasked the Council of the EU to 
increase its contributions for use by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and to 
                                                                                                                                                             
173 De facto, this amounted to recognition of the Republics well before the de jure recognition of January 1992.  
174 Operations were decided for the Adriatic in November 1992 and became operational in June 1993, while for the 
Danube they materialized in the spring of 1993.  This was not a military action, but an action qualified by the WEU 
itself as a “police and customs operation”.  
175 This operation took the form of 200 policemen sent to the assist the EU in the management of Mostar. 
176 See Fink-Hooijer, Florika, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union”, European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 2, n. 5, 1994 
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 support by all necessary means the transportation of humanitarian food aid to Bosnia following 
consultations with both UNPROFOR and the UNHCR.  That was a good decision to take; 
however, when it came to implement it, the question arose as who would pay for it?  Would the 
budget for this joint action come from the Community budget or would it come from national 
contributions?  This discussion lasted four months in the Council of the EU177, with the decision 
finally being made in December 1993 that the budget would be equally divided between the EC 
budget and national contributions.  By then, winter was over and the aid was not urgent anymore. 
The money ended up being transferred to the administration of Mostar, another joint action to 
which I now turn. 
 The Mostar joint action is an interesting case-study of the early implementation of the 
CFSP.  It allows to study the interplay between the different EU institutions and the possibility, 
raised in the Maastricht Treaty of the WEU involvement as the “security arm” of the EU.  It 
should be said, however that technically, the Mostar joint action is not per se an EU initiative.  
Indeed, it was rather the EU answer to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of August 1993 and to the 
Washington Agreements of March 1994 creating the Muslim-Croat Federation178.  
Mostar was a city in Bosnia where Croats and Muslims lived.  The operation launched by 
the EU was a peace-building operation, aimed at providing public order (with the help of WEU 
experts to train a joint Bosnian/Croat police force179), reconciling Croats and Muslims, and 
rebuilding the infrastructure of the city.  Hans Koschnik, the former mayor of Breme in 
                                                 
177 Spence, A. and Spence, D., “The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam,” in 
Eliassen, K. (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, London: Sage, 1998, pg. 52  
178 The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan called for the city of Sarajevo and Mostar to be respectively placed under the UN 
and EU administration for a transitional period of two years.  In September 1993, the EU who at first was reluctant 
to be entrusted with such a responsibility, agreed to it and Germany came forward to bring a small administrative 
team for the project.  However, the project could only be implemented on the ground after the reconciliation 
between Croats and Muslims orchestrated by the US and the creation of the Bosnian Federation.     
179 It was the first time the WEU had been involved in a fully integrated EU joint action. 
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 Germany, was appointed Administrator in April 1994 and began his duty in July 1994.  Once 
again however, the joint action would be undermined by procedural and operational problems. 
A working group on former Yugoslavia was created within the Council of the EU at the 
beginning of the crisis, thus still under the EPC mechanisms.  The group was composed of 
experts delegated from the permanent representations of the member-states to the EU, experts 
from the desk officers in charge of Yugoslavia within the national ministries of foreign affairs 
and a Commission representative.  This composition reflected the then division of labor between 
the Coreper, the Political Committee, and the Commission (with the balance obviously tilting 
towards the member-states).  This group prepared the decisions of the monthly meeting of the 
Political Directors, as well as the decisions of the GAC.  For the Mostar case, the group was 
helped by another working group dealing only with the Mostar situation and meeting every 
week.  In this group, the Commission representative in Mostar and the diplomatic adviser of 
Hans Koschnik were present.  The rotating Presidencies also played a crucial coordinating role 
because of the number of actors involved in the process and because in case of an emergency, 
decisions needed to be taken by the Political Committee or by the GAC.  In Mostar, the 
administrator was surrounded by advisers, sent by the Council of the EU, which gave him 
instructions.  In addition, each Presidency designated a special representative from the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry, whose role was to go back and forth between Mostar and the country holding 
the Presidency to serve as a liaison.  This was thus a heavy bureaucratic machine whose center 
was in the Council of the EU, with the Presidency and the national capitals as the most important 
players. 
For instance, the financing of the joint action led to difficult negotiations between the 
various actors involved.  Article J.11.2 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that CFSP operational 
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 spending can be covered by the EC budget or by member-states’ contributions.  In June 1994, the 
GAC decided that the Mostar operation would be financed according to the second option and 
the principle of each member-state contributing according to its GDP.  However, since national 
contributions were slow to arrive, 32 million ECU of the unspent allocation for humanitarian aid 
to Bosnia (see above) was transferred to provide initial support for the Mostar Administration.  
By October 1994 however, only three member states had paid their due while several states 
stated they did not want to participate in the financing of the operation.  It was then decided to 
partially take the money from the EC budget (17 millions ECU from the member-states and 15 
millions ECU from the EC budget).  For that reason, the Commission and the EP requested a role 
in the decision-making process of the Mostar Administration, because of their legal rights to 
control Community spending.  The Council nevertheless decided to control the release of funds 
to the Mostar Administrator and that the latter would only be accountable to the Council, 
reporting regularly to the Presidency.  But because the member-states did not contribute all the 
money they had promised, the Council was forced to negotiate and agreed to associate the 
Commission to the management of the national contributions180.  The EP finally approved the 
Community budget for Mostar in October 1994.  
This procedure was a call for complication181.  First, the same joint action relied on two 
different budgetary decision-making, involving different institutional actors.  Coherence and 
clarity were of course the victims of such a decision.  In addition, some member-states requested 
                                                 
180 The management of the national contributions was subjected to a very peculiar system.  It was in the hand of the 
presidency, helped by the Mostar working group referred to above, in association with the Commission.  It was the 
Presidency who defined the orientations and gave the amounts requested to finance the joint action.  Koschnik 
received the contributions from the member-states, ensured the spending of the money, and regularly reported to the 
Presidency.  It was thus the Administrator himself who became the budgetary agent of the Council, and not the 
Commission. 
181 See Remacle, Eric and Delcourt, Barbara, “La PESC à l’épreuve du conflit yougoslave: acteurs, représentations, 
enseignements”, in Durand, Marie-Françoise et de Vasconcelos, Alvara (eds.), La PESC: Ouvrir l’Europe au 
monde, Paris: Presses de Sciences Politiques, 1998, pg. 256 
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 that the amount coming form the EC budget not be used for the WEU police force, in order to 
avoid an informal involvement of the Commission and the European Parliament in a “security” 
issue.  Some member-states also were worried that the even low-key involvement of the 
Commission in the process could lead to the creation of a distinctive organ within the 
Commission for the management of the CFSP.  During the negotiations of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, an inter-institutional agreement on the financing of administrative aspects of CFSP 
actions was annexed to the treaty.    
With regard to the relation between the EU and the WEU, the joint action was the only 
one that explicitly called for the involvement of the WEU for a police operation.  The Agreement 
on Mostar called for a unified police force under the authority of the Administrator and for the 
WEU to provide the international component of the force.  The tasks of the WEU were to inform 
and advise the administrator on all aspects related to public order; to advise the administrator on 
the creation and organization of selection and training rules of the local police force; to organize 
some police tasks; and to supervise other tasks.  These were thus essentially public order tasks 
and a logistical support for the administrator.  It took a long time for the WEU to find 180 police 
officers, which showed that if the WEU were to have been involved in peacekeeping or peace-
enforcement, the task would have been more difficult to achieve.       
 Finally, the joint action on Mostar was doomed by the situation on the ground, which the 
EU could have been able to understand if it had any sort of independent planning and analysis 
capability.  Serb attacks on the city intensified, making it clear that it should have been a peace-
making operation (involving military force) rather than a peace-building operation.  In addition, 
the Croat leadership of the city was not cooperative on joints with the Bosnian leadership.  The 
EU Administrator had no means at his disposal to coerce the parties, while even the WEU would 
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 not answer to him, only taking orders from the WEU authorities.  In February 1996, an attempted 
assassination against Koschnik led to his resignation. 
 Thus, even in the civilian side of the CFSP, the EEC/EU did not fare too well.  The 
transition from EPC to CFSP and the use of the new instrument called joint action did not 
amount to improved efficiency.  In addition to lack of will from the member-states, the 
institutions were involved in turf battles.   
 
5/ Conclusions: Lessons from the 1991-1995 Balkan Wars Case 
A. The Type of Action Used 
The Yugoslav wars were a series of inter-ethnic conflicts in which standards diplomatic 
tools had little chance of success; the choice of crisis management instruments was crucial.  In 
the early years of the conflict, the EEC/EU favored non-coercive actions based on its role as a 
mediator.  There was a general unwillingness to use force.  The lack of military force was clearly 
a problem to enforce decisions on the parties.  Diplomatic and economic means were not enough 
to resolve the crisis.  The EU’s efforts were directed at brokering cease-fires and attempting to 
get the warring parties to negotiate a political settlement.  The threat to use economic sanctions 
against republics that were not cooperative, isolate Serbia diplomatically, and grant recognition 
to Slovenia and Croatia had some effects on the negotiations for a political solution, as the cease-
fire between Serbia and Croatia in January 1992 showed.  However, the EU’s role as a coercive 
peacemaker could not have had an impact on the conflict, as the EU itself did not credibly 
threaten the use of force.   
Sanctions were widely used by the EEC/EU.  However, sanctions, although important 
instruments of crisis management, are medium to long term instruments and only work if they 
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 are coupled with other coercive instruments or if they are taken as steps towards increasingly 
stronger coercive diplomacy.  Because the EEC/EU (and the international community) did not 
want to use force in Yugoslavia in the early years of the conflict, sanctions often proved 
ineffective.  In addition, the arms embargo against Yugoslavia set up at the outset of the conflict, 
rather than being neutral, reinforced Serbia and to some extent Croatia’s military superiority. 
Finally, early on, as mentioned above, the EU favored Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity 
and therefore, did not want to appear as taking sides in the conflict.  This stance was however 
quickly put into question and self-destroyed by the use of diplomatic recognition of the Yugoslav 
Republics BOTH as carrot and as stick to induce them to cooperate. 
Such as diplomatic recognition, humanitarian aid was also used both as carrot and as 
stick.  Humanitarian aid was the primary goal of crisis management used by the EEC/EU.  
However, it was also used as a tool of crisis management.  Humanitarian aid was important but it 
was a mistake to use it in place of other instruments of crisis management.  As Nicole Gnesotto 
writes, the West chose two approaches, which they have continually repudiated in practice while 
retaining them in their rhetoric.  The first was mediation and impartiality in the conduct of 
negotiations, which presupposes dialogue with all the parties involved and the refusal to 
designate an aggressor: but, from November 1991, the first economic sanctions were applied to 
Serbia-Montenegro, against whom the West was subsequently to invoke chapter VII of the 
charter of the United Nations, […], while pretending to maintain its role of mediator and 
refusing to denounce the aggressor by name182.   
However, once peace was established on the ground, the EU appeared as a stronger, more 
visible actor with regard to reconstruction issues, even though the effectiveness of the decision-
making was often left to be desired.  For instance, in Mostar, the EU intervention helped keep a 
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 fragile peace between Croats and Muslims and EU money contributed to economic and technical 
reconstruction producing tangible benefits particularly for the Muslim part of the city.  As Brian 
White emphasizes, conflict resolution requires a range of different instruments and the EU 
clearly has a contribution to make on the basis of its existing “civilian power” capabilities.  The 
EU was successful at humanitarian aid delivery (although this was slow) and at defining broad 
political guidelines, but proved unsuccessful when it came to implement those guidelines into 
more precise actions. 
 
B. The Decision-Making 
The absence of a planning and analysis capability clearly prevented the EU to define a 
common strategy based on a European interest, a possibility that was specifically rejected during 
the Maastricht negotiations.  Most of the time, the EEC/EU action was reactive rather than 
proactive.  Even when there was some type of prevention and some interesting innovations such 
as the ECMM, the missions were doomed to failure because they were not allowed to use force.  
This failure to find a consensus on the use of force rested primarily of a profound 
misunderstanding of the conflict.  A planning and analysis unit would not have resolved 
everything, but it would have helped to react to the events in a more informed way.  The 
Presidency during the conflict was mainly dependent on the information the member-states were 
willing to share with their colleagues.  Big countries have more intelligence capabilities than 
small one, but are very reluctant to share it.   
In the same vein, the absence of a person capable of leading the various member-states 
and steering national positions towards a common interest or defend a common EU position was 
clearly felt.  Every presidency came with its own agenda for the conflict.  For instance, the 
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 Italians pushed very hard to send the Troika for the first time in Belgrade in June 1991.  Italy was 
a strong support of the CFSP within the IGC.  However, as Nuttall underlines, in this particular 
case, more immediate national interests were at stake.  Italy shared a border with Slovenia, 
where it had important economic interests.  […]  And there were only three days remaining 
during which De Michelis would be a member of the Troika.  Whatever the motivation, the 
Italian initiative at the European Council showed once again that EPC suffered from the lack of 
an objective mechanism to define the European interest and make the necessary proposals183.  
The result was that the deliberations of the European Council became those of a diplomatic 
conference mediating among the domestic interests of the participants, rather than a body 
working out and implementing a common foreign and security policy reflecting the joint interest 
of the EEC/EU. 
It is however clear that before the focus moved to the Contact Group, membership in the 
EC/EU did matter, in a positive or negative way for the EU as a whole.  Collective action was 
the primary goal of the EU policy and had to be maintained, even if this collectivity led to 
inaction when there were important disagreements among the member-states or even if it was a 
reaction to the defection of a member-state (cfr. Germany and the recognition issue). 
As Andreas Kintis underlines, these difficulties […] did not prevent the EU states from 
inventing a wide variety of new foreign policy procedures in their bid to contribute to a peaceful 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis.  EU involvement took various forms: the dispatch of ministerial 
troika missions to mediate in Slovenia; successive peace conferences with a permanent EU 
chairman; the dispatch of teams of monitors; the deployment of an assortment of economic 
instruments as a means of pressure designed to support the EU’s mediatory diplomacy; the 
imposition of economic sanction; the administration of Mostar, where the EU has assumed 
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 primary responsibility for the physical and political reconstruction of Bosnia’s second largest 
city; the provision of humanitarian assistance; and support for the creation of stable political 
and economic systems, reconstruction and development, and the establishment of normal 
relations among all the states and people in former Yugoslavia184.  However, this burst of 
creativity concerned the internal EC decision-making process.  The fact remains that when these 
measures failed to resolve the crisis, the EU’s limited competence in security and defense 
matters and, more importantly, its member states’ disparate foreign policy objectives together 
ensured that the EU’s ambition to assert its presence as an international actor was impaired by 
its inability to maintain common positions. Even though in its initial response to the crisis, the 
EU succeeded in maintaining a relatively cohesive position, its later inability to compose 
divergent views within its own ranks undermined its effectiveness185.  This statement joins the 
argument made in the previous chapter that member-states learnt through their mistakes and 
adjust the processes to increase the effectiveness of the CFSP in the treaty revisions following 
the Yugoslav wars. 
The case of the Yugoslav wars also reinforces the argument that with regard to security 
and defense the most important states are France and the United Kingdom.  The big member-
states were also pleased to be dealing with the Yugoslav problems in other fora where they were 
put on equal footing with other important outside actors, such as in the Contact Group or in the 
UN.  However, small member-states mattered too when their preferences were important to their 
national interests (cf. Greece and the question of Macedonia).   
In addition, the rotating presidency failed in providing the necessary strong and constant 
leadership needed in period of crisis.  This problem was especially acute when a small member-
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 state was at the helm of the EU.  What the EU policies in the Yugoslav wars amounted to was an 
incredible paradox: to attempt to maintain consensus at all costs while still following national 
interests outside the EU.   
 Finally, Dayton succeeded for various reasons, one of them being that the EU and the 
USA worked together.  It seems thus that the EU and the USA cannot solve problems in which 
the other has a strong interest without cooperation between them; and that in such situations it is 
risky to deploy European troops without American support.  The earlier Vance-Owen Plan of 
1993 that was not so different than the final Dayton Agreement did succeed in being accepted 
because of the different positions held by the US and its European allies.  It is maybe not too 
much of an exaggeration to say that the Yugoslav Wars lasted as long as they did in part because 
the differences between the US and Europeans were greater than the differences within the 
EEC/EU itself.     
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CHAPTER FIVE – The CFSP-post 1999 in the Balkans – The Case of the FYROM 
 
In the 2003 edition of the Journal of Common Market Studies’ Annual Review, Allen and 
Smith wrote that the Western Balkans have for a long time been symbolic of the failure of the 
EU’s CFSP.  Nevertheless, by the end of 2002, there were distinct signs that at last the EU might 
be beginning to pull together the political, economic, military, judicial and civilian aspects of its 
external policy into a coherent whole186.     
Following the institutional changes referred to in chapter two of the thesis particularly 
since the Amsterdam Treaty, the question that arises is whether those changes impacted the 
action of the EU in the Balkans.  One major conflict that threatened to reopen the Balkan 
question was the ethnic problem in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
between the Albanian minority and the Macedonian majority.  FYROM had always been 
branded as the success story of ethnic cohabitation in the Balkan.  However, the country seemed 
to slip towards more violence, especially after the 1999 war in Kosovo.  Determined to avoid not 
only a repetition of the first Balkan Wars and of the Kosovo conflict, but also a spillover to the 
rest of the region, this chapter analyzes how the EU as an actor in itself, responded to the 
Macedonian situation.  The first section gives some background on the situation in Macedonia 
that led to the 2001 crisis, while also briefing introducing the special relationship one EU 
member-state, Greece has with FYROM.  The second section analyzes the EU decision-making 
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 process in the conflict.  Finally, the chapter concludes by taking the findings of this case-study to 
a more theoretical level. 
 
1/ The Context 
A. The Greek Problem  
Macedonia was one of the republics of the former Yugoslavia whose independence was 
deemed acceptable by the Badinter Commission at the outset of the first Balkans Wars in 
January 1992187.  The then EEC however postponed recognition of the international legal 
personality of Macedonia, following Greek opposition to it.  At the Maastricht European Council 
of December 1991, Greece indeed succeeded in inserting a clause in the conclusions requiring 
from Macedonia a commitment to adopt constitutional and political guarantees assuring that it 
has no territorial claim towards a neighboring member state of the Community, and that it will 
not undertake propaganda hostile to that state, including the use of a name which implies 
territorial claims.  Greece’s argument was that despite constitutional changes stating that 
Macedonia had no territorial claims in Greece, the use of the name “Macedonia” implied 
expansionist claims, because of its link with Greek history.  Although the probability that such a 
small country, whose economy was exhausted and with no military would invade Greece (which 
had an important military in addition to being a NATO member and thus protected by the US) 
was close to none, Greece’s EEC partners did not oppose its demands. 
 A closer look at the situation reveals however that Greece’s fears were twofold.  First, it 
was worried that Macedonia’s independence would put the focus on Greece’s own minorities, 
Macedonians, as well as Turks and Albanians.  The issue was that Greece had never recognized 
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 the Macedonian minority and referred to it as “Slavophone Greeks.”  Turks and Albanians were 
referred to as “Muslim Greeks.”  Greece thus feared that the existence of a Macedonian state 
would generate instability within the country188.  Second, Greece feared that Macedonia 
independence would push the country in the Bulgarian sphere of influence, whose relationship 
with Turkey was warning up.  This would be an unacceptable position for Greece, as both 
Bulgaria and Turkey were Greece’s adversaries.    
 In the spring of 1994, individual EU countries began to establish diplomatic links with 
Macedonia.  Macedonia was also accepted in the UN General Assembly under the temporary 
name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  In November 1995, Greece and FYROM 
began to normalize their relationship by signing an interim agreement, not without Greece 
having in the preceding years imposed a unilateral embargo on Macedonia that was deemed 
contrary to the EC according to the Commission who took Greece to the European Court of 
Justice.  The Macedonian case is thus a good example on how the politics of one member-state 
held hostage an EU foreign policy that was on the whole pretty coherent189. 
 
B. The UNPROFOR Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) 
 During the Yugoslav Wars, Macedonia was to become one of the first examples of 
conflict prevention by the international community.  Through UN Security Council Resolution 
795 adopted in December 1992, the UN decided on the deployment of a preventive force in the 
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188 Gow also shows how the Macedonian question was linked in Greece’s cognitive map to the Cyprus question.  
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the island which prompted the Turkish invasion.  However, it was clear that Cyprus formed part of the Greek mental 
landscape and that, following the Cyprus model, any acknowledgement of a minority, especially Turkish, would 
imply eventual moves towards annexation. – See Gow, James, op. cit., pg. 79  
189 The Greek policy towards Macedonia also shows however, how the foreign policy of an EU member-state has 
became Europeanized throughout the years of working within the CFSP structures.  See for instance, Kavakas, 
Dimitrios, “Greece”, in Manners, Ian and Whitman Richard (eds.), op. cit., pg. 146 
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 country, in order to avoid an extension of the on-going conflict.  At the height of its power, the 
UNPROFOR FYROM mission comprised 1,107 troops in June 1994.  This early concern with 
FYROM was also explained by the argument that a war in Southern Yugoslavia would probably 
not be contained, but would have regional ramifications, possibly involving two NATO allies, 
Greece and Turkey190.  The force was deployed along the border between Macedonia and Serbia, 
particularly the section with Kosovo.  The scenario was that a war in Kosovo would lead to the 
support of Macedonia’s Albanian minority, as well as of Albania and that Albania would send 
arms to Kosovo through Macedonia.  UNPROFOR worked closely with the ECMM who had 
personnel in the country that was involved in mediation, for instance by assisting negotiations 
between Albanian factions and by providing channels for contact between the Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs in Skopje on the one hand and Albanian political leaders on the 
other hand.  The UN mission only left the country in 1999.       
 Interestingly, the Macedonian crisis of 2000-2001 is widely seen as a left-over from the 
Kosovo war of 1999, a scenario already envisaged in 1992. 
 
C. Origins of the Crisis 
 The origins of the Macedonian crisis can be traced in structural and more conjectural 
factors.  Structurally, since its independence from Yugoslavia in the early nineties, Macedonia 
has suffered from a “security deficit”191.  Macedonia’s identity has been challenged externally 
and internally.  Externally, three of its neighbors have grievances towards the country.  Bulgaria 
has challenged Macedonia’s language, claiming it is only a dialect of Bulgarian.  Greece has 
challenged the country’s name and flag, accusing it of irredentism.  Finally, Serbia has refused to 
                                                 
190 This also explains the important American contingent in the UNPROFOR FYROM mission. 
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 recognize the separate existence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.  Internally, Macedonia 
comprises an important Albanian minority, whose relationship with ethnic Macedonians has 
suffered from a mutual lack of trust.  Although a long history of hostility cannot really be 
accounted for, some specific events (such as proclamation from some Albanian parties to wish a 
reunification with Kosovo and Albania or Macedonian police interventions in Albanian towns in 
the mid-1990s) have led to question the fragile equilibrium among both ethnic groups.  Such a 
security deficit is only reinforced when one takes into consideration the fact that FYROM is not 
only a young state, but had to deal with key external events during its decade of independence.  
Macedonia has indeed been in the midst of a regional turmoil since its independence that has 
affected both its security, such as during the Kosovo conflict, and its economy, which suffered 
from the embargoes on Yugoslavia and the trade embargo imposed by Greece in the early 1990s. 
 In this uncertain context, the Macedonian government showed less flexibility in dealing 
with the Albanian minority over the ten years of independence.  The question for instance of an 
Albanian University was not perceived as a way of improving the quality of education offered to 
Albanians, but as a political claim which, if fulfilled, would further increase Albanian 
nationalism.  Neglecting legitimate Albanian demands only accentuated the fragility of the state, 
because the minority began to identify the state and its government with ethnic Macedonians.  
Albanians thus became more responsive to groups that were calling for the use of force, as a 
reaction to what they saw as the failure of traditional Albanian political parties to secure crucial 
reforms to the Macedonian Constitution guaranteeing better minority rights. 
 This situation combined to more conjectural factors triggered the 2001 conflict.  It is to 
those conjectural factors that I now turn.  First, an arms smuggling and trafficking network was 
                                                                                                                                                             
191 See Balalovska, Kristina; Silj, Alessandra, and Zucconi, Mario, “Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: Crisis in 
Macedonia”, Ethnobarometer – Working Paper, January 2002 
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 operating in and out of Kosovo in the mountain border between FYROM and Kosovo.  Second, 
the Kosovo war was interpreted by some Albanian factions as a victory of force against 
negotiations.  Third, an agreement between Belgrade and Skopje on the demarcation of the 
border between the two countries was reached in February 2001.  As a result, a mountain area in 
Northern Macedonia, which had been a no-man land since 1991 because of the lack of agreement 
on the borderline, was assigned to FYROM.  Fourth, the negotiations between NATO, Belgrade, 
and the Albanians rebels (grouped in the PMBLA – Presevo – Medvedja – Bujanovac Liberation 
Army) in the Presevo Valley sealed the defeat of the Albanian rebellion in the area, while 
Serbian troops were authorized to enter the buffer zone in March 2001.  Therefore the PMBLA 
had to find another area to seek refuge and take its weapons.  The faction regrouped in the 
mountainous area of Northern Macedonia with the National Liberation Army of Macedonia 
(NLA) who was only then beginning to get organized, occupying some villages along the 
borders of FYROM, Serbia, and Kosovo.  In January 2001, the first attacks against Macedonian 
policy patrol occurred and the conflict started.   
 
2/ The EU CFSP Decision-Making 
When looking at the EU policy-making process during the crisis in FYROM, it can be 
fairly said that the “capability-expectations gap192” was not as wide as in previous crisis the EU 
had to face.  In about two years and a half, the EU made enormous progress in putting in place a 
whole new institutional framework for the CFSP and the ESDP.  Although these 
institutions/structures are still today relatively new and are sill trying to find their role and place 
                                                 
192 See footnote 70. 
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 in the global EU decision making process, they allowed the EU action in FYROM to produce a 
more positive outcome than was the case in previous Balkans crisis. 
A. The High Representative 
First the role of the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, was invaluable.  The 
creation of the post of High Representative definitely brought the visibility/continuity element 
that was lacking in the EU’s CFSP and was deeply felt during the first Balkan wars.  Mr. Solana 
traveled to Skopje very frequently and put pressure on both the Macedonian and the Albanian 
sides to arrive at an agreement by political means.  It is remarkable, to that extent, that almost 
each time Javier Solana was leaving Skopje, the relations between the two parties were dropping 
to a low level and he needed to go back to put the political process back on track.  When in May 
2001 a government of national unity was formed, Solana kept rushing to Skopje whenever the 
coalition seemed under strain.  As Nicholas Whyte puts it, rather than pompous and ineffective 
statements from the Council of Ministers, Europe is now sending in Javier Solana, a figure with 
almost the authority of an American Secretary of State.193 
 Credit should be given to Mr. Solana for its input in the position of High Representative. 
As was explained in the second chapter of the thesis, the post was called for in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, but as a new institutional structure, a lot was depending on the precedents being created 
through the first person holding the position.  The choice of Mr. Solana was to that extent an 
excellent one.  Mr. Solana brought to the EU his numerous international contacts made through 
his position as former Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain, as member of the International 
Socialist, and as former NATO Secretary General.  He is widely respected by Europeans and 
                                                 
193 Whyte, N., “L’heure de l’Europe – Enfin arrivée?”, in Whyte, N.; Arbatova, N. A. and Allin, D. H., “The 
Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security”, ESF Working Paper, no 2, July 2001 
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 Americans, a quality that was regarded as crucial by all member-states.  What is more, his 
qualities as negotiator are unanimously praised in all diplomatic circles. 
In addition, the creation of the policy unit allowed the High Representative to have a 
permanent representative in Skopje when he himself could not be there194.  The Policy Unit, also 
established in the Amsterdam Treaty and previously referred to as the Policy Planning and Early 
Warning Unit195, is the think-tank of Solana.  However, it is more and more obvious than rather 
than being a long-term policy unit, it is becoming the support staff of the High Representative on 
his day-to-day work.  This is a consequence of the small entourage who works directly for 
Solana.  The DG CFSP of the Council of the EU, although working closely with the High 
Representative is first and foremost responsible for helping every Presidency. 
 
B. The Commission 
Mr. Solana however, could not have accomplished the results he achieved, without using 
some sort of incentives, which were in the hands of the European Commission.  The looming 
signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)196 between the EU and FYROM 
was certainly the stronger incentive Mr. Solana could have used to pressure the two parties in the 
conflict to conclude a political deal.  Indeed the SAA gives FYROM the status of a potential EU 
candidate, thus opening up the possibility of future accession to the EU197.  On April 9, the EU 
                                                 
194 However, it is also important to note that this shuttle diplomacy went in both directions, Macedonian officials 
being also invited in Brussels.  The Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister visited Brussels several times, while the 
President of FYROM attended the European Council of Stockholm in June 2001. 
195 See chapter 2 of the thesis. 
196 The Council of the EU adopted on January 24, 2000 its negotiating directives to the Commission.  The 
negotiations were launched by the Commission in Skopje on March 5, 2000 and the agreement was signed on April 
9, 2001. 
197 As the preamble of the Agreement states, ‘the European Union’s readiness to integrate to the fullest possible 
extent the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the political and economic mainstream of Europe and its 
status as potential candidate for EU membership on the basis of the Treaty on European Union and fulfillment of the 
criteria defined by the European Council of Copenhagen in June 1993, subject to successful implementation of this 
Agreement, notably regarding regional co-operation.’ 
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 made Macedonia the first southeastern European country to sign the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement, the most important first step established by the EU in the process toward 
institutional integration.  Interestingly enough, the final deal over the SAA was reached during 
the negotiations for the formation of a grand coalition government, a key demand of the EU to 
put an end to the threat of civil war in the country (all the parties represented in parliament were 
invited to Luxembourg to the signing ceremony of the Agreement).  The very fact that the 
Agreement was signed by the EU even though Skopje was still far from the required standards is 
a sign of the political capital the EU and its member-states were ready to invest to bring political 
stability in FYROM.   
The process of the SAA has important political, economic, and symbolic significance and 
is one of the most important elements of a multiple EU strategy designed to favor a progressive 
process of integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the EU.  To support this 
statement one just needs to look at the different parts of the agreement: respect of international 
peace and stability; political dialogue between the EU and FYROM; enhanced regional 
cooperation among the Western Balkans countries; perspective of the establishment of a free-
trade area between the EU and FYROM; movement of workers; commitment by FYROM to 
approximate its legislation to that of the EU; and cooperation between the EU and FYROM in a 
wide range of areas, including issues of the third pillar.  The creation of the SAA dates back to 
April 1997, when the EU General Affairs Council adopted a Regional Approach towards the 
Western Balkans, establishing political and economic conditionality for the development of 
bilateral relations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and FYROM.  In 1999, the Commission proposed the establishment of a 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the 
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 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and FYROM.  The SAP provided a new framework for the 
development of relations between these countries and the EU.  For the first time, it offered those 
countries a prospect of EU integration, based on a progressive approach adapted to the situation 
of each country.  The SAP offers major incentives to these countries, but also sets political and 
economic conditions.  In order to develop a closer relationship with the EU, these countries have 
to gear their political, economic, and institutional development to the values and models 
underpinning the EU: democracy, respect for human rights, and a market economy.  According 
to Michael E. Smith, these agreements are also the result of a Commission strategy to increase its 
influence in the EU foreign policy.  Indeed, rather than wasting its resources and inviting 
disputes by initiating numerous CFSP actions, the Commission has tended to pursue a strategy 
of embedding foreign policy issues in broader sets of EU agreements or policies, such as 
“Association Agreements” […].  These agreements are in fact an institutionalized framework to 
help achieve coherence among the EU’s policies toward important areas of interest.198 
The much-awaited bureaucratic battle between the Council and the Commission did not 
occur in FYROM.  The factor of urgency played an important role: there was a strong sense 
among the EU institutions and the EU member-states that FYROM was on the verge of a civil 
war.  In addition, the failed experiences of the wars in Bosnia and the experience in Kosovo were 
other important factors that help understand the relative easiness with which the relations 
between the Council and the Commission developed and the willingness of and consensus 
among the member-states to delegate authority to the High Representative.  The personalities of 
                                                 
198Smith, M. E., “The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to 
Amsterdam”, in Sweet, A. S.; Sandholtz, W. and Fligstein, N. (eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, pg 185 
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 both Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten are also quite compatible, one not trying to hinder the other over 
his job.  Both try to respect as much as possible their own competencies.  
In addition, the External Relations Directorate General (DG) under Commissioner Patten, 
is not a DG trying to push for more Commission visibility in the field of CFSP, but rather is a 
DG that is trying to protect the competencies acquired in the past and to deliver efficient and 
effective policies.  The focus is on delivering and managing, rather than on a political vision 
about the role of the Commission in the second pillar.  Part of the reason that might explain why 
this is so should be looked for in the Santer Commission debacle of 1999199.  The actual Prodi 
Commission is still a Commission that is trying to recover from that episode.  On the overall, 
Javier Solana, the EU high representative for the common foreign and security policy, and Chris 
Patten, the EU external relations commissioner, have made great strides in exercising Europe’s 
political clout and improving its speed and performance in delivering assistance and providing 
access to European markets and institutions. 200 
Finally, the EU, through the Commission, promised to organize a donors' conference for 
FYROM on condition that the Macedonian parliament approved and implemented the agreement 
on constitutional reforms.  The new Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was also first utilized in 
the FYROM crisis.  The mechanism was created in February 2001 to allow the European 
Commission to dispatch Community funds rapidly in case of emergency201.  The creation of the 
RRM was a response to the new EU development in crisis management/crisis prevention.  One 
can wonder if the creation of the RRM was not a specific response from the Commission to the 
development of new structures within the Council on crisis management such as the Situation 
                                                 
199 The Santer Commission resigned in 1999 amid accusations of fraud and mismanagement of funds.  
200 “Taking Stock and Looking Forward – Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond”, United States Institute for 
Peace Special Report, February 22, 2002, n. 83 
201 The funds available through the RRM are 20 million euros for 2001 and 25 million euros for 2002. 
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 Center.  What is more, the Commission was really handicapped by the fact that it was 
responsible for the Community funds but had no way to deploy them rapidly  The first action 
undertaken under the RRM dates back to March 2001 and concerned the houses destroyed or 
damaged by the fighting in the areas of Tetovo and Skopska Crna Gora.  In October 2001 the 
Commission adopted a decision to finance a Confidence Building Program for FYROM, also 
with the funds of the RRM.  The 10.3. Million euro budget for this action was conditional on full 
ratification of all the amendments to the FYROM Constitution, as well as on the adoption of a 
new law on local government, as was requested by the Ohrid agreement signed in August 2001.  
The Commission also proposed to extend to FYROM the mandate of the European Agency for 
Reconstruction for Kosovo and Yugoslavia.  Europe Aid, the EU agency for development too 
was involved in the management of the crisis.  It set up a special working group in Brussels and a 
local team to support projects in FYROM. 
Although most of the financial incentives were part of the EC (1st pillar), it is a fact that 
the diplomatic visibility was more in Mr. Léotard and Solana hands, rather than with the 
Commission Delegation in Skopje.  The Commission Delegation in Skopje kept a rather low 
profile, due to the personality of the head of the delegation.  Also the whole system of 
Commission delegations was in the process of being reformed, as part of a broader reform of the 
Commission external aid management decided by Patten. 
 
C. The Member-States 
 To now turn to the member-states, they also realized that they should act together to 
maintain their credibility.  They consistently spoke with one voice.  The June 16, 2001 statement 
of the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers read: “We urge the Macedonian authorities to achieve 
tangible progress now.  The Macedonian government must present a report on interethnic peace 
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 efforts to EU Foreign Affairs ministers on 25 June”.  Losing aid was the alternative, something 
Macedonia could not afford, especially considering the hole in the budget due to the war efforts.  
On June 25, a special meeting of the EU foreign ministers was convened in Luxembourg to 
discuss the crisis.  Summoned there was the Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister Ilinka 
Mitreva.  Determined to bring the ethnic Macedonian leadership and ethnic Albanian politicians 
to a compromise, the EU foreign affairs ministers appointed former French Defense Minister 
François Léotard as special EU envoy to Macedonia202.  They also warned Skopje not to count 
on new financial assistance unless the Macedonian government and the ethnic Albanian 
opponents settled their differences.  That same condition, they made clear, applied to any 
prospect for integration into the EU.  The constitutional French lawyer Robert Badinter who had 
been very active in the first Yugoslav Wars203, was summoned up to help reform the Macedonian 
Constitution. 
The system of the rotating Presidency quite paradoxically was not a hindrance in the 
FYROM crisis.  The crisis worsened in March 2001 under the Swedish Presidency.  As a matter 
of fact, Sweden does not have an embassy in FYROM and Sweden’s interests are represented by 
the British Ambassador in Skopje.  However, there was just a change in Ambassador at the time 
and the new British Ambassador was quite young.  What is more, since Sweden was holding the 
Presidency, the British Ambassador could not represent the UK, Sweden, as well as the EU as a 
whole, if it is just for practical reasons.  This is when the consensus was reached that there 
should be an EU Special Envoy to Skopje.  The choice was set up on François Léotard, a former 
                                                 
202 The appointment of an EU representative, acting under the authority of the High Representative for CFSP was 
confirmed at the European Council of Göteborg on 15 and 16, June 2001. 
203 See chapter three of the thesis. 
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 French Defense Minister.204  Quite surprisingly, the discussions were not so difficult regarding 
the person who should hold the position, but proved more difficult regarding who, from the 
European Commission, the Council of the EU, or the member-states should fund Mr. Léotard’s 
costs, reflecting once more the awkwardness of the pillars division.  The decision was finally 
reached that it was the Council who should pay for the costs of the Special Envoy.  It was clear 
that the Commission did not want to establish a precedent, especially if it meant taking money 
from the Community budget to pay for the representative of the member-states!  
  
D. NATO and the US 
Going besides the EU policy making during the crisis, a word should be said of NATO 
role that was also deeply involved in the management of the crisis.  NATO and EU collaboration 
on the matter was remarkably good and close, something that one could not even have imagined 
about four years ago.  It was all the more remarkable that at the time of the crisis, NATO and the 
EU were embroiled into finding an agreement on the use by the new ESDP of NATO assets205.   
NATO was needed in the crisis management process as the military deterrent.  Mr. 
Solana went several times to Skopje with Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General to increase 
the pressure on the Macedonian government and on the Albanian side.  NATO was necessary 
because the EU ESDP had not yet been declared operational.  What is more, NATO was already 
on the other side of the northern border of FYROM, i.e. in Kosovo, closely watching the 
developments in FYROM.  And although NATO’s relationship with Skopje and particularly with 
the Macedonian public soured during the crisis, the situation was almost schizophrenic in the 
                                                 
204 Mr. Léotard has now been replaced by Mr. Leroy.  This change reflects the progress made in the management of 
the crisis.  Mr. Léotard was a higher diplomatic figure and had more visibility than Mr. Leroy who is less politically 
known. 
205 See chapter two of the thesis 
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 sense that the vulnerability of Macedonia made the presence of Western forces an indispensable 
guarantee206.  Moderate leaders often recalled UNPREDEP (UN Prevention Deployment 
Mission) as a presence they would have liked to see reestablished.  For all the resentment it 
attracted in 2001, NATO had somewhat taken over the security role played in the 1990’s by the 
UN force.  That, and the enduring desire to join the alliance207, explained why even the most 
nationalistic parts of the Macedonian political spectrum respected the Alliance.  For the 
Albanians, NATO and the EU were an indispensable element of the political equilibrium in 
Macedonia.  In addition, NATO had earned a lot of capital with the Albanians since the Kosovo 
war.  For instance it was NATO and the EU that convinced the NLA to change its claim from 
territory to rights for the minority.  And after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement it was the 
NATO representative, Peter Feith who concluded a separate agreement with NLA leader Ahmeti 
in which the Albanian fighters agreed to demobilization under NATO control. 
With regard to the involvement of the US208 in the conflict, Washington sent a resident 
envoy -James Pardew209- to FYROM to help conclude the Framework Agreement of August 13, 
2001.  In addition, one of the important moments in the conflict was the agreement on “common 
                                                 
206 Schizophrenic because at the same time, the majority of the Macedonians resented NATO as being bias towards 
the Albanians, because of NATO military campaign against Serbia in 1999. 
207 There were expectations related to NATO enlargement as a consequence of the important role FYROM played 
during the Kosovo war. 
208 Following a now classical division of labor, while the EU was supporting the peace with “soft instruments”, the 
US was providing the Macedonian government with military help.  The US for instance sent two unmanned spy 
planes to help the government track the movements of the guerrillas.  Washington was however also very generous 
with aid.  The Bush administration requested an increase in bilateral aid to Macedonia to about 45 million dollars, in 
addition to 11 million in military aid.   
 
209 Pardew was the second Western envoy to be designated as persona non grata after Robert Frowick.  After 
Pardew vehemently protested with Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski against the way in which the police-training 
program (funded by the US) was being run, and what he called mistreatment of the Albanians who were recruited 
for the first training course, Georgievski reacted angrily.  He told the American envoy that he would no longer be 
allowed into the Prime Minister’s office or into any other government building and ordered the police to kick the 
ambassador out should he not comply with that order.  In November, Pardew left the country.   
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 action” struck in Prizren in late May 2001 between the NLA210 and the two main Albanian 
political parties, the DPA and the PDP211.  As Balalovaska, Silj, and Zucconi note, the agreement 
was secretly negotiated by Robert Frowick, an American OSCE official in Skopje, who was de 
facto special envoy of President Bush to President Trajkovski.  […]  When the news of Frowick’s 
mission leaked out, it produced an outcry in the Macedonian public and among political leaders, 
and Frowick was asked to leave the country.  But by then his mission had been accomplished212.   
Both sides also asked for a NATO presence in the country, but NATO did not want to get 
involved in the fighting213; therefore the West increased its pressure to arrive at the peace 
agreement before sending in troops.  A Western approach that mixed aggressive pressure on the 
local parties and the offer of substantial financial assistance was therefore consistently followed 
in the period after June 25.  On July 5, both parties signed an agreement on a new cease-fire.  
The talks began on July 9 on a platform suggested by Léotard and Pardew.  The plan contained 
provisions on local government, the use of the Albanian language, changes in the preamble of 
the constitution, and Albanian representation in public administration.  Talks ensued and the 
plans were modified several times to accommodate both Albanians and Macedonians.               
The final agreement, known as the Ohrid Agreement was signed in August 2001.  Interestingly, 
after stating that it was concluded under the auspices of the President of the Republic and listing 
the names of the representatives of the political parties who signed it, the final provisions also 
                                                 
210 National Liberation Army 
211 This agreement is one of the most obscure episodes of the conflict.  It is still in the open as to whether this was a 
unilateral American initiative taken without consulting NATO or the EU.  When the agreement was announced, the 
office of the President of the EU Commission condemned it, issuing a statement that said that “the EU and its 
member countries have already made clear that there is no place for the NLA and its political representatives at the 
negotiating table.”  The US Embassy in Skopje also condemned the agreement as “totally unacceptable”, counting 
on the fact that no one in Skopje was supposed to know that Frowick (officially with the OSCE) had acted under 
direct instructions from Washington.   
212 Balalovska, Kristina; Silj, Alessandro, and Zucconi, Mario, “Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: Crisis in 
Macedonia”, Ethnobarometer, Rome: 2002, pg. 30 
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 named as witnesses Léotard and Pardew.  Of course, Léotard and Pardew were not there as 
simple witnesses; they had engineered the whole negotiation and the final deal.  Special 
representatives of Brussels and Washington had been in Macedonia in the previous phase.  
Observers consistently talk of “heavy pressures” by the outside actors aimed at making the two 
local parties come to a compromise.  The Macedonian government was the party targeted with 
the heaviest pressure.  However, as mentioned before, substantial rewards were also put on the 
table for its compliance, such as the SAA.  The tandem EU-NATO definitely had authority on 
the turn of events.  Even the nationalistic Macedonian Prime Minister Ljubko Georgievski, while 
denouncing the pressures that had compelled his government to “accept to reward terrorism,” 
warned that “it is obvious we should not gamble with NATO’s authority214.” 
 
E. Evaluation 
Although it is true that the EU faired well in the case of FYROM, the situation was 
relatively less complex than the previous Balkan conflicts the EU had to deal with.  First, none of 
the neighboring countries supported the Albanian guerilla.  Second, the government in power in 
FYROM could be considered on the overall as a relatively moderate government, if one 
compares it for instance to the Serb leadership in Bosnia during the first Yugoslav Wars. 
It thus seems that the Balkans, because of the institutional improvements in the EU 
second pillar, because of their geographical closeness, and because of the possible use of the 
“soft” instrument of candidacy for a future enlargement, are globally not an area of contention 
                                                                                                                                                             
213 Reversing its previous, repeated stand of no troop commitment in Macedonia, on June 27, President Bush said 
that he was not ruling out the possibility that US armed forces be sent to that country, and that no option was “off 
the table.” 
214 Cited in Zucconi, Mario, “The “external factor”: the Macedonian state’s security deficit and the international 
community”, in Balalovska, Kristina; Silj, Alessandro; Zucconi, Mario, op. cit., pg 87 
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 among the EU Member-states anymore and it can safely be said that it is the only area in the 
world were there is a true European foreign policy.   
However, for all the smoothness with which the EU decision-making process worked 
during the FYROM crisis, several points of contention need to be identified.  First, the problem 
of the inter-pillar coherence is still at the core of the CFSP decision-making process.  As David 
Hannay states, for all the success so far of the Solana/Patten duo, the welcome truce in the 
traditional turf fighting between the Commission and the Council still rests on the fragile basis 
of two outstanding individuals determined to repress the natural tendencies of their officials.215  
The best solution would be the adoption of an inter-institutional agreement between the Council 
and the Commission to define who does what, but the prospects of such an agreement are very 
thin.  Charles Grant rightly pointed to the fact that the current institutional arrangements, with 
responsibilities split between the Commission and the Council, Coreper and the PSC, and Patten 
and Solana, are sub-optimal.  A potential strength of the EU compared with other international 
organizations, is that it should be able to draw upon a wide range of foreign policy tools – 
ranging from technical assistance, to humanitarian aid, to trade sanctions, to warplanes.  At the 
moment, the EU makes a poor job of coordinating these various instruments, and is weaker as a 
result.216 
 The second area where things also need to be improved is the area of conflict prevention. 
The EU still does not fare good at policy prevention.  To that extent, it is interesting to note with 
Christopher Hill that the concept [of conflict prevention] is still nowhere referred to in the 
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 revised Title V even after the Treaty of Nice.217   Some early signs were pointing to the fact that a 
crisis might emerge in FYROM, especially since the Kosovo conflict in 1999.  First the growing 
importance of Albanian refuges from Kosovo in FYROM following Milosevic crackdown on 
Albanians in Kosovo and the NATO air campaign from March until June 1999.  Repeatedly the 
Macedonian government warned the international community that it could not take more refuges 
on its soil, for economic reasons, but also by fear of reverting the fragile ethnic composition of 
the country.  Second, there was a lot of evidence that a massive activity of arms smuggling in the 
region of Kosovo-northern FYROM and Southern Serbia was occurring218.  Reports were 
available showing that Albanians in FYROM border villages were arming themselves.  Third, 
the EU failed at establishing a linkage between the crisis of the Presevo Valley219 and a possible 
crisis in FYROM.  The participation of ethnic Albanians from Macedonia in a number of 
meetings in Kosovo but also in Macedonia, in part related to the activities of the KLA220 and 
PMBLA221 in the Presevo Valley and more generally, to the problem of pan-Albanian extremism 
should have alerted the Macedonian government and the international community.  Finally, 
warnings had also come from ethnic Albanian political leaders to the effect that there were 
                                                 
217 Hill, C, “The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 6, issue 3, Autumn 
2001, pg. 322 
218 It was however widely known that members of the Macedonian government participated in the arms trafficking, 
one of the reasons why this issue was not well dealt with.         
 
219 The crisis of the Presevo Valley can be analyzed as a consequence of the Kosovo war.  After NATO stopped its 
air campaign, Milosevic had to agree to the withdrawal of its security forces from Kosovo and to the establishment 
of a five kilometers-deep demilitarized zone along Kosovo’s border with Serbia.  In this zone, an Albanian guerilla 
force emerged: the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac from the names of these three 
municipalities with an important Albanian population.  Initially the stated goal of the guerilla was to protect the 
Albanian population of the region from Serbs repressive actions.  Step by step however, the stated claim of the 
guerilla became to unite their region with Kosovo.  A perspective that could not be accepted by the Serbs, already 
worried that they might lose the province of Kosovo, actually under a UN administration.  This perspective also 
worried FYROM because the Presevo Valley is located on the Northern border of FYROM.  The Presevo Valley is 
internationally recognized as part of Serbia.  Following Milosevic political defeat and the arrival of the Kostunica 
government in Serbia, the international community finally allowed the Serbian army to come back in the Presevo 
Valley, under NATO supervision in March 2001.  This, in turn, led those guerrillas “to lose their jobs” and they 
were “recycled” in the fight for Albanians in FYROM. 
220 Kosovo Liberation Army 
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 radical elements in the ethnic Albanian community who may take action if the parties failed to 
convince the governments and the parliament to approve reforms that would meet Albanian 
claims.  The attention of the international community was more focused on Kosovo and Serbia, 
and FYROM was regarded as a relatively stable country and a model for the other countries in 
the Balkans222.  
The EU’s capacities to manage crisis have quite improved, but prevention still poses a 
problem.  Most of the work of crisis prevention lies within the Commission and the Commission 
has been doing crisis prevention for a very long time, even though it was politically incorrect to 
label this work as conflict prevention, since it sounded “too political”.  What seems to emerge 
with the new developments in CFSP/ESDP within the EU is a division of labor between the 
Secretariat General of the Council and the Commission, the former doing short term work, while 
the later is focusing on long term work.  This is probably not an ideal division, but unless the 
member-states decide to reform the way the EU acts as an international political actor, this is the 
tendency that is emerging at the moment.  To be fair, the EU did help FYROM with different 
projects in the years preceding the crisis.  The EU sponsored reforms of the judicial and 
administrative system.  In addition FYROM was included in the NATO Partnership for Peace 
and the negotiations for the Stabilization and Association Agreement were begun early.  These 
last two choices reflect the will of the EU and NATO to show that FYROM was on the road of 
becoming part of the “West”. 
 Finally, the rotating-Presidency system needs to be reformed.  Although the system did 
not prevent the EU of showing continuity in its work in the FYROM case, the problem is still 
present and could be a very striking one in another case, when the convergence of interests is less 
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 strong and now that the EU is a group of 25 states.  What is more, there are important disparities 
in member-states diplomatic resources in international affairs and the six-month rotating 
presidency system often confuses third parties, even though in the Macedonian case the 
Presidencies relied almost entirely on the High Representative.  
3/ Conclusions 
 This final section of the chapter is an attempt to make sense theoretically of what the 
empirical case study has shown.   
I will label the CFSP decision-making in the case of FYROM as a 
transgovernmental/transinstitutional system of governance; this denomination will be used as the 
theoretical roof characterizing/generalizing the CFSP decision-making.  This concept emphasizes 
the empirical finding that the policy-making in the EU second pillar is located between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, to refer to terms borrowed from EU integration 
theories.  Indeed, when studying the decision-making process of the EU second pillar different 
questions arise such as: when is it fair to say that a group of member-states civil 
servants/ambassadors cannot be considered anymore as delegates from their member-states but 
as a supranational institution, or at least as a group who transcends a simple intergovernmental 
college?  When do the member-states decide that it is less costly for them to delegate power, 
rather than being involved at every stage of the decision-making process?  If the Commission 
does not use its right of proposal in the second pillar, is it because it has another strategy in mind 
that could strengthen its role in the CFSP process with less visible means?   
What the analysis of the EU second pillar decision-making process in the FYROM crisis 
emphasizes above all is the fact that to understand the functioning of the EU CFSP, one needs to 
look beyond the treaties i.e. at the actual implementation of the policy.  Indeed, although the 
139 
 second pillar is legally intergovernmental (the Commission has only a shared right of initiative 
together with the member-states; neither the European Parliament nor the European Court of 
Justice are involved in the CFSP decision-making process), it appears that it is becoming more 
and more transgovernmental/transinstitutional.  I purposively do not use the term 
“communautarized”, as this would imply an identical decision-making process as the one found 
in the first EU pillar, which is obviously not the case.  In addition, if the process were 
intergovernmental, the most important actors in the decision-making of the EU second pillar 
would be the member-states.  However, we have seen in the case study analyzed that CFSP is in 
fact a process that is not only intergovernmental.  Of course, member-states were important 
actors in the process223, but other actors, previously established such as the Commission or more 
recent, such as the High Representative and his team were also part of the decision-making and 
member-states had to work with them.  
Indeed, what is emerging in CFSP, next to the European Commission, is a more and more 
autonomous Council Secretariat General, with the High Representative at its center.  From a role 
similar to a secretariat general of a classic international organization, i.e. mainly drafting minutes 
of meetings, the Secretariat General of the Council is acquiring more and more political power 
since the creation of the post of the High Representative.  To that extent, it is interesting to note  
with one of the interviewees that some three and a half years ago, the civil servants of the 
Council Secretariat General were very much silent during the meetings of the Council Working 
Groups or/and the meetings of the Council of the European Union.  Today, they do not hesitate 
anymore to express themselves during these meetings.  Although it is still very early to talk 
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 about general theoretical conclusions, one can wonder if the “unintended consequences” 
identified by historical institutionalism224 are not slowly emerging.   
Indeed most of the member-states’ desire is to keep the Commission as much outside the 
CFSP decision-making process as they can.  The creation of the post of High Representative, 
originally a French idea, was intended to fill in the gap in EU visibility vis-à-vis third parties.  
But to some member-states, and particularly France, it was also intended to show the 
Commission that the EU second pillar was remaining in their hands225.  However, the way Javier 
Solana is modeling the position, might make some member-states have second thoughts.  Solana 
is getting more and more identified by external actors as being the EU.  Time will tell if the 
notion of “path-dependency” advanced by Pierson is useful in understanding some of the aspects 
of the institutional developments in the CFSP decision-making process.  Historical 
institutionalists argue that it is important to look at how prior institutional commitments 
condition further action, limit the scope of what is possible and cause agents to redefine their 
interests, 226 what in other words they call the “lock-in effect” of previous decisions taken and 
difficult to change later on because of their unintended consequences.  
  Intergovernmentalism would thus not be an appropriate tool to understand the decision-
making process of the second pillar in the case of Macedonia.  Neo-functionalism would not be 
neither as it would give preeminence to supranational institutions, with the Commission playing 
an entrepreneurial role. The Commission, or rather the instruments that the Commission has 
                                                 
224 For historical institutionalism, see Pierson, P., “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29. n. 2 
225 The Amsterdam Treaty states in its article 26  that ‘the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the 
common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and 
implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the 
Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.’ 
226 Schneider, G. and Aspinwall, M. (eds.), The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of 
Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001 
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 under its responsibility, were important factors that needed to be used by Solana to strike a deal 
in FYROM, but the Commission as such was not the preeminent actor the neo-functionalists like 
to see in the EU decision-making process.  Therefore the need to look for a new concept to 
understand the implementation of the CFSP. 
The notion of transgovernmental is preferred over the notion of transintergovernmental 
because the latter would refer to a decision-making process that involves high-ranking level 
political figures such as heads of state and of government.  However, although there is no doubt 
that this is true when the fundamental mechanisms for CFSP/ESDP were created and written in 
the EU treaties, what this article is concentrating on is the actual implementation and every day 
working of the EU second pillar.  What appears to be happening, especially in our case study on 
FYROM is an increasing involvement of Brussels-based diplomats, beside the figurehead of 
Solana on the ground.  This is particularly true in the case of the European Commission with a 
foreign policy based more and more on expertise and technical matters. 
Transinstitutional refers to the importance of the relations between institutions.  To that 
extent, the relations between the Council Secretariat General and the Commission will be 
essential to the development of a coherent foreign policy of the EU.  This seems to have been 
taken into account in the new constitutional treaty and the decision to appoint an EU Foreign 
Affairs Minister who will also be Vice-President of the Commission. 
Finally, the notion of transinstitutional puts the emphasis on the external factors relevant 
to the crisis, the relationship with NATO and the US.  Without the inclusion of these variables, 
an understanding of the governance system in the CFSP is not complete.  In the case of FYROM, 
there was a strong convergence of views between the transatlantic allies, a convergence that was 
absent for a long time during the first Balkan Wars.  In this context, Washington let the European 
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 allies take the initiative in the military dimension and assisted with logistic and transportation.  It 
is even striking, that due to the Macedonian resentment against NATO, during the negotiations 
of the Ohrid Agreement, Washington probed the Europeans on the possibility of a military EU 
operation.  However the logistics of a NATO-EU agreement were not in place yet and most 
Europeans did not feel confident enough to let the EU take the lead of a military operation.   
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 CHAPTER SIX - The CFSP-post 1999 in the Middle East 
 
Europe’s interests in Middle East are numerous and stem mainly from the geographical 
proximity of the region to some EU member-states.  Those interests include the dependency on 
Middle Eastern oil; the question of Muslim/Arab immigration to Europe; the need to neutralize 
threats from the region (proliferation of WMD, religious extremism, international terrorism and 
various smuggling activities, etc.); and the need to assist the economic and political development 
of the region.  It is thus understandable that when the EU CFSP was established in the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Mediterranean region was singled out as one of the priority areas for the new policy.  
In addition, when Solana took his post, the Middle East conflict quickly became one of its 
priorities.  The Middle-East case is interesting in that the EEC already had since the 1970s a set 
of unified positions vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, the best example of socialization at work 
in the EPC227.  These unified positions were however held in parallel with the member-states 
foreign policies.  For this reason, the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative, 
although less prominent than in the Balkans, has increased the visibility of the Union and the 
coherence between the member-states foreign policy and the EU CFSP, even though from time 
to time member-states still like to put forward their ideas on the future of the region.  The key 
difference also vis-à-vis the post-1999 Balkans situation is the still important role of the 
Presidency in the formulation of the Middle-East foreign policy.  The first section of this chapter 
gives an historical background on the EEC/EU position vis-à-vis the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-
Palestinian conflict up until the aftermath of the Oslo agreements.  The second section analyzes 
the major actors of the EU foreign policy decision-making process in the recent crisis that 
erupted in 2000.  Finally the last section draws theoretical conclusions from the case-study. 
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 1/ Historical Background 
A. From Divergences to the Venice Declaration  
The EU foreign policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has witnessed – such as its 
policy in the Balkans - an important evolution.  From member-states holding complete opposite 
positions, to member-states’ positions coming together – but with still un-coordinated diplomatic 
action -, to member-states holding common positions and attempting to appear more united in 
their diplomatic action, the changes are astonishing.  More recently the appointment of the High 
Representative created more coherence in the EU CFSP vis-à-vis the Middle East.  To 
understand this evolution, it is necessary to look at where the EEC/EU foreign policy in the 
region is coming from. 
Until the oil crisis of 1973, the EEC member-states were very much holding different 
positions with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict with Germany and The Netherlands closely 
supporting Israel and France at least since 1967, developing a foreign policy closer to the Arab 
states.  However, the issue would quickly become one of the first items on the EPC agenda and 
one of the most successful stories of EPC in coordinating European foreign policy.  As Ben 
Soetendorp notes, in spite of the original different views among the member-states with respect 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EC member-states managed during several years to bridge their 
differences and to compromise on a common foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the preferred course of action to solve this conflict.  Moreover, this common policy was a 
deliberate effort to follow an independent course towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
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 resolution of that conflict, by which the EC as such distinguished itself from the other major 
Western player in the Middle East, the United States228.        
The literature on this area shows that the major reason the Arab-Israeli conflict ended up 
on the EPC agenda, was due to France’s pressures to have it so.  The goal was to bring the EEC 
partners closer to the French position, i.e. supporting the Arab side, while at the same time, 
defining an independent policy from the US.  However, before the oil crisis of 1973, neither 
Germany, nor The Netherlands were ready to side with France, although they realized the 
increased European dependency on Middle-Eastern oil.   
The oil crisis proved to be the catalyst for Europeans to start speaking with a more 
unified voice.  In order to increase their influence on Europeans and on the US, the Arab states 
organized themselves in the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and 
divided the oil consumers into different categories depending on their positions vis-à-vis the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  The friendly countries, such as France and the UK, continued to enjoy free 
flow of oil.  Most of the other EC members were subjected to some cut-backs, while The 
Netherlands, who had consistently defended Israel, was categorized as enemy and was 
completely embargoed.   
A joint EEC declaration was adopted in November 1973, following Franco-British 
pressures.  The declaration called for Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied since the 
war of 1967, while restating the right of each state in the region to live in peace within secure 
and recognized borders.  In addition, for the first time, the then nine EEC member-states 
recognized that account had to be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians in the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace.  The evolution was put in motion.  In 1974, the Nine 
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 started to refer to the Palestinians as the Palestinian people.  A year later, they stated in the UN 
General Assembly that a Middle East settlement should include recognition of the right of the 
Palestinian people to the expression of their national identity.  In 1977, the member states 
endorsed, under British Presidency, the French opinion that the Palestinians have a right to their 
own homeland.  The declaration also stated that the Palestinian people should participate in the 
negotiations on an overall settlement.   
This led in 1980 to the Venice declaration, a milestone in the EEC/EU common position 
with the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The declaration acknowledged that the Palestinians were entitled 
to fully exercise their right to self-determination and that Israel had the right to exist in a secure 
environment.  The declaration also for the first time called for the PLO to be associated with the 
negotiations on a peace settlement.  As Soetendorp underlines, within ten years France managed 
to push its views on the content of the common EPC declarations regarding the Middle East 
conflict.  The EC as a whole endorsed the French belief that the recognition of the rights of the 
Palestinians is the key to a Middle East peace settlement229.  For a long time, the Venice 
declaration was to remain the point of reference of the EU policy vis-à-vis the Middle East 
conflict.   
It is also in the context of the oil crisis that the separation between the EPC and the EC 
ended, when the EC decided to enter talks with the Arab world in 1974.  The talks demonstrated 
that it was no longer possible to separate political matters from commerce.  Soon after, the 
European Commission, which had been excluded from the EPC, became involved in 
coordinating links between the EPC and the Council. 
 However, the influence of the EC on the ground remained limited both because the US 
did not want any extra-involvement and because Israel did not trust the EEC/EU to be an honest 
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 broker.  For instance at the start of the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel, following 
the Arab oil embargo, the USA did not really want the EEC to be involved in the negotiations, 
mainly because the two had very different opinions as to where the process ought to go.  While 
the US adopted a gradualist approach concentrated on separate bilateral agreements between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors, the EEC member-states favored multilateral negotiations that 
would involve all parties concerned and would lead to an overall peace settlement.  In addition, 
while the US left it to the parties to agree on solutions, the EEC formulated itself what the final 
solution should be.  Israel and the US exerted considerable pressure on the EEC to support the 
Camp David Agreements and to avoid making any different unilateral move.  The US at the time 
had already become the major player in the Middle East and Israel trust in the EEC had greatly 
declined.  As Hazel Smith writes, the EC promised a new political initiative in the peace process 
but in practice was unable to offer much of substance given US and Israeli hostility.  Instead the 
EC found itself reluctantly continuing to support US initiatives […].  In general, the EC failed to 
play a significant part in securing amelioration of the conflict or in making any significant 
contribution to peace230.  
 
B. The End of the Cold War and the Peace Process 
When the Cold War ended and the US managed to re-launch the peace process between 
Israel and its neighbors after the first Gulf War, the EU was not invited to act as a co-sponsor of 
the peace talks231, although it was invited to the Madrid Peace Conference232.  Responding to the 
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 changes in the international system, the USSR was instead chosen as the co-sponsor of the peace 
process.  The EU was also excluded from the separate bilateral negotiations between Israel and 
its neighbors Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.  The EU was however 
given a more prominent role in the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process, as the US 
expected the EU to contribute a substantial share to the funding of the peace process.   
At about the same time the Madrid process was launched, the Maastricht Treaty signed in 
December 1991 assigned to the Council the task of elaborating a report on the possible evolution 
of the CFSP with a view to determining the areas in which joint actions (which was a newly 
created foreign policy instrument) could be developed.  The report was presented in June 1992 at 
the Lisbon European Council and contained the first orientations on possible joint actions for the 
Mediterranean region: In the current phase, some of the determining factors of important 
common interests can be enumerated.  The following, among others, are those factors that must 
be taken into consideration when defining the issues and areas of joint actions: 
- geographic proximity of regions or specific countries; 
- an interest in the political and economic stability of the regions or countries; 
- the existence of threats to security interests of the Union233. 
The report also listed several geographical areas where the EU should adopt joint actions.  The 
Mediterranean region, particularly the Maghreb and the Middle East was one of them.  With 
regard to the Middle East, the Council’s report recalled that the region had been a source of 
constant concern for the Europeans.  When defining the spheres that could generate joint actions, 
the following were mentioned: 
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 - supporting the peace process and guaranteeing active participation of the Union in the said 
process; 
- influencing Israel to change its attitude in relation to the settlements and convincing the Arabs 
to renounce their commercial boycott; 
- supporting the actions aimed at regional integration; 
- guaranteeing that countries in the region comply with the treaties on disarmament and arms 
control; 
- examining foreign policy aspects in matters of terrorism and drug trafficking.   
 At the Brussels European Council in October 1993, the European Council reaffirmed that 
the Middle East was one of the five priority areas for the implementation of joint actions on the 
basis of article J.3 of the Maastricht Treaty.  The developments of events that would follow and 
the continuing strong presence of the US in these events would make it difficult for the new EU 
to implement the proposals of the Lisbon report.  As will be later developed, the EU however 
succeeded in adopting a joint action with regard to the MEPP, but it was extremely limited in 
scope and did no more than supporting the other EU activities being developed outside the CFSP 
framework. 
The secret peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO at Oslo produced an Israeli-
Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in September 
1993.  Although neither the US nor the EU played a mediating role in the Oslo negotiations, the 
US regained quite soon its leading role in the management of the implementation process, this 
time both in the political and economic components of the peace process.  The EU however, 
deprived of political clout, exploited its economic power to increase its influence in the peace 
process through concrete financial contributions.  It became the world largest donor to the PA 
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 and to the Palestinian refugees via the UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA).  It also co-chairs 
the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for assistance to the Palestinians.  It not only underwrites the PA 
institutions, but also contributes to its operating budget.  Following the Oslo agreements234, the 
EU indeed chaired the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) and co-
organized the working groups on environment, water, and refugees. The important financial 
support the EU brought/brings to the PA is based on its projection of the creation of a Palestinian 
state.  As Ginsberg notes, the Palestinians have come to depend as much on the EU for an 
economic lifeline and diplomatic support as the Israelis have come to depend on the US for 
diplomatic support, military cooperation and economic aid.235” 
 Since the EU had failed to convince the US to invite the PLO to the Madrid conference, 
it attempted to impose its line in the REDWG.  It refused for instance to accept Israel’s request 
that Palestinians from outside the West Bank and Gaza should not participate in the REDWG 
meetings.  Israel threatened to boycott the REDWG meetings, but the EU went ahead and started 
the negotiations without an Israeli representation.  In addition, the EU held hostage a new 
bilateral trade agreement with Israel until Israel gave up on Palestinian representation in the 
working group236.  The group made little progress towards achieving its goal, i.e. to increase 
regional integration through joint economic development, but it nevertheless facilitated political 
ties and cooperation between Arabs and Israelis.  As David Lennon underlines, since then, there 
has been a clear transatlantic division of labor with regard to the MEPP.  While the United States 
as the global superpower seeks accommodation, the Europeans have been helping by providing 
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 services, development funds, and humanitarian aid to the needy.  The EU describes its role as 
being complementary to US political leadership: essentially, the United States supports and 
protects Israel, while the EU provides the Palestinian side with funds and political support237.  
Israel still does not accept Europeans as official brokers in the political process because it sees 
them as pro-Palestinian.  However, individual European diplomats and leaders have played 
facilitating roles, most notably in creating the framework for the peace negotiations that began in 
Oslo in 1993.   
As mentioned above, the EU adopted in April 1994 a joint action within the CFSP 
framework238.  The joint action referred to some general policies, such as contributing to 
redefining the relations between the countries of the region, monitoring Israel settlements in the 
occupied territories, participating in the international conventions to guarantee peace in the 
region in the context of the process initiated at Madrid, supporting measures to promote 
democracy and human rights, and working to lift the Arab boycott of Israel.  Other aims focused 
on areas where the EU was more active: developing its role in the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee 
(AHLC); maintaining its prominent role in the REDWP and intensifying its participation in other 
multilateral groups; and working to speed up the application of aid programs for the Occupied 
Territories.  The joint action specified a number of instruments such as support for the 
establishment of a Palestinian police force, help in organizing and monitoring elections in Gaza 
and the West Bank, and participation in the temporary international presence in the occupied 
territories if needed.  To reward Israel, the joint action also provided support for the organization 
of an international economic conference on infrastructure projects in the region and the 
conclusion of a new association agreement.   
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 As Barbé and Izquierdo note, logically, the practical results of the joint action are more 
clearly visible in those areas where the EU has greater weight and experience: economic aid to 
the Occupied Territories […] and participation in the AHLC as prime donor; presidency of the 
REDWP; and concrete commitments referring to the Palestine Police Force and the preparation 
of Palestinian elections.  However, the EU’s activities with respect both to aid for the 
Palestinian Territories as well as the fora of economic cooperation did not require the joint 
action procedure within the CFSP framework as they were already being developed.  The same 
was true of the contribution to the creation of the Palestine Police Force which could be 
included in the assistance for developing Palestinian governmental and administrative 
structures.  Thus, the central political element of the joint action became the contribution to the 
preparation of Palestinian elections and coordination of the international observation 
operation239.  The Joint Action was thus in line with the low profile exerted by the EU in the 
MEPP.  The policy implemented in the Middle East is based to a large extent, on the EC pillar.  
In the more political area, agreement was still difficult to reach and member-states were much 
less inclined to relinquish sovereignty.  Also, the joint action was taken in haste, more to show 
what the EU could do with its CFSP, than because of its content.  It was very broad, lacked 
clarity of purpose, and was not adequately operational.  Much of what is in the action had 
already been done or could have been done by the EC in conjunction with the old EPC.  
Another way the EU has sought a greater diplomatic role in the MEPP was by appointing 
in 1996 its first Special Representative to the region, Miguel Moratinos.  However, analysts 
agreed that the EU’s diplomatic role remained extremely limited relative to its economic 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Barbé, E. and Izquierdo, F., “Present and Future of Joint Actions for the Mediterranean Region”, in Holland, M. 
(ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms, Virginia: Pinter, 1997, pg. 130 
238 See decision 94/276/CFSP 
239
153 
 presence240.  National reflexes were still at the forefront with, for example, the dispatch of the 
French foreign minister to Lebanon during the April 1996 Middle East crisis.  The appointment 
of a Special Envoy to the Middle East was to that extent a double-edge instrument.  On the one 
hand, it reinforced the EU visibility in the region.  On the other, his mandate, although broad241, 
is to be applied within the context of intergovernmentalism, since he cannot commit the EU 
without the previous agreement of the member-states.  As a consequence, Mr. Moratinos has 
encountered great difficulties in cutting for himself a role beyond that of “facilitator” of the 
peace talks, although he has taken part directly in many stages of the negotiations, earning the 
trust and respect of all the main actors involved242.  Moratinos became indeed a very valuable 
partner to the US Special Envoy in the Middle East, Dennis Ross, in helping mediate political 
agreements between the Palestinians and Israel, using the leverage the EU had with the 
Palestinians.  The appointment of a Special Envoy was also seen with a lot of skepticism from 
both Israel and the Arab states.  For Israel, it was seen as a further sign of the EU’s desire to 
meddle in the peace process.  The Arab states questioned Moratinos’ experience as well as his 
ability to play a significant political role.  His mandate was very broad and it was thus unclear 
what his specific functions would be and how his activities would complement the existing 
EU/European institutional framework243.  However, as Peters writes, the presence of a European 
special envoy has allowed European Middle East policy to become more visible to regional and 
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 extra-regional actors, to become more flexible and responsive to developments in the peace 
process and to identify specific areas where Europe can undertake practical measures to help 
build confidence between the parties and support agreements reached244.  The appointment of 
the Special Envoy for the Middle East was also met with great reluctance by the Commission.  
As one interviewee pointed out, the EU Delegation in Israel was even wary of providing him 
logistical support.   
 
2/ Post-1999 Changes? 
The period under investigation here is the one going from the breakdown of the Camp 
David Agreement under President Clinton sponsorship in 2000 and the subsequent launch of the 
second Intifada until the present.  The outbreak of the second Intifada and the subsequent 
election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s Prime Minister in February 2001 made a return to the 
negotiating table extremely difficult.  In addition, at first, the new Bush Administration operated 
a fallback from direct involvement in the conflict.  An analysis of the role the EU played during 
the ongoing crisis is relevant to understand the decision-making process of the CFSP in time of 
crisis.   
There has been four phases to the recent crisis: the Sharm el-Sheik and Taba negotiations 
of winter 2000-2001; the Mitchell Commission; the dialogue on security and humanitarian 
matters in spring 2002 (which was particularly effective in bringing an end to the siege of the 
Basilica of the Nativity in Bethlehem); and the creation of the Quartet.  During the crisis, it has 
been noted that the presence of Javier Solana as representative of the Union as a whole rather 
than any particular member states is a novel concept that has helped to raise the profile of 
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 Europe’s policy on the conflict245.  Three stages can be differentiated in the EU involvement in 
the current crisis.  First, from September 2000-2001, the EU – as an entity or through its member 
states – was very active in order to set up a lasting cease-fire, in coordination with the Clinton 
administration in the Sharm el-Sheik summit, then alone, as the new Bush administration stayed 
in the background.  These attempts failed because the parties were unwilling or unable to stop 
the violence.  Then, after 9/11, the Bush administration came back to the MEPP with a more 
multilateral approach to the situation.  On the other hand, 9/11 led to the association of Arafat 
with terrorism.  Then came the third phase, which saw a reassessment by the Europeans of their 
position: force is not the only solution.  Europeans came with an array of proposals, aiming at 
restarting the peace process.  Two ideas were recurrent in the proposals: elections or referendum 
in the PA in order to give a new legitimacy to the Palestinian leaders and immediate 
proclamation of a Palestinian state whose precise outlines would then be negotiated with Israel 
on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338.  Differences among member-states were however 
present with the UK and Germany insisting on the priority of security considerations.   
 
A. The High Representative 
Since the changes introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty and the appointment of Javier 
Solana as the High Representative, the EU coherence and visibility in its foreign policy in the 
Middle East has increased.  However, contrary to the Balkan situation, where Solana’s position 
is almost comparable to the US Secretary of State, in the Middle East, member-states still like to 
                                                 
245 Ortega, M., “Conclusions: Peace Lies in Their Hands”, in  Ortega, M. (ed.), The European Union and the Crisis 
in the Middle East – Chaillot Paper 62, July 2003, pg. 53 
156 
 be directly involved – when they sense that their own position would reach further than the 
common EU denominator246. 
Solana became very involved in the various international attempts to deal with the crisis 
that broke out in October 2000.  The crisis developed into a violent confrontation between Israel 
and the Palestinians, leading to a cycle of retaliations and counter-retaliations with the Israeli 
military intervention in the Palestinian-ruled territories and the destruction of the infrastructure 
of the PA.  The goal of the international community at that point, was to achieve a truce between 
the parties, so that the peace process could be saved and restarted.  A summit was held in 
October 2000 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt with the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Yasser 
Arafat, Bill Clinton, Kofi Annan, the leaders of Jordan and Egypt, and Javier Solana, as the EU 
representative247.  After long negotiations, the parties agreed in principle to end the violence and 
to establish a commission of inquiry into the crisis.  Solana became one of the five members of 
the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee, also known as the Mitchell Committee, for the 
name of the former US Senator who led it.  The recommendations of the Mitchell Committee 
were to end the violence, to rebuild confidence, and to resume negotiations.  However, neither 
side was ready to implement them.  The fighting continued and the peace process actually 
collapsed.   
The EU was also present at the Taba negotiations in January 2001.  Since the beginning 
of the second Intifada, the EU, as a whole, seems to have involved itself more into the search for 
a solution to the crisis.  In February 2002, the EU Special Envoy published an article in the 
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 Israeli Haaretz newspaper about the 2001 Taba negotiations, detailing the points of agreement as 
well as the open questions.  This way Moratinos tried to shift the public debate in Israel and 
Palestine back to the issues to be resolved in talks on the final status – building on the European 
assessment that the Israeli and American approach of dealing with security matters first would 
not work without a political vision. 
Solana launched into a discrete shuttle diplomacy, meeting Israeli and Palestinian leaders.  
He proposed a plan that was endorsed by the Göteborg Council of June 2001248 and was to 
become the main EU strategy for dealing with the crisis.  The Solana report recognized that the 
US was an indispensable partner in the crisis.  Europe and the US may have different approaches 
but they have the same goal and must therefore constantly consult each other to make sure that 
their efforts are complementary.  Solana indicated that the EU should also undertake close 
consultations with the UN Secretary General, Russia, and Japan.  The High Representative 
wanted to improve the political dialogue with Israel and to pursue a relationship of trust with the 
Palestinians, as he realized that any initiative to solve the crisis that did not receive the support of 
both sides was doomed to fail.  He also noted that any plan to solve the crisis had to be based on 
the Mitchell report, though he admitted that there was an urgent need for a plan that translated 
the recommendations of that report into reality.   
Throughout the second Intifada, Solana maintained a high profile in the Middle East, 
trying at all times to keep the EU united whilst seeking to keep the US interested in pressurizing 
Israel into moderating its increasingly intolerant behavior towards the Palestinian Authority.  In 
2002, Solana was twice denied access to Arafat by Israel and, during one meeting between 
Arafat and the EU Special Representative Miguel Moratinos, Arafat headquarters came under 
fire from Israeli helicopters.  Despite lack of trust from Israel towards the EU, Solana did 
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 succeed in maintaining the EU’s profile in the MEPP in particular via the role that he played in 
the work of the quartet.  In October 2002, under Danish Presidency, the Quartet presented the 
road map that was supposed to lead to a negotiated settlement to be reached by the end of 2005 
with the creation of a Palestinian state.  The initiative was mainly based on EU proposals, as we 
will see later on.    
In the first section of this chapter, we saw how in the past, member-states would pursue 
their own diplomacy if the EU common denominator was lower then their own foreign policy.  
This was especially the case of France.  As Soetendorp writes, Solana ended this practice and 
achieved a higher level of coordination among the Member States.  Through close cooperation 
with the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the rotating Presidencies, the High 
Representative has established himself as a valuable agent of the Member States rather than a 
threat to their sovereignty.  The Nice Treaty has in fact reinforced the central position and 
responsibility the High Representative has in the making of a common European foreign 
policy249.    
 
B. Member-States and Presidencies 
Some member-states wanted the EU however to play a greater role in the process.  France 
and Germany presented two separate peace plans.  The French plan called for a declaration on 
the return of Israeli troops to the positions they held before the beginning of the 2000 Intifada; an 
independent Palestinian state and its recognition by Israel; general elections in the Palestinian 
Authority under international supervision to give the Palestinians a new and more democratic 
leadership; and final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  The German plan 
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 called for a cease-fire; the withdrawal of Israeli troops; international peacekeeping troops to 
patrol a buffer zone between Israel and the Palestinian areas; the declaration of a Palestinian 
state; an end to Jewish settlements in Palestinian occupied territories; and a negotiation on 
Israel’s borders and the status of Jerusalem.  The two plans were discussed at the General Affairs 
Council of February 2002 and received broad support from the other member-states, but did not 
become the basis for a new EU peace plan.  Indeed, divergences remained among member states.  
For instance Fischer, the German Foreign Affairs Minister stated that at that stage, elections 
could further radicalize Palestinian society.  The UK was also opposed to any move out of line 
with the US policy.   
After the diplomatic mission to Israel in April 2002, where Solana and the Spanish 
Presidency were not permitted to visit Arafat in his HQ failed, the EU became more divided on 
its approach towards Israel.  The European Parliament recommended and the Commission 
proposed taking trade sanctions against Israel, but the Council failed to reach consensus on the 
issue with Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom opposing such a move, 
preferring instead to back the peace mission of the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell.  
In May 2002, in a meeting in Washington DC, the US formed the Quartet Group on the Middle 
East, composed of the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia.  As Ben Soetendorp writes, thus, more 
than twenty years after the Venice declaration and ten years after the Madrid conference, the EU 
is at last fully involved in Middle East peacemaking250.          
 Up until the second Intifada, the EU had significant political influence over the PA, as 
was underlined above.  Although the EU leverage over Israel is quite weak (most notably 
because Germany and The Netherlands are very reluctant to do anything against Israel), it could 
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 exert some pressure, as it takes the bulk of Israel’s total exports, many of which are tariff free or 
subject to significant tariff preferences.  On the other hand, whilst the EU is Israel most 
important trading partner, Israeli exports to the EU are worth $7.6 billion compared to EU 
exports to Israel amounting to $13.9 billion.  Israel made it also clear that any attempt to apply 
political conditionality under the terms of the 1995 EU-Israel trade agreement would result in the 
exclusion of the EU from the Middle-East peace process.  In addition, the EU’s political impact 
is limited by a still deep seated Israeli distrust of the EU for what it considers a pro-Arab policy 
and of the Europeans in general given the long shadow of the past that still hangs over European-
Israeli relations following the Holocaust.  Israel has indeed constantly denounced the European 
declarations on the Middle East for their one-sidedness, for pre-judging the outcome of the 
negotiations, and for the way in which they reflect the views of the Arab states.  The Venice 
declaration reflected a low point in Israel’s relations with the European Community from which 
it has never fully recovered.  Under the Sharon government, Israel has pursued a boycott of 
EU/European officials who visited Arafat251.         
 The Quartet Group was born mainly out of the 9/11 attacks on the US and the new way 
the Bush administration decided to approach the MEPP.  When the Bush administration first 
came into power, it decided to step back from direct involvement in the peace process, basing his 
judgement on the failure Presidency Clinton encountered towards the end of his Presidency with 
the Camp David negotiations.  Combined with the 9/11 attacks, paradoxically, the new US 
administration opted for a more multilateral approach to the process, through the creation of the 
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 Quartet Group.  With the Quartet, both the High Representative for CFSP and the EU Special 
Envoy to the Middle East have increased their power of negotiation.  The road map was first 
agreed upon at an informal meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Elsinore, Denmark on August 
30, 2002.  That paper had a significant influence on the Quartet’s own road map252, which can be 
seen as an important success for EU diplomacy.  First, the EU was successful in pushing and 
having the EU approach accepted – the need to have a political perspective and a clear timetable, 
as well as immediate gains for both parties.  Second, the EU was successful in keeping the US 
working on finding a common approach, even though there have clearly been different priorities.  
Third, the EU was successful in convincing the US administration not to physically eliminate 
Arafat.  The road map accepted by the Quartet differed however in various points from the 
declaration accepted by the EU foreign affairs ministers.  For instance the Quartet document 
does not mention the 1967 borders as a point of reference and makes entry into each of the 
following phases conditional on the achievement of certain benchmarks.  The EU was also not 
successful in persuading the US to release the road map before the Israeli elections.  The US 
instead went with Israel’s request that the road map be not published before the legislative 
elections of January 2003.  The US on the other hand did not succeed in imposing its view to the 
Europeans/EU that Arafat be sidelined from the peace process.  Hill notes that from a cynical 
perspective it could even be said that it (the Quartet) is a way of keeping the EU and Russia 
compromised – and therefore quiet - through conceding them a superficial share in US-
sponsored mediation.  At the same time it was being set up, during the crisis over presumed 
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 Palestinian terrorists holed up in the Church of the Holy Nativity in Bethlehem during May, the 
Europeans were being treated by the US as merely useful for “clearing up”, with Italy in 
particular being expected to provide exile for the Palestinians despite not having been 
consulted253. 
It should however be emphasized that the peace plan accepted by the EU and presented to 
the Quartet was the result of good diplomacy led by the Danish Presidency rather than by Solana.  
Solana helped on the ground, but it was more of a Danish tour de force.  In addition, within the 
Quartet the EU is still a triad and is represented by Solana, Patten, and the Presidency.  What is 
more, various proposals still surface from the member-states when the Quartet meets.  For 
instance at its July 2002 meeting, Germany presented a non-paper to the Quartet proposing a 
three-phase process: first, Arafat would nominate a Prime Minister who would reform the PA 
until elections would be held.  Second, a provisional Palestinian state would be created.  Third, 
negotiations on the final status would be over by 2005 at the latest, which would allow the 
creation of a real Palestinian state.  France proposed an international conference that would re-
launch the peace process.  Denmark for its part, who at the time was holding the EU Presidency 
suggested setting up working groups to solve practical problems254. 
Thus, Presidencies and member-states have also kept an important role in the crisis, but 
that role has tended to be more consistent and coherent with the EU role as a whole.  The EU has 
been successful in negotiating cease-fires in some limited conflict situations.  For instance, EU 
mediators were able to secure early in the second intifada a cease-fire between Gilo and Beit 
Jalla.  However, these mediations were limited and did not prevent on the whole further 
escalation of violence. 
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C. The Commission 
The Commission is also involved in the MEPP, but more indirectly through its role in the 
Barcelona process.  The Barcelona Conference in 1995 set up what is now referred to as the 
Barcelona Process, a wide-range policy bringing together the 25 member-states and 12 
Mediterranean countries, including Algeria, Cyprus (now a EU member), Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Malta (now a EU member), Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey (an official candidate 
country), and the Palestinian Authority.  The aim was to create an area of peace and stability 
with the perspective of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010.  The partnership is based 
on three baskets: human rights and democracy, prosperity, and a social and cultural partnership.  
The EU has now signed a bilateral trade agreement with all the partners, except Syria.  These 
agreements are similar to the European agreements concluded with the Central and Eastern 
European states, as they provide for cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, and financial 
fields as well as a dialogue on foreign and security policy issues.  The Barcelona process has not 
produced the results it was hoped for, in great part because of the stalemate on the MEPP.  The 
EU wanted to keep both separate, but this was an idealistic vision that did not survive the reality 
on the ground.  The Euro-Mediterranean framework continues however to be an important and 
accepted multilateral meeting place for all those states involved in and affected by the peace 
process.  The network of bilateral Mediterranean agreements provides another important set of 
economic contacts that can be exploited by those working towards political objectives within the 
second pillar. 
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  In addition, the important aid provided to the Palestinian Authority comes from the EC 
budget, which gives the Commission a clear visibility in that particular area.  The Commissioner 
for External Relations Christopher Patten is for instance credited to have forced the PA to agree 
to set up an independent judiciary to replace a system of military courts255.  Such as in the 
Macedonian case, Commission and Secretariat General of the Council worked well together 
during the crisis, one not trying to impede the work of the other.  As Soetendorp underlines, 
although it looks as if the creation of the function of a High Representative for the CFSP has 
introduced a new contender to the title of the EU foreign policy spokesperson, in reality it has 
reduced the competition between the Presidency and the Commission in the external 
representation of the EU and has helped the EU to develop a single voice and face256.  
 The old reflexes of a dissenting choir have not completed receded however, with at times, 
the HR, the Presidency, the Commissioner for External Relations, and sometimes the 
Commission President, expressing their views after each major development, views that do not 
always converge.  However, as long as the Commissioner for External Relations and the HR 
cooperate and complement each other, the division of labor is not a hindrance to the development 
of the EU as an international actor.  Lets not forget that it was because of its economic 
involvement, managed through the Commission services, that the EU got involved in the MEPP 
and not because of its second pillar.    
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 D. The Transatlantic Link 
One of the key variables to understand the EU policy towards the Middle East is the 
transatlantic relationship.  The relationship is evident in the division of labor between the EU and 
the US.  The US guarantees the security of Israel and of moderate Arab governments.  The EU 
for its part, gives political backing to the US, while keeping open a number of channels with 
other Arab states, such as Syria.  In addition, the EU financially supports the MEPP and attempts 
to bring economic betterment for the states in the region, through for instance the Barcelona 
process.  The EU thus needs to work in close cooperation with the United States, as its policies 
cannot be effective if it is acting against the superpower.  Countries in the region – Israel and the 
Arab states - indeed expect the US to give guarantees for a final settlement.   
Although the Clinton Administration tried to keep the EU at arm’s length in the MEPP, 
the Bush Administration is more welcoming of or at least tolerant of the EU role, not so much 
for love of the EU but because it recognizes that the Americans alone cannot revive the peace 
process and when and if peace comes, the EU resources will be needed to rebuild Palestine.  
Frédéric Charillon speaks of diplomatie du créneau to show how the EU, faced with the 
omnipresence of the US in the Middle East had to invest in the “niche” that was left, i.e. the 
economic side of the peace process257.  A good example of this lies in the 1999 episode where 
Yasser Arafat, the President of the PA, frustrated by the lack of progress in the negotiations 
decided to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999, a day before the Israeli 
elections.  Both the US and the EU worked together to prevent such a declaration.  Then 
American President Bill Clinton sent a letter to Arafat promising that the US would make a 
major push for a final-status agreement within a reasonable period of time in a Washington 
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 Summit meeting.  Clinton also expressed his support for the Palestinian aspirations to have their 
own state.  The EU on the other hand repeated earlier declarations recognizing the Palestinian 
right to self-determination, including the option of a state and the Berlin Council conclusions of 
March 1999 mentioned for the first time that the Heads of state and of government of the EU 
were ready to consider the recognition of a Palestinian state in due course.  It is interesting to 
note that the Berlin declaration258 was drafted in close consultation with the US.  Both assurances 
led Arafat to withdraw his threat of declaring a state.   
Thus, even though the EU is still not a mediator in the peace process, it has become an 
important actor together with the US and likes to define itself as a facilitator.  
 
3/ Conclusions 
First, there has been – historically - a definite convergence of opinions within the EU.  
More recently, the coherence between the two pillars and the visibility within the CFSP has been 
increased.  The EU policy towards the MEPP is discussed at all levels within the EU, in the 
second pillar but also in the first, because as in the Balkans, first pillar instruments are used to 
implement decisions taken within the second pillar, but also because the Commission is 
responsible for long-term projects of economic assistance to the Mediterranean region.  As Muzu 
reminds us, it was actually in the context of EU Middle East policy that the boundaries between 
the EC and the EPC were broken down for the first time in the 1970s: the Euro-Arab Dialogue, 
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 for instance, had for the first time a special inter EPC-EEC working group, which reported to 
both the COREPER and the Political Committee of the EPC; this EPC procedural innovation 
was then institutionalized with the Amsterdam Treaty 20 years later259. 
Second, because of this convergence, the EU visibility has increased.  For instance, the 
budgetary assistance the EU has been providing to the Palestinian Authority has become crucial 
to the survival of the Palestinian Authority.   
Third, although the EU was able to develop through EPC and then CFSP a consensus on 
the major issues concerning the Middle-East conflict, this has not prevented some member-states 
to continue defining their own foreign policy when the EEC/EU position was not far-reaching 
enough for them.  Over the years however, these separate national proposals and endeavors have 
been more embedded within the European framework, through the work of the Presidencies, or 
more recently through the work of the High Representative.        
 Finally on a more theoretical note, the CFSP in the Middle East is definitely a system of 
governance, as we have seen that the EU takes and makes decisions in the area.  It seems 
however that this system of governance is a bit fuzzier than the one in the Balkans.  In the 
FYROM case, the balance of power was definitely shifting towards the High Representative and 
his team.  In the case of the Middle East, the balance is also shifting towards the Council, but 
within the Council there is more power going towards the DG CFSP that helps the Presidencies.  
In addition, the member-states, particularly the big ones, are more susceptible to get involved in 
the process.  The crisis analyzed in the case-study however shows that even when they launch a 
national initiative, it goes first to their EU colleagues who attempt to find a compromise.  The 
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 reason for a less high-profile involvement of the High Representative might be that when Solana 
came into office, the EPC/CFSP machinery had been well in placed since the late 1970s already.  
Solana’s position was thus added in the Middle East case on a previous institutional design that 
had already showed its worthiness.  In addition, when Solana took up his post, a Special 
Representative of the EU, Miguel Moratinos had already been in the region for three years, and 
had succeeded in building a network of contacts and being accepted not only by the parties of the 
conflict, but also by the member-states.  In addition, the Middle East shows another key variable 
in understanding the CFSP: the EU - be it represented by the High Representative, the Special 
Envoy, the Presidencies, or the member-states - always works in the shadow of the US, who is 
the real mediator in the region. 
 
4/ Some Preliminary Remarks about the Three Case-Studies 
 Before the general conclusions of the thesis, it seems appropriate, now that the three 
empirical cases have been presented, to dwell a bit in the CFSP governance system that was 
analyzed throughout the thesis.  More precisely, it seems particularly relevant to take each of the 
main actors – institutions, member-states, outside state – and make some generalizations about 
their positions in the second pillar.    
 
A. The High Representative   
There were fears when the post of High Representative was created in the Amsterdam 
Treaty that the member-states would designate somebody with a low profile and carrying no 
political authority.  The reality though has proven different.  Even though Solana’s task is very 
difficult (he cannot challenge the authority of the Council, nor of the presidency which is still 
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 responsible under the Treaty for the management of CFSP), he has succeeded in making the 
position of High Representative more than just a new Council’s Secretary General260.   
The choice to create such a position did not come from an empty background.  There 
were institutional precedents to a “Mr. CFSP.”  As Brian Crowe rightly writes, a policy [in 
Bosnia] the EU had: from the Cutilhero Plan through the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the 
Invincible Plan and the European Action Plan: the product of giving a leadership role to 
someone, mainly David Owen, to propose, persuade, negotiate, and implement, with the 
authority and ability to deal not only with the parties on behalf of the 12, but also within the 
Council to persuade member states of what was necessary.  In a lesser way and at a lower level 
the EU’s Special Envoys for the MEPP and Great Lakes illustrate the same point261.   The fact 
that member-states decided to anchor “Mr. CFSP” in the Council and make him wear a double 
hat (as High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary General of the Council) testifies to the 
fact that there were limits to what they were envisioning for the position.  In addition, as the 
institutional historical overview in chapter two made clear, the decision to combine the position 
of Mr. CFSP with the position of Secretary General of the Council was the result of a steady and 
continuous reinforcement of the Secretariat General of the Council since the early days of the 
EPC, as well as an attempt to improve the continuity of the EU foreign policy.  Finally, the new 
position was greatly dependent on how the member-states, especially the big ones were going to 
deal with the person appointed to the post.  The choice of Solana helped since the EU states were 
used to deal with him as NATO Secretary General.      
                                                 
260 Solana gained its acceptance by the member-states when he traveled to Ankara in December 1999 to persuade 
Turkey to accept the conclusions of the Helsinki Summit, which recognized Turkey as a candidate country, but did 
not fix a date to open accession negotiations. 
261 Crowe, Brian, op. cit., pg. 321 
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  Solana’s priorities when he came into office were first the development of the ESDP, 
second the Balkans, and third the Middle East.  The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 
gave him a mandate together with the Commission to ensure the coherency of EU policies 
towards the Balkans, to strengthen the impact of the EU contribution, and to enhance 
coordination with other actors.  In Solana’s own words one year after he was appointed High 
Representative, my objective is to use the post of High Representative to create new momentum 
within the CFSP.  We have to ensure that the EU provides a more coherent approach to the rest 
of the world.  The Council has to guarantee that the member states deliver on this262.  The 
approach towards the Balkans has indeed been more targeted and decisions have been delivered.  
As he goes on, there are plenty of smaller developments which taken together are beginning to 
add up to a sea change in the way the Union conducts its foreign policy, and in how it is 
perceived by the outside world.  Firstly, the role of the Union’s Special Representatives is being 
reappraised and enhanced.  They are a highly effective tool for projecting the policy of the 
Union in a particular region.  I am determined to use them to best effect.  Secondly, I have on 
behalf of the Presidency chaired meetings between the EU and third countries.  This is a small 
but important step, which will provide continuity across our relations with third countries.  
Thirdly, for the first time the Union was able to express itself as a single voice in the UN Security 
Council when I addressed a debate in June on the subject of the Balkans263.  […]  The High 
Representative operates within the framework of the Council, and over the last year much of my 
work has been determined by a number of specific mandates from the European Council.  The 
post fills an institutional vacuum, and sets in motion policies and activities in areas where the 
EU was previously either inactive, or irrelevant as an actor.  It can help to provide better focus 
                                                 
262 Solana, Javier, “Developments in CFSP Over the Past Year”, European Policy Center Commentary, October 12, 
2000 
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 for the Council, both internally within the Union, by helping to ensure greater coherence 
between members of the Council and other EU institutions, and externally with third countries 
and international organizations.  During my first year as holder of this post, I have seen at first 
hand a new willingness from all sides to promote the interests of the European Union264.  The 
two cases have shown that Solana has indeed succeeded, not only in being accepted by the 
member-states, but also in being given important tasks that have allowed him to reinforce the EU 
coherence and visibility.  Although his staff is still not comparable to that of a regular foreign 
affairs ministry, it is an improvement from the extremely limited resources that were given to the 
Council Secretariat in the Maastricht Treaty to deal with the second pillar.   
In the Balkans, Solana has become the point EU person.  In the Middle East, Solana has 
indeed increased the consistency and visibility of the EU, without yet being able to completely 
supplant the member-states. 
 
B. The Commission 
The appointment of a High Representative located within the Council Secretariat was met 
with a lot of resistance from the Santer Commission, who during the Amsterdam negotiations 
fought for increased power for the Commission in the second pillar.  This is the traditional 
reaction of a bureaucratic structure pursuing its own interests, with the purpose of increasing its 
power within the decision-making process.  It has constantly been the goal of the Commission 
throughout the three case-studies, from the early days of the CFSP in the Yugoslav wars to the 
Middle-East Peace Process and the management of classic bureaucratic politics argument, this 
leads to incessant competition among bureaucracies the Barcelona Process.  According to the for 
                                                                                                                                                             
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid. 
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 power, prestige, and position.  In addition these struggles lead the members of the bureaucratic 
structure to acquire a sense of belonging to the particular structure, which in turn influences the 
perceptions of the individual or to say it simpler, “where you stand depends upon where you sit”.  
The appointment of Solana corresponded with the appointment of a new Commission, after the 
resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999.  Although the new Commissioner for External 
Relations, Christopher Patten has enjoyed a great working and personal relation with Solana, 
mistrust is still palpable between the services of the Commission and those of the DG CFSP in 
the Secretariat of the Council.  In the Council Secretariat, there is a perception that the 
Commission is defensive about the potential loss of influence in external relations as the Council 
Secretariat builds up its institutional strength in this respect.  On the Commission’s side, 
concerns are being voiced about the dangers of duplication of tasks and expertise.  In an internal 
document of June 2000, Patten’s services accused Solana to have taken over tasks that should 
have been given to the Commission.  According to the document, the creation of the High 
Representative position led to new institutional complexities.  The Commission is very sensitive 
not to lose the competencies it has acquired in external relations and the emergence of this new 
political actor worries it265.  The Commission is particularly suffering from being understaffed – 
especially when one compares it to national foreign ministries.  The Secretariat General of the 
Council and Solana’s team do not have a big staff either, but they can rely on contacts and 
information from the member-states.  Indeed most of the people that have been placed around 
Mr. Solana are coming from national administrations and have thus access to national 
information.  In addition, the professional background of the people who have recently been 
hired to work in the new EU areas, such as ESDP, is a job in NATO or the WEU.  That 
                                                 
265 In addition, there is a certain jealousy among the Commission’s civil servants, because the Council’s civil 
servants with a grade A are paid more than the Commission civil servants with the same grade. 
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 sociological element creates a difference of culture that is making the Commission’s civil 
servants and the Council’s civil servants relationships difficult.  Most of the people working on 
CFSP/ESDP in the Secretariat General of the Council never had to deal with EU first pillar 
matters and are not very acquainted with them.  Their background is mainly on security and the 
Commission is just not part of their mental maps.  So they have some difficulty to integrate the 
Community matters in their daily work.   
However, both sides understand their mutual dependence, as both our cases have shown. 
Christiansen underlines that Commission-Council Secretariat cooperation here has some formal 
aspects, but is on the whole a question of informal contacts and ad hoc meetings to address 
specific issues.  Given the nature of the policy area, cooperation is to a large extent problem-
driven rather than process-driven, and has been most intensive in case of crises, in particular 
with respect to EU policy on the Balkans.  Either side professes a recognition of mutual 
dependence between the institutions266.  The Council Secretariat for instance is well aware of the 
expertise and resources of the Commission and knows the necessity of developing a well-
functioning working relationship to obtain what it wants.  The Commission possesses a network 
of delegations across the globe that allows it to gather information on the ground.  The Council is 
keen to have access to this information, as more than often, member-states are very protective of 
their own information.  In addition, the Commission also controls the “soft instruments” of 
foreign policy, such as humanitarian aid, technical assistance, and economic sanctions, to name a 
few.  The Commission on the other hand, recognizes that the Council has close contacts with 
member-states (for instance through the fact that a lot of the new civil servants working on CFSP 
in the Secretariat General of the Council are seconded national diplomats).  The Commission 
also appears to have given in to demands from the Council Secretariat that Solana be accorded a 
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 more senior status in the diplomatic protocol than Commissioner Patten, even though this breaks 
with past inter-service conventions.   
Another example of the way the Commission is reacting to the CFSP developments in the 
second pillar lies in the parallel development of the tasks of conflict prevention and conflict 
management in the Commission267.  As Antonio Missiroli notes, the new focus of the EU on 
conflict prevention and crisis management met a specific bureaucratic interest – that of the 
Commission, in whose remit fall many aspects of conflict prevention – and a contingent political 
interest: that of the forthcoming Swedish presidency of the Union, which saw in that an 
opportunity to play on its national strengths and to convey to its domestic public opinion a more 
acceptable and familiar image of CFSP/ESDP268.  It seems that as our cases study have shown, 
the EU is moving towards an institutional division of labor between the Council Secretariat with 
the High Representative at the center of the institution dealing with shorter term, diplomatic 
crisis on the one hand, and the Commission, with all the instruments at its disposal, dealing with 
long term involvement in the resolution of the crisis (the SAA in the FYROM case; the 
Barcelona Process in the MEPP case). 
                                                                                                                                                             
266 Christiansen, T. op. cit., pg 763 
267 In an April 2001 Communication (COM (2001) 211), the Commission developed conflict indicators in order to 
systematically evaluate risks in unstable countries.  The Commission’s work in conflict prevention was not easily 
acknowledged by the Council.  For instance, as an interviewee reminded me, in the preparation of the GAC of 28 
and 29 of January 2002, an annex was attached on conflict prevention (SI (2002) 57).  Even though its object 
concerned the Commission very much, the Commission itself was not mentioned.  The end result was however a 
double mention of the Commission’s work thanks to, among others, the help of The Netherlands.  The Commission 
was of course extremely keen in having its work recognized, as it did not want to establish a precedent.  The final 
text was the following: The Council underlined the importance of a coherent approach of conflict prevention and 
welcomed the action undertaken by the Commission in this field.  […]   This work should build upon information 
from relevant working groups and more detailed thematic, regional and sub-regional analyses by the Commission 
and the Council Secretariat, including the Policy Unit.  Where the conclusions read, the Council asked the Political 
and Security Committee to develop and monitor conflict prevention actions within the CFSP including ESDP and to 
make operational recommendations, the original draft added that the PSC would make recommendations […] 
including in the first pillar, which of course met with resistance from the Commission. 
 
268 Missiroli, Antonio, “Introduction”, in Missiroli, Antonio (eds.), Coherence for European Security Policy: 
Debates – Cases – Assessments, Occasional Paper – The Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, n. 27, June 2001, 
pg 6 
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 Formal mechanisms also exist that allow for greater coherence in the Council-
Commission relations in foreign policy.  First the new Troika, as set in the Amsterdam Treaty 
comprises the President of the Council, the Commission, and the High Representative.  This 
allows for a regular meeting place for the Commission and the Council Secretariat, even though 
the purpose of the troika is external representation and not internal cooperation.  In addition, the 
Commission is present in the Council working groups, including the PSC.  Even though its role 
in the working group is different from its role in the first pillar working groups in that it does not 
possess the monopoly of initiative, the Commission’s presence allows for exchange of 
information between the two institutions.   
Nevertheless, just as in other policy areas, informal networks are prominent in external 
relations and officials working in a specific area of CFSP within the Council are in daily 
telephone and e-mail contact with their counterparts in the Commission and vice-versa.  
Sometimes personalities clash and contacts suffer, as in every bureaucracy/organization.  In 
general though, informal contacts are effective in overcoming the physical distance between the 
institutions.  These personal contacts particularly when Commission and Council Secretariat are 
required to react collectively and quickly to a crisis in the area of foreign policy, as was the case 
in Macedonia.  They are also key to forge a coherent EU-level foreign policy, as instruments are 
still divided among the two institutions.   
  The Commission has thus succeeded in developing for itself, through its expertise of 
different dossiers (especially with very technical matters, humanitarian aid or with questions 
related to enlargement) and various instruments (Community funds and information from its 
network of delegations for instance), a parallel and important, but still secondary role to the High 
Representative, the PSC, and the Council.  It has made rather limited contributions to the CFSP 
176 
 per se269, focusing instead on areas where it knows it can increase its power through a 
comparative advantage that will be needed by the member-states and the Council’s Secretariat.  
The three case-studies have shown the dialectical relationship between Commission and Council, 
with the Commission indeed providing the material resources of the EU foreign policy in terms 
of expertise and soft foreign policy instruments. 
 
C. The Presidency 
Before the creation of the post of the High Representative, the management of the CFSP 
was carried out by the national foreign ministry of the country holding the six-month rotating 
Presidency.  A tendency nevertheless developed, to share some tasks with officials from the 
Council’s General Secretariat, in order to bring some continuity to the day-to-day activities of 
the CFSP.  Each Presidency was thus assisted, in the preparation of the Council meetings and the 
implementation of the decisions taken, by a separate unit of the Council’s Secretariat General, 
dealing exclusively with CFSP issues and part of the DG for External Relations.  The unit was -
still is - rather small and acts as some sort of a collective memory for the rotating presidencies.  It 
is staffed by European civil servants (who are supposed to act independently from their country 
of origin) and an equal number of national civil servants seconded to the unit, to avoid that it 
develops into an autonomous structure.   
                                                 
269 This attitude varies from one Commission to the other.  The Patten Relex DG is, as was mentioned in chapter 
five, a DG that is not looking to increase its power in CFSP, but is rather focused on increasing the effectiveness of 
the areas it already has under its control.  This is a reaction to two circumstances.  First, the resignation of the Santer 
Commission led the Prodi Commission to adopt a lower profile as a whole and focus on “cleaning the house.”  
Second, the memory of Delors’ idea to transform DG Relex into an EU foreign affairs ministry after the Maastricht 
Treaty came into force and the negative reaction of the member-states have made the following Commissions 
reluctant to use their joint right of initiative. 
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 Although the relationships between the High Representative and the Presidency were left 
ambiguous in the Amsterdam Treaty270 (thus leaving the Presidencies to learn how to use the 
High Representative for the benefit of the EU), most of the Presidencies since Solana came into 
office, gave him a large room of maneuver at least with regard to the Balkans and the Middle 
East.  In the Middle East, Presidencies still hold a lot of power (cfr. the Danish Presidency in the 
second half of 2002 and the Quartet Group) probably because the Middle East is an issue close to 
the heart of several member-states for historical reasons and of interests to all the member-states 
since 9/11.  Another reason lies in the fact that the Middle East question is also one of the key 
issues on the transatlantic agenda and different views about that relationship often prevents the 
policy to be completely “Europeanized”.  In the Balkans, Europeans and Americans have the 
same basic understanding of the future of the region and Americans are willing to let Europeans 
play a greater role.  
Competition is sometimes to be found within the Council Secretariat, between the DG 
CFSP/ESDP and Solana’s own team.  The DG CFSP is indeed the unit in charge of helping the 
work of the Presidency.  Although contacts are permanent between both groups, competition is 
reduced when a big member-state holds the presidency because larger state tend to rely more on 
their national resources and less on the EU-based resources such as the DG CFSP.  Small 
member-states make greater use of EU-based resources, which then increases the competition 
between both units to win the favors of the Presidency.     
                                                 
270 According to the Treaty, the High Representative shall “assist” the Presidency, while the Presidency “represents” 
the Union in matters concerning the CFSP and is responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under the 
CFSP. 
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D. The Member-States 
 Member-states still are at the core of the decision-making process with the European 
Council and the new GAERC defining the general orientations of the second pillar, and the PSC 
and the High Representative dealing with the more day-to-day work.  They are the actors who 
need to engineer the delegation to the European level.  In some areas, those covered by the 
dissertation, member-states have agreed to delegate a considerable amount of power to new 
institutions.  The Balkans case is one of the areas where it is now fair to speak of a true EU 
foreign policy, as envisioned in the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty.  In the Middle East, 
matters are less clear, but the evolution is there with an increased EU visibility and coherence 
and a constant declarative policy since the EPC.  Member-states such as France who used to 
launch in “unilateral” initiatives when the EEC/EU common denominator was below their own 
positions, are now embedded in an EU framework. 
The place of the member-states in the CFSP testifies to the paradox of the second pillar.  
On the one hand, policy and institutional learning, as well as path-dependency have led the 
member-states toward an increasingly EU centered foreign policy making; they are also required 
by the EU treaty not to prevent the formation or implementation of a collective policy (without 
however any mechanisms/institutions to sanction them if they do not).  On the other hand, 
member-states retain their sovereign rights since the second pillar is legally intergovernmental 
and there is no institution, such as the European Court of Justice in the first pillar that is able to 
force a member-state to adopt a common policy.  Thus, member-states have the option of dealing 
with any particular foreign policy issue unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally (through 
institutions such as the UN and NATO or through ad hoc coalitions), or through the EU.  In the 
case of the Balkans to a great extent and the Middle East to a lesser extent, a collective EU 
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 foreign and security policy has become defined by member-states policy elites as being intrinsic 
to the pursuit of their national interests, therefore allowing the delegation of power to EU-level 
institutions.       
  Of course there are still areas where the foreign policy of the member-states prevails and 
where member-states block the adoption of a common policy.  During the pre-war Iraq crisis in 
the spring of 2003, the EU was almost completely absent of the picture and the CFSP 
incapacitated, with the member-states pitched against each other271.  Although cases like this 
have and will happen, it is clear, as the dissertation has shown, that there is now a system of 
governance in CFSP that is well anchored in the EU and that might explain why even though the 
CFSP has gone through tremendous strains, such as the first Yugoslav Wars or the Iraq war, it 
has not disappeared.  Even at the height of the crisis, the EU CFSP and its many other important 
foreign policy issues, which predated the crisis have continued to occupy the EU and the 
member-states.   
Hill rightly points out that a dialectical relationship exists between the national instinct and 
the perceived need for solidarity.  It is evident partly when a foreign policy failure leads to 
renewed efforts at cooperation, but it occurs more subtly in the way that member-states diverge 
from each other within broad limits set by the tacit acceptance of common interests and 
outlooks272. 
With regard to the new Political and Security Committee, it is only step by step that this 
new Brussels-based institution is finding its place within the second pillar institutional 
framework.  Although the PSC is recognized in the Nice Treaty, it is not easy to know where it 
                                                 
271 It is however worth reminding that even during the crisis, the then Greek Presidency called for an emergency 
European Council meeting in February 2003 and succeeded in pulling together a declaration accepted by the fifteen 
member-states. 
272 Hill, Christopher, op. cit., pg. 30 
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 positions itself vis-à-vis other institutions.  Indeed, according to the Nice Treaty, ‘the Political 
and Security Committee will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP[…]’.  
However, it is relatively difficult to define what in foreign policy falls under the responsibility of 
the PSC and what falls under the responsibility of the Coreper, besides hard core military 
instruments.  Struggle has been happening between the Coreper and the PSC, both being in 
addition Brussels-based institutions.  The Coreper supervises all EU matters and prepares the 
Councils meeting, while the PSC is legally dealing strictly with foreign and security issues.  
However, this division of labor is difficult to maintain as such since numerous instruments of 
foreign policy are part of the first pillar.  In addition finances –non military related - are also part 
of the Community matters.  Bureaucratic politics is certainly visible here; particularly the PSC 
finds himself an advantage when one knows that Coreper meets the day before the PSC, thus 
sometimes having a tendency to revise what the Coreper has agreed on before the Councils 
meetings.  On the other hand, there is a feeling of seniority within the Coreper who thinks that 
the Ambassadors in the PSC are juniors, which does not always correspond to reality –although 
they could be considered junior to the extent that most of them are relatively new to the EU 
processes.  It sometimes happens that the Ambassadors on the Coreper and the PSC from a 
similar country end up defending a different position.  This of course also refers to a national 
problem among the diplomatic services within the national capitals.  Personalities also play an 
important role, some Ambassadors from the same country in the PSC and the Coreper getting 
along pretty well, other being really antonymous. 
Analysis of the role of Coreper in the first pillar273 have shown how this institution tasked 
to prepare the Councils of the EU meetings, as well as the European Councils, and thus 
                                                 
273 See for instance, Peterson, John and Shackleton, Michael (eds.), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002 
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 representing the member-states and composed of the national ambassadors to the EU, has 
developed a true “esprit de corps”, through a socialization effect.  Because Coreper is a Brussels-
based institution, the participant Ambassadors really know each other and are embedded in an 
EU framework, contrary to national delegates or foreign affairs ministers who are stationed in 
national capitals.  The PSC is also a Brussels-based institution and an esprit de corps is also 
developing there.  It is to that extent truly remarkable that the PSC was codified in the Nice 
Treaty, so quickly after it was set up in an interim fashion.  Indeed a number of member-states 
were not ready to see the political directors disappear completely in favor of the PSC.  This is 
understandable when one realizes that political directors were actually national civil servants 
based in foreign affairs ministries, who had been at the center of the EPC and CFSP up until 
2000.  As Andréani puts it, putting political directors at the core of CFSP decision-making 
reflected considerable ambivalence among member-states.  They were entrusting it to the 
officials in charge of formulating national foreign policies, who therefore had less stake in 
developing a common foreign policy than, say, a group of ambassadors in residence in Brussels.  
The latter, as can be seen in the NATO Council, tend to develop a collective ethos of their own, 
and often end up acting as representatives of their institution’s interests vis-à-vis their capitals, 
in a way political directors do not.  The choice of a high-level body in Brussels would mean a 
CFP that would begin to take influence away from capitals, and it is no surprise that its exact 
powers remain a contentious issue as a result274.   It is worth remembering also the lack of 
enthusiasm from the foreign affairs ministers (and less from the European Council) for the 
proposal to have the High Representative chair the new PSC.   
   
                                                 
274 Andréani, Gilles, op. cit., pg. 85 
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 E. The Transatlantic Relation 
 Although the US is not an intrinsic actor to the CFSP, the transatlantic relation is an 
important variable in understanding the EU second pillar, especially when the use of force might 
be included.  In the case of FYROM, although the EU did most of the diplomatic work, the US, 
through NATO was involved because it was clear early on that any peace keeping operation in 
the country would involve some elements of NATO because of the organization’s presence in 
neighboring Kosovo.  In the case of the Middle East, the US is the major actor in the region, not 
only through its link with Israel, but also because both sides of the conflict recognize that a peace 
agreement can only be guaranteed by the US.   
To that extent, as chapter two has shown, ESDP was as much the product of a genuine 
willingness from the EU member-states to be able to deal with a crisis in their own backyard, as 
it was an attempt to reinforce the transatlantic relationship, badly shaken during the first 
Yugoslav wars, as fundamental differences opposed both sides of the Atlantic.  The lesson 
learned from this episode was that to succeed in facing a crisis, both the US and Europeans had 
to work together.  It also seems that when the transatlantic relation is not an issue of contention 
among the member-states with regard to a particular foreign policy issue, a consensus among the 
EU states is easier to achieve.  Chapter two and the case-studies seem to point out to two 
generalizations about transatlantic relation and the development of an EU voice in international 
affairs.  First, the EU tends to act or at a minimum to define itself in re-action to US positions, 
i.e. elaborating positions to differentiate itself from US positions (if not with regard to long-term 
objectives, at least with regard to the means used to attain those objectives275.)  Second, with 
regard to the development of military capabilities at the EU level, this is done in close 
                                                 
275 See for instance both the EU attempt to define a European identity in the 1970s, as well as the EU Security 
Doctrine of 2003 
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 cooperation with the US, because ESDP needs both France and the UK to be credible, and thus a 
compromise is always to be found between those two states regarding their particular views of 
the transatlantic relationship and the role of NATO.    
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 CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS: EU Governance in the CFSP 
  
The dissertation has studied the decision-making processes of the EU CFSP since the 
changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999.  The central research question was to 
understand if the institutional changes introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty and afterwards in the 
decision-making process of the CFSP made a difference by progressively allowing member-
states to produce a more concerted foreign policy.  More explicitly, the dissertation evaluated the 
role of different actors in the EU foreign policy decision-making process and assessed the 
coherence of the process.  Today there are still legal characteristics that do not allow for such a 
coherent process.  The EU has no president to take decisions, only a Presidency of the Council 
who is little more than the manager of a multi-headed college that has to reach decisions by 
consensus.  The means for implementation are dispersed among the Commission for trade and 
aid, with political responsibility for foreign and security policy falling to a Presidency lasting 
only for six months.  Depending on the point of view, there is nobody consistently responsible 
for policy formulation or follow through or on the other hand, there are too many actors involved 
in the process.  Even though there is now a High Representative for the CFSP, he takes his 
mandate from the member-states and reports to them.  In short, the EU still seems de jure to lack 
leadership276.  The dissertation has shown that in reality, the Council Secretariat, in the form of 
Solana and of the DG CFSP has increasingly assumed the leadership role, more directly in the 
                                                 
276 In summary, the CFSP procedural decision regime might be defined as follow: 
- the European Council defines the overall principles of the CFSP and specifies the general guidelines for the 
common positions and the joint actions; 
- the Council of the EU takes the actual decisions necessary for the adoption and implementation of the common 
positions and joint actions; 
- the Presidency, assisted by the High Representative acts as the executive in the area of CFSP and represents the EU 
in issues related to the CFSP. 
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 Balkans, and more indirectly in the Middle East where the member-states still like to have their 
voice heard. 
To answer the research question, the thesis adopted a FPA approach, but a revised FPA 
approach to adapt the framework to the study of the foreign policy of a non-state actor.  To do 
just that, the dissertation combined FPA with EU integration institutionalist approaches.  The 
combination of these two approaches allowed for an analysis of the decision-making process of 
the CFSP.  While FPA was useful as a general framework to include the actors, instruments, and 
context of the foreign policy decisions, institutional approaches were needed to isolate the 
various actors intervening in the process and to understand their de facto roles.  
In these conclusions, I first go back to the case-studies to generalize the findings.  Then, I 
restate the argument for a revised FPA, to finally conclude with some brief remarks about the 
future of the CFSP in light of the constitutional treaty and the recent EU enlargement. 
 
1.  Generalizing the Empirical Findings 
Dave Allen has suggested that two cultures are competing for control of the EU’s foreign 
policy; one represents the desire to preserve national autonomy in foreign policy 
(institutionalized in the Council of the EU), while the other aims at creating a common foreign 
policy (institutionalized in the Commission.)  The possibilities of strengthening the EU’s 
performance in international relations while maintaining what is essentially an intergovernmental 
framework are considered limited.  However, even though most of the treaty’s changes happened 
within an intergovernmental framework, they seem to have gained a life of their own and created 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, the PSC is responsible for the preparation and implementation of the Council’s decisions in CFSP.  The 
PSC work is prepared in specialized working groups composed of national officials from the Permanent 
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 something that the realists could not have anticipated and that has make Allen’s two cultures less 
relevant.  Ironically, the new EU constitutional treaty brings the two branches of CFSP together 
by creating the post of EU Foreign Affairs Minister and locating it in the European Commission, 
as Vice-President of that institution.  In addition, one of the CFSP’s great under-utilized 
resources - the worldwide diplomatic network of EU representations abroad – will be put at the 
service of the EU and include officials from the Commission, the Council, and the member-
states277.   
 What the case-studies have shown is a gradual reinforcement of governance in the second 
pillar that was entitled transgovernmental and transinstitutional.  The reinforcement has 
occurred in two ways.  On the one hand, the member-states did not want CFSP to be totally 
different from the old EPC and thus wanted the process to remain essentially in their hands.  On 
the other hand, questions of efficiency and effectiveness have led them to strengthen and 
centralize the process in the hands of the Secretariat General of the Council of the EU.  By doing 
so, they have reinforced the capacity of the Council, not as the institution acting as a traditional 
Secretariat General as it used to, but as the locus of the CFSP/ESDP.  The Commission 
meanwhile raised its profile by proposing the use of various foreign policy instruments that are 
part of a longer term strategy to increase (or at least to not lose) its power in foreign policy. 
   The case-studies have also shown however that the process is still bifurcated, i.e. an 
understanding of collective action in CFSP must include the EU AND the national level.  
Member-states are indeed still key to an understanding of the CFSP, and this at two different 
levels in the process.  First, they are the ones who “formally” create the institutions and the 
decision-making processes, generally through intergovernmental conferences (IGC).  This first 
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 (“history-making” as Smith refers to it) step was not the focus of the dissertation, even though it 
mentioned in chapter two covering the historical evolution of the EU foreign policy.  The second 
level where member-states are also crucial variables in our understanding of the CFSP decision-
making processes is to be found in the actual policy implementation of the CFSP, first when 
states decide to delegate power to the EU-level and second when they agree to comply with the 
EU institutions’ decisions.  The process is thus not as one-sided as Smith is arguing.  In the case 
of Macedonia, the balance was definitely tilting towards the EU institutions of the first and 
second pillars, once the states gave a mandate to the High Representative to act.  In the Middle-
East case, the member-states delegated power more reluctantly to the High Representative, as 
they wanted to keep a higher profile in the region.  Transatlantic differences in the approaches 
were also more marked in that region than in the Balkans.    
 The empirical cases thus showed that a system of governance definitely exists in the 
second pillar and that some aspects of this governance are exercised at the EU-level.  It is a type 
of governance that will be familiar neither to students of the EU first pillar, nor to students of 
international relations, studying “traditional” inter-states cooperation.  Governance in the second 
pillar is confusing, because on the one hand, it does not make use of the decision-making 
processes and institutions to be found in the first pillar.  But on the other hand, it does not 
operate as a traditional intergovernmental system, such as those to be found in the UN or in 
bilateral relationships for instance.   
 Governance in the second pillar also cannot be understood if an external variable is not 
taken into consideration, mainly the “US factor”.  Ignoring external-EU variables has been a 
traditional criticism of EU integration theories.  However the analysis presented in this thesis has 
shown that a thorough understanding of the second pillar cannot be accomplished while ignoring 
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 the US.  Through NATO which represents the institutionalization of the US presence in Europe, 
the US has intimately been linked to the security of Europe.  The US is indeed a “European 
power” and even though it is willing to let the Europeans take a more active role in the Balkans, 
it is not willing to be completely left out of the picture, as the recent debates about the EU taking 
over for NATO in Bosnia have shown.  EU foreign policy decisions, especially those with 
military implications are closely watched by the US and usually taken in close cooperation with 
the US.  In the Balkans, the US has wanted since the first Yugoslav wars a pro-active EU.  
Because the crisis had military implications, the EU was not able to reconcile differences about 
which organization was best to get involved.  By the time of the Macedonian crisis, the EU had 
set up a new institutional framework to deal with foreign affairs crisis and had started to learn 
from its mistakes.  The action was mush more coherent, but still developed in close cooperation 
with the US (primarily in the case military coercion was needed).  Since the Yugoslav wars, the 
Balkans has thus become a much less contentious area of the transatlantic relationship, therefore 
allowing the EU to step in as a more unified actor. 
 In the Middle East case, the US is still the key actor, recognized by both sides as 
indispensable to a lasting peace in the region.  Middle East stability is also a key foreign policy 
goal for the US.  Because the region is considered a national vital interest to the US national 
security (be it analyzed from a realist, neo-liberal, or hegemonic stability theoretical 
perspective), the US is not ready to let the EU have a bigger political role in the region, while 
Israel is not willing to accept the EU has a honest pace broker party.  The EU has however 
increased its clout, by speaking with a more unified voice.  Ironically this unified voice was 
already present during the days of the EPC, nevertheless running in parallel with independent 
national actions.  This parallel diplomacy has receded since 1999, but has not completely 
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 disappeared, as member-states still like to have their voice heard, especially if it denotes a 
different view from that of the US.                 
2/ Foreign Policy Analysis Adapted 
The dissertation has shown that FPA is still a useful framework to understand foreign 
policy, even if foreign policy outcomes are the product not of states, but of a novel actor in 
international politics, the EU.  FPA has allowed to take into consideration the systemic context 
of the CFSP decision-making, the constant relationship between the three levels of analysis that 
are at the core of the CFSP (the national level through the member-states, the transgovernmental 
level through the Secretariat General of the Council, and the supranational level through the 
European Commission), the bureaucratic processes between EU institutions and within EU 
institutions, and the various instruments used within the framework of the second pillar.  
Studying foreign policy through the lenses of process approaches stresses that there are other 
factors in understanding foreign policy than structural factors related to the international system.  
Of course these are also important, but too often in international relations theories, the focus is 
only on those structural aspects and/or external factors, leaving aside the decision-making 
processes.    
That being said, FPA needed adaptation if it was to grasp the complex institutional design 
of the EU CFSP.  The adaptation put forward in the thesis was that FPA could be applied to the 
study of the EU foreign policy if it interacted with the EU institutionalist approaches that are 
well developed in the study of the first pillar.  This interaction was able i) to focus the analysis 
on the important role of various institutions (old and new) in the CFSP decision-making process; 
ii) to isolate processes such as the socialization taking place within the member-states and within 
the EU institutions.  The framework used in the thesis also had to be flexible i) to take into 
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 account the different decision-making processes over the areas of CFSP, in our case the Balkans 
and the Middle East; ii) to be able to integrate the changes that have occurred so quickly in the 
second pillar (and that will still occur once the new constitutional treaty enters into force); iii) to 
understand a multi-layered and less hierarchical decision-making process with numerous actors 
involved, the absence of a true leader in the process, the presence of transnational elements next 
to national foreign policies, and an formal agenda-setting actor that is changing rapidly (the six-
month rotating Presidency).  The thesis thus illuminated the usefulness of the dialogue between 
FPA and institutionalist approaches for an understanding of the EU foreign policy.  While FPA 
puts the emphasis on organizational processes, the institutionalist literature puts the emphasis on 
the specifics of the EU institutional framework.  
The thesis showed that EU institutions played a crucial role in the EU second pillar, as 
they do in the EU first pillar, even if those institutions have different roles and different 
respective importance in both pillars.  As Gilles Andréani writes, institutions matter for the EU 
in a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norm setting and 
institution-building.  Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and 
inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging.  Since the 1980s, each new step in 
European integration, each new common policy, has brought along its own set of institutional 
requirements: the single market stimulated the extension and the effective use of qualified 
majority voting; economic and monetary union, and the justice and home-affairs policies called 
for their own specific arrangements and bodies.  Defense will inevitably do the same, all the 
more so because the EU is currently devoid of any defense culture: only in a specialized 
institutional setting will such a culture hopefully be imported into, and solidify278.  To summarize 
the findings of the thesis, the CFSP process identified through the case-studies starts when an 
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 intergovernmental bargain occurs over the establishment and general development of the foreign 
policy in a specific area.  From this initial step, flows some transgovernmental governance 
among foreign ministers, PSC Ambassadors, and other foreign policy specialists, helped in their 
endeavor by the authority of the High Representative.  Also to be singled out is the increased 
involvement in some areas of the CFSP of the Commission and its technical expertise.  Finally 
the result is a fairly coherent policy process that has increasingly been linked to the policies and 
procedures of the first pillar both in the Balkans and the Middle East.  
Institutionalization was in addition shown to matter in that it establishes strong 
socializing pressures on the part of those participating, both within the formal structures and 
within the more informal processes and procedures that surround them, such as everyday 
interactions between the Secretariat General of the Council and the Commission, despite mutual 
mistrust of the bureaucratic structure.  Such pressures can be resisted, if for instance national 
interests are too strong.  However, in other areas, the institutionalization has led to a more 
effective and visible foreign policy at the EU-level, after a long and slow path of integration. 
This socialization is best understood through a dialogue between institutionalist 
approaches and constructivist approaches and further research needs to be conducted in that 
realm.  Lets look at the Council for instance, the key institution of the CFSP279.  From an 
intergovernmental perspective, the Council is the locus of intergovernmental bargains where 
member-states come with their national position and, adopting a rational choice perspective, 
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 attempt to gain the most out of the negotiations280.  However, as Lewis notes, this image remains 
incomplete and partial.  In particular, models of EU decision-making need to allow for the 
possibility where sociability and the density of the normative environments can affect bargaining 
outcomes by constructing interests and identities in the first place.  […]  where the 
intergovernmentalist image emphasizes individual strategic rationality and the asymmetrical 
advantages of relative power, the sociological institutional image stresses collective, 
communicative rationality and a culture of compromise where the reflex to behave consensually 
has become more instinct than ideal281.  What the study has demonstrated is that even in some 
areas of foreign policy, such a logic can be seen operating.  It was shown for instance how 
through even the EPC, member-states positions became more unified on the question of the 
Middle East.  These developments in CFSP, although not using the traditional “Community 
method” seem far too ambitiously collective to still be labeled intergovernmental.  The 
constructivism in the making in CFSP might not yet be extremely thick, but it is clear that there 
is now a European level in foreign policy, created by the interactions among the member-states.  
This new European layer might not yet consistently shape the behavior of individual states but it 
has clearly imposed some constraints on the substance and the process of foreign policy making 
in the individual member-states.  Winn and Lord point to the right questions: at what point, for 
example, does it cease to be analytically plausible to treat a working party of national officials 
as a series of loyal delegates of their governments? At what point does such a body become 
indistinguishable from a supranational body?  When it starts to take a lead in forming 
preferences?  When it becomes costly for political principals to monitor every move taken by the 
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 working party? 282  These questions again point to a decision-making regime that is not purely 
intergovernmental anymore and will become increasingly relevant over the years of 
implementation of the CFSP decision-making.   
Institutions may in addition make cooperation possible by facilitating an agreement 
among the member-states, but if the interests are too divergent, then institutions in foreign policy 
will be of no use, since they cannot create a common interest.  The changes brought to the 
institutional design and decision-making process of the CFSP were every time intended to 
rationalize the process, to facilitate the exchange of views among member-states, to facilitate 
common analyzes, and to provide the means to cooperate if common interests exist or can be 
forged.  The new institutional design was successful in achieving this goal in the case of 
Macedonia and less so (in its implementation) in the case of the MEPP.  
The empirical cases covered the EU and the Balkans as well as the EU CFSP in the 
Middle East.  More precisely, the EU CFSP during the first Yugoslav Wars and during the 2001 
crisis in FYROM was analyzed, as well as the role of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process 
during the second Intifada started at the end of 2000.  In the FYROM case, the key EU actors 
were Solana and Patten, while in the Middle East, the key EU actors were Solana and the EU 
Presidencies.  In both cases, the transatlantic relationship was taken into consideration and the 
analysis revealed that it was a more important variable in the Middle East case.  
 
This CFSP decision-making regime was shown to be adequately grasped with the notion 
of governance, which implies a less hierarchical decision-making process and puts the emphasis 
on more informal decision-making, while at the same time allowing for policies to be elaborated 
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 and implemented.  More precisely, I have conceptualized the EU foreign policy decision-making 
by using the notion of transgovernmental/transinstitutional system of governance as the 
overarching concept.  Transgovernmental was intended to grasp the continuous involvement of 
member-states in the CFSP, but at another level than the traditional intergovernmental level 
traditionally associated with the EU second pillar, visible for instance in the esprit de corps 
developed in the Brussels-based PSC.  Transgovernmental was also intended to grasp the 
involvement of lower-level national civil servants in the CFSP working groups, rather than 
higher level politicians.  Transinstitutional was deemed useful to understand the involvement of 
various EU institutions in the process, as well as the interactions within each institution.   
   
3/ Final Remarks - Looking into the Future  
Even though the EU still does not have a fully-formed foreign policy, it does have a 
system of governance in CFSP that has, over the years, converged towards EU institutions and 
away from national capitals.  What will the consequences of the May 2004 enlargement be on 
this peculiar system of governance? 
During the accession negotiations, most Central and Eastern European countries did not 
have problems to accept the acquis politique of the EU.  During the Constitutional Convention, 
the appointment of an EU foreign minister or the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the treaty 
were generally acceptable to them, while some newcomers had reservations about the extension 
of QMV or the transformation of the EU into a military alliance.  The 2004 enlargement will 
probably reinforce the central place of the Secretariat General of the Council in the EU CFSP, as 
new members will have to rely on it because of their lack of experience in dealing with the EU 
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 machinery.  If the Constitution is however ratified, the EU will have a single person playing the 
role of both foreign affairs minister and Commission Vice-President, an arrangement that will 
reinforce the bi-furcated system of governance identified in the thesis, while hopefully better 
streamlining its resources, rather than making it dependent on personality’s compatibility.  
------------------------------------------------ 
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 APPENDICES 
1/ Provisions on CFSP in the Nice Treaty 
2/ The Formal Decision-making Process in the Second Pillar 
 
 Appendix A: The Provisions on CFSP in the Nice Treaty - Title V  
Article 11 (ex Article J.1) 
The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all 
areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: 
to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 
to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles 
of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; 
to promote international cooperation; 
—  to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. 
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the 
Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. 
The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. 
 
Article 12 (ex Article J.2) 
 
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by: 
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy; 
deciding on common strategies; 
adopting joint actions; 
adopting common positions; 
strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy. 
 
 
Article 13 (ex Article J.3) 
 
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defense implications. 
 
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the 
Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made 
available by the Union and the Member States. 
 
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the 
common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the 
European Council. 
 
 The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall 
implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions. 
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. 
 
Article 14 (ex Article J.4) 
 
1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations 
where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down 
their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their 
duration, and the conditions for their implementation. 
 
2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to 
joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take 
the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand. 
 
3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the 
conduct of their activity. 
 
4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals 
relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a 
joint action. 
 
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant 
to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior 
consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not 
apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions. 
 
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council 
decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having 
regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall 
inform the Council immediately of any such measures. 
 
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State 
shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. 
Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its 
effectiveness. 
 
Article 15 (ex Article J.5) 
 
The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach 
of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States 
shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions. 
 
Article 16 (ex Article J.6)  
 
 
 Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of 
foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union’s 
influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent 
action. 
 
Article 17 (ex Article J.7) 
 
1.   The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the 
security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, 
which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide. It shall 
in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect 
the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be 
compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that 
framework. 
The progressive framing of a common defense policy will be supported, as Member 
States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments. 
2.   Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. 
3.   Decisions having defense implications dealt with under this Article shall be taken 
without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, second 
subparagraph. 
4.   The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation 
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western 
European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to 
or impede that provided for in this Title. 
5.   With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article 
will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48. 
 
Article 18 (ex Article J.8) 
1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common 
foreign and security policy. 
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under 
this Title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in 
international organizations and international conferences. 
 
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall 
exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy. 
 
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to 
hold the Presidency. 
 
  
5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with 
a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. 
 
Article 19 (ex Article J.9)  
 
1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.  
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member 
States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 
 
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in 
international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States 
participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.  
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are 
permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, 
ensure the defense of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to 
their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
 
Article 20 (ex Article J.10) 
 
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission 
Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to 
international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and 
joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.  
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments 
and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
 
 
Article 21 (ex Article J.11) 
 
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic 
choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the 
European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be 
kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the 
Union’s foreign and security policy. 
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to 
it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and 
security policy. 
 
Article 22 (ex Article J.12) 
 
1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating 
to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council. 
 
  
2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request 
of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting 
within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period. 
 
Article 23 (ex Article J.13) 
 
1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. 
Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption 
of such decisions.  
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by 
making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be 
obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a 
spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action 
likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other 
Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their 
abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance 
with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision 
shall not be adopted. 
 
By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified 
majority: 
- when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis 
of a common strategy;  
- when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position 
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5). 
 
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a 
vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the 
matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.  
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 
205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions 
shall require at least 62 votes in favor, cast by at least 10 members. This paragraph shall 
not apply to decisions having military or defense implications...  
 
 
3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.  
 
Article 24 (ex Article J.14) 
 
1. When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international 
organizations in implementation of this Title, the Council may authorize the Presidency, 
assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such 
agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency. 
 
 
 2. The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal decisions. 
 
3. When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or common 
position, the Council shall act by a qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2). 
 
4. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI. When 
the agreement covers an issue for which a qualified majority is required for the adoption 
of internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a qualified majority in 
accordance with Article 34(3). 
 
5. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council 
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the 
other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply 
provisionally. 
 
6. Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be binding on 
the institutions of the Union. 
 
Article 25 (ex Article J.15)  
 
Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a 
Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas 
covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of 
policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own 
initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to 
the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. 
Within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of 
the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. The 
Council may authorize the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis 
management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions 
concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation, without prejudice 
to Article 47. 
 
 
Article 26 (ex Article J.16)  
 
The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the 
common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the 
formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate 
and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting 
political dialogue with third parties. 
 
Article 27 (ex Article J.17) 
 
 
 The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common 
foreign and security policy field. 
 
Article 27a 
 
1. Enhanced cooperation in any of the areas referred to in this Title shall be aimed at 
safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its 
identity as a coherent force on the international scene. It shall respect: 
- the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign 
and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy; 
- the powers of the European Community, and 
- consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities. 
 
2. Articles 11 to 27 and Articles 27b to 28 shall apply to the enhanced cooperation 
provided for in this Article, save as otherwise provided in Article 27c and Articles 43 to 
45. 
 
Article 27b 
 
Enhanced cooperation pursuant to this Title shall relate to implementation of a joint 
action or a common position. It shall not relate to matters having military or defense 
implications. 
 
Article 27c 
 
Member States which intend to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves 
under Article 27b shall address a request to the Council to that effect. 
The request shall be forwarded to the Commission and to the European Parliament for 
information. The Commission shall give its opinion particularly on whether the enhanced 
cooperation proposed is consistent with Union policies. Authorization shall be granted by 
the Council, acting in accordance with the second and third subparagraphs of Article 
23(2) and in compliance with Articles 43 to 45. 
 
 
 
Article 27d 
 
Without prejudice to the powers of the Presidency or of the Commission, the Secretary-
General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, 
shall in particular ensure that the European Parliament and all members of the Council 
are kept fully informed of the implementation of enhanced cooperation in the field of the 
common foreign and security policy. 
 
Article 27e 
Any Member State which wishes to participate in enhanced cooperation established in 
accordance with Article 27c shall notify its intention to the Council and inform the 
 
 Commission. The Commission shall give an opinion to the Council within three months 
of the date of receipt of that notification. Within four months of the date of receipt of that 
notification, the Council shall take a decision on the request and on such specific 
arrangements as it may deem necessary. The decision shall be deemed to be taken unless 
the Council, acting by a qualified majority within the same period, decides to hold it in 
abeyance; in that case, the Council shall state the reasons for its decision and set a 
deadline for re-examining it. 
 
For the purposes of this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority. The 
qualified majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the weighted votes and the 
same proportion of the number of the members of the Council concerned as those laid 
down in the third subparagraph of Article 23(2). 
 
Article 28 (ex Article J.18) 
 
1. Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the 
areas referred to in this Title.  
 
2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this 
Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European 
Communities.  
 
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise 
shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such 
expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications and cases 
where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.  
In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it 
shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product 
scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure 
arising from operations having military or defense implications, Member States whose 
representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), 
second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.  
 
4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European 
Communities. 
 
Article 207(2): 
2. The Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat, under the responsibility of a 
Secretary-General, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, who 
shall be assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General responsible for the running of the 
General Secretariat. The Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General shall be 
appointed by the Council, acting by a qualified majority. 
The Council shall decide on the organization of the General Secretariat. 
 
 
  
Declaration on the European security and defense policy 
 
In accordance with the texts approved by the European Council in Nice concerning the 
European security and defense policy (Presidency report and Annexes), the objective for 
the European Union is for that policy to become operational quickly. A decision to that 
end will be taken by the European Council as soon as possible in 2001 and no later than 
at its meeting in Laeken/Brussels, on the basis of the existing provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union. Consequently, the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice does not 
constitute a precondition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix B: The Formal Decision-Making Process in the Second Pillar 
Decision-Making 
European Council 
?     
Council of the EU     Representation/Implementation 
?---------------------------------------------- Presidency    
Coreper  / PSC    ? 
?      Secretary General of the Council 
Council Working Groups   ? 
      Special Representatives 
 
COMMISSION is associated at all levels and has a joint right of initiative. 
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